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Abstract
This thesis examines the effects that containerisation had on the growth in world
trade between the years 1962 and 1990. Containerisation is a technological change that
arises from shipping goods via containers rather than through the traditional break-bulk
method which characterised international shipping since antiquity. This thesis makes
many contributions to the literature. This is the first quantitative and econometric
study into the effects of containerisation in economics. We collect data from a specialist
business publication and construct container variables which are used for the first time
in economics. We also use a scientific classification from 1968 to classify products as
containerisable or non-containerisable. Another contribution is that the econometric
models employed in this thesis allow for a ”horse race” between the technology variable
and the policy variables: free trade agreements, General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade (GATT) membership and currency unions. We make use of the cross-sectional
and time series variation available to us in the adoption of the technology across 157
countries to identify the effects of containerisation on world trade. We employ several
specifications and try different trade flow dimensions to pin down the right way to
model containerisation. In doing so, we deal with several econometric problems that
arise in similar econometric studies such as omitted variable bias and endogeneity bias.
The effects of containerisation are felt 10 to 15 years after bilateral adoption of the
technology. We estimate that containerisation led to an increase of 380% in North-
North containerisable trade 10 to 15 years later. We find no evidence for endogeneity
in this specification and we can be confident to make a causal statement. We also find
evidence that containerisation affected North-South trade the most, followed by North-
North and then South-South containerisable trade although we cannot be as confident
about making causal statements in the case of North-South and South-South trade.
The evidence is however suggestive of strong effects on containerisable trade in the two
subsamples. In all cases, the effects of containerisable are found to be multiple times the
size of the effects of the individual policy variables - 2 to 10 times as large depending
on the subsample and the variable in question.
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”Born of the need to reduce labour, time and handling, containerisation links
the manufacturer or producer with the ultimate consumer or customer. By
eliminating as many as 12 separate handlings, containers minimise cargo
loss or damage; speed delivery; reduce overall expenditure”1
After World War II, world trade has grown to unprecedented levels. This is some-
times referred to as the second era of globalisation. Between 1948 and 1993, world trade
has grown by an average of 150% annually in nominal terms. In real terms, world trade
has grown by an average of around 21% annually between 1962 and 1990. According to
Krugman (1995), economists and journalists have differed in opinion as to why trade has
grown so much. The first group relate this growth mainly to bilateral and multilateral
trade liberalisations while the second group maintains that it was led by technologi-
cal advances in transport, logistics, and communication. Many economic studies have
emphasized the role of trade liberalisation in advancing world trade and globalisation.
While many other studies explored the effects of the switch from sail to steam and the
introduction of the railway/steam train in the first globalisation era, very few economics
studies exist that look at the role of technological progress in the second globalisation
era which is characterised by the introduction of the container in shipping in the 1960s
and 1970s and cheap air cargo in the 1990s.
This PhD thesis examines the effects that containerisation had on the growth in world
trade. Containerisation is a technological change that arises from shipping goods via
containers rather than through the traditional break-bulk method which characterised
1Containerisation International Yearbook 1970, page 19
1
international shipping since antiquity. This thesis makes a few contributions. Although
there is plenty of qualitative and case study evidence suggesting that containerisation
stimulated international trade, we are not aware of any direct quantitative evidence of
the effects of containerisation on world trade. This is the first attempt to study the
effects of containerisation on international trade quantitatively and econometrically.
The few studies that aim to quantify the effects of containerisation have primarily
focused on the effects of port-to-port transportation costs after countries’ adoption of
container technology. However, the transportation literature stresses that the main re-
source savings from containerisation stem from the container-induced overhaul of the
transportation system that eliminated as many as a dozen different handlings and linked
the producer more directly with the customer. There are qualitative aspects of container-
isation - like the creation of new container ports- that the above-mentioned studies do
not capture. Other aspects include time savings, volume effects (scale), the reduction
of pilferage, port efficiencies, and reduction in labour union powers, and the induction
of the hub and spoke systems.
The subject of this research lies at the crossroads of two major streams of research.
One delves into the impacts of changes in transportation technology. Containerisation
is actually only one of many technological changes that have hit the shipping industry
in the past two centuries. The switch from sail to steam in the 19th century (Harley
(1973)) coupled with the proliferation of railways (Hurd (1975)) led to radical changes
in the industry. The resulting decline in freight rates encouraged significant increases in
world trade (Mohammed and Williamson (2003)). This research investigates whether
containerisation had a similar impact on trade. Evidence of a similar decline in freight
rates after World War II (WWII) seems to be lacking. Some scholars doubt that ocean
freight costs have fallen very much since the middle of the twentieth century (Hummels
(1999, 2007)). The second line of research which this research pertains to is the trade
costs literature. This literature is mainly concerned with estimating the effects of re-
ductions in trade costs on trade. Traditionally, the literature aimed to do this using
gravity equations. We review the relevant literature in Chapter 3 of this thesis. We also
present some background reading into the development of containerisation in Chapter
2. This is necessary as will become clear later because part of the analysis in this thesis
is driven by the narrative.
2
A major contribution of this research is the collection of and use of data that has not
been used in the economics literature before. This is presented in Chapter 4. We collect
information on the countries’ first adoption of containerisation from a specialist trans-
port publication, Containerisation International Yearbook. Different countries adopt
the container at different points in time. We view containerisation as a technological
change manifested by countries’ first handling of containers. Contrary to popular belief,
containerisation was not exclusive to ports. In fact, containerisation is a comprehen-
sive intermodal goods transportation system. The container can be shipped by sea on
a containership, travel on a wagon inland by rail, and/or be pulled on a trailer by a
truck. The data we collect encompasses two of the three modes of transport - ports and
rail2. We have no information about containerisation on the road. This may introduce
measurement error in our variable.
We exploit the time series and cross-sectional variation in the adoption of the tech-
nology in 157 countries in ports and rail as an identification strategy for estimating
the effects of containerisation on bilateral trade. Based on the data we collect, we find
that the introduction of container ports - outside the innovation country of the US -
occurred exclusively between 1966 and 1983. From this data, we construct qualitative
variables of containerisation for a panel of 157 countries and examine the impacts of
containerisation on world trade during 1962-1990, which could be viewed as the period
of global container adoption. We capture containerisation as a country specific qualita-
tive variable that switches from 0 to 1 when a country starts containerisation either in
ports or rail. Furthermore, we use a scientific product classification on the containeris-
ability or suitability of shipping products in containers. This classification is based on
the physical characteristics of the SITC 4-digit products in 1968. Products classified
as suitable for containers in 1968 did not require any adjustments and could be readily
transported in containers. Based on this classification, we also construct a 1-digit SITC
product containerisability classification. We use the containerisability classifications is
2Air cargo transport was not widespread at the time of containerisation (Hummels (1999) and Harri-
gan (2010)). For the UK, between 1965 and 1979, 99% of total trade was transported by sea (Author’s
own computations based on data from National Ports Council). According to the UK department of
transport, about 95% of international freight by weight was transported by sea in 2006, compared with
only 0.5% by air (and the rest by the Channel Tunnel). According to the OECD (Korinek and Sourdin
(2009)), ninety percent of merchandise trade by volume was transported by ship in 2007. The share of
transport by ship could only have been higher in the period 1962-1990. Therefore, one can conclude that
the only modes of transport that mattered at the time were sea and land transports. See also Hummels
(2007).
3
our analysis in ensuing chapters.
We start our empirical exercise to identify the effects of containerisation on the ag-
gregate bilateral trade flows in Chapter 5. In line with the literature that attempts to
explain and predict trade flows, we start from a gravity model with the constructed
container variables to estimate the effects of containerisation on the aggregate bilateral
trade flows during the years 1962-1990. We estimate a traditional gravity equation in
which we introduce the exporter- and importer-year varying container variables while
controlling for country-pair and time FE. We find evidence for a strong economic and
statistically significant effect for the adoption of containerisation by the origin and des-
tination countries on bilateral aggregate trade flows in this specification. The structural
gravity equation derived by Anderson and van Wincoop (2003) suggested that the esti-
mates in this specification suffer from omitted variable bias since it fails to control for
multilateral resistances or price terms which are in-turn functions of trade costs3. The
inclusion of country-time effects allows us to capture multilateral resistance identified
by the structural gravity literature and other time-varying factors that might be cor-
related with countries’ decisions to invest in container ports. Since the country-time
effects are collinear with the opening of container port facilities, we can only estimate
the effects of containerisation when origin and destination country both containerise.
Hence, containerisation in a bilateral trading relationship occurs when both the origin
and destination countries have containerised. Also, to allow the regressions to run, we
choose time points in the panel that are 5 years apart. This has the advantage of al-
lowing some time for trade to adjust to containerisation. We estimate both a FE model
and a first-differenced model. We argue that the first-differenced model has many ben-
efits over the FE model. When estimating the models with the country-time effects, we
find no effect for containerisation on the aggregate trade flows. However, we capture
an effect for containerisation on manufacturing trade. This could be explained by the
fact that not all products can be moved in containers. Also, containerisation is likely
to have affected different products differently and hence aggregation may introduce bias
(Anderson (2011)).
3Anderson and van Wincoop (2003) define multilateral resistances as the average barrier of two
countries to trade with all their partners.
4
In Chapter 6, we suggest a product level or commodity estimation specification.
Since we argue that not all trade can be moved in containers, we use the product con-
tainerisability classification described earlier to restrict our sample to products that were
readily containerisable in 1968. We argue that these products did not require adjust-
ments to be transported in containers and could be readily transported in containers
whereas all other products may include products that became containerisable later on or
that are sometimes strongly affected by containerisation because their intermediate in-
puts are containerisable. Causal statements are therefore clearer for containerised prod-
ucts. The panel nature of our data enables us to apply empirical models of treatments
effects (Wooldridge (2010)) which have also been recently exploited in estimates of the
effects of Free Trade Agreements (FTAs) on bilateral trade flows (Baier and Bergstrand
(2007)). We decide to first-difference the data to allow the regressions to run given the
size of the data set and we argue that a first-differenced model would be most suitable
to identify and capture the effects of containerisation. The first differencing of the data
also takes care of difficult to measure geographic factors, like government desires to act
as container port hubs. The inclusion of exporter- and importer-time effects allows us to
capture multilateral resistance identified by the structural gravity literature and other
time-varying factors that might be correlated with countries’ decisions to invest in con-
tainer ports. Identification of the effects of containerisation therefore comes from the
treatment of trade flows of the containerised pairs, controlling for any common changes
in trade volumes that occurs for the exporting country with all its other importing
countries, as well common changes to trade flows for the importing country with all
remaining countries. We estimate that containerisation had large effects on container-
isable trade. We also find that the effects of containerisation do not differ according to
the level of product disaggregation. We consider full containerisation (ports and rail)
and port containerisation only and find that estimates for the effects of full container-
isation are higher than port containerisation. Another contribution of this research is
that the nature of the estimated equations allows for a ”horse race” between the tech-
nology variable and the policy or institutional variables. The effect of containerisation
on trade in containerisable products at the 1- and 4-digit levels is estimated to be at
least two-times of the effect of trade policy liberalisation, depending on the measure
of trade policy being considered. When restricting the sample to explore heterogeneity
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in results, containerisation is estimated to have affected North-South trade the most,
then South-South trade, and then North-North trade the least4. The narrative tells us
that North countries were first to containerise and we argue that our container vari-
able is likely to capture containerisation on the 3 modes of transportation (ports, rail
and roads). Measurement error is therefore minimised in the case of North countries.
Causal relationship is therefore clearer for North-North countries as we argue although
the strong results are suggestive of a causal relationship in the case of North-South and
South-South trade. We explore this further in chapter 7.
The nature of the empirical specification devised in chapter 6 allows us to examine
whether the effects of containerisation decay or increase over time, or whether they
precede the opening of the first container port in that bilateral pair. This is done
in chapter 7 by including lagged and lead terms of the treatment variables. As per
Wooldridge (2010), including a future level (lead) variable serves as a test for strict
exogeneity. We find containerisation had contemporaneous as well as lagged effects on
containerisable trade. This suggests that containerisation effects could be felt 10 to 15
years after the adoption of the technology. The estimated cumulative container effects
are 6 to 10 times the estimated cumulative effects of the policy variables depending on
the policy variable in question. Here too, we draw on the narrative to motivate our
analysis. The narrative suggests that North countries were first to containerise. This
means that any pre-container effects should not be there on our estimation for North-
North trade. Also, as we discussed above, measurement errors are likely to be minimal
in the case of North countries. This suggests that we should not have a lead effect for
the container variable. We test for this in the sample of North-North countries. We find
no evidence for a feedback effect (pre-container effect) in the sample of North countries
- the early containerisers - which suggests that we can be confident about the causal
relationship between containerisation and containerisable trade in this sample. This is
not the case for the samples of North-South and South-South trade where we estimate a
positive and significant coefficient of the lead container variable although the estimates
are relatively small. The estimates for North-South and South-South trade are therefore
suggestive of the direction of causation although we cannot be as confident about making
4North countries are all OECD countries up to 1990 minus Turkey. South countries are all other
countries.
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a causal statement as we are for North countries. Judging by the cumulative effects of
the container coefficients, we find that North-South trade was affected the most followed
by North-North and then South-South trade.
Just like policy variables, containerisation may be endogenous to world trade in that
countries may choose to containerise because of their existing trade patterns. The issue
of potential endogeneity of containerisation in explaining world trade flows is dealt with
in different ways in this thesis. In chapter 5, we deal with endogeneity by including
county-time and country-pair FE which solves for endogeneity coming from omitted
variable bias. We also restrict the sample to sub-samples where endogeneity is less of
a concern such as removing the top 5 trade partners of each country. In chapter 6,
we take this one step further by dealing with another possible source of endogeneity
which is measurement error. We argue that measurement error is likely to be minimal
in the case of North-North countries since they are the countries that introduced and
developed the technology first. In chapter 7, where we discuss the long term effects of
containerisation, we make use of including lead terms along with the lag terms which
serves as a test for strict exogeneity.
The thesis is thus divided into 6 core chapters (other than the introduction and
conclusion). Chapter 2 explores the background of the container since the economic
analysis in the rest of the thesis is driven by the narrative as will become clear. Chapter
3 sets the motivation, the research question, and the relevant literature. In Chapter
4, we describe the data on containerisation. We then construct our measure for con-
tainerisation to be used in the remainder of the thesis. Chapter 5 looks to identify the
effects of containerisation on the bilateral aggregate trade flows. Chapter 6 introduces
a product dimension to the identification specification. Finally, Chapter 7 investigates
whether the effects of containerisation persist, increase, or decay over time.
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Chapter 2
A Historical Narrative of the
Container
2.1 Introduction: Containerisation and World Trade
Before the container, loading and oﬄoading ships was still as labour intensive as it used
to be in the times of the Phoenicians. Transporting goods was expensive that it did not
make economic sense to ship many things halfway across the United States much less
halfway around the world. In the 1960’s, the first container ship made its way across
the Atlantic from New York to Europe. With that, the container revolution was set to
start.
According to Donovan and Bonney (2006) in their illustrative book, containerisation
”changed the industry’s economics as drastically as the switch from sail to steam had
done a century ago”. Hence, containerisation is the biggest change to hit shipping since
the switch from sail to steam propulsion a century earlier. Before the container, world
trade was concentrated in basic commodities such as fuel, grain, and metal ores. But
now anything from socks to machine parts is being traded and transported by ship.
The container made it possible to manufacture the good where it is cheapest to do so
and to transport it to world markets. It is no secret that Wal-Mart, the largest US
importer of containerised good, is able to operate an efficient supply chain, the in-time
delivery system, thanks to containerisation. Many retailers copied the Wal-Mart system
successfully. The role of containerisation in our global economy was put to a test in 2002,
when a strike by the International Longshore and Warehouse Union (ILWU) closed US
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Coast ports for 10 days. The shutdown of ports was almost immediately visible, resulting
in empty store shelves and idle assembly lines 1.
Containerisation did not only change shipping as we know it but also helped redraw
the global maritime map. Traditional maritime centres such as New York, Liverpool,
and London saw their docks decline into obsolescence. The congested docks of these
metropolitans were not suited to handle containers and the berths were not deep enough.
New ports were needed. Massive ports were built in Rotterdam, Busan, Singapore, and
Shanghai among others. In the UK, Felixstowe, unheard of before the container wave,
became the UK’s busiest container port.
The container also changed the local economic picture. For centuries, manufacturers
clustered near the docks for easier delivery of raw materials and faster shipment of
finished goods. This was evident around the London Docks and the Port of New York
which were host to major manufacturing bases. With containerisation came the ease of
transfer of the container between the ship and land modes of transport. Manufacturers
no longer found it necessary to locate near a port or close to their customers. They could
locate to distant locations where they could operate more cheaply. The London docks
as well as the Port of New York lost their manufacturing bases as a result to inland and
overseas locations2.
Also entire communities changed beyond recognition. It was clear from the beginning
that containerisation would eliminate the profession of dockworkers, but no one could
imagine that it would cause massive job losses among workers whose livelihoods were
tied to the presence of the nearby docks. The once thriving dockers’ community of
East London with its unique culture no longer exists. On the site of what used to be
the West India Docks now stands London’s new financial district, Canary Wharf. The
surrounding boroughs are now inhabited by young professionals employed by the big
banks and financial institutions in Canary Wharf.
No one anticipated that the container would result in vast changes in where and how
goods are manufactured or that it would help integrate East Asia with the rest of the
world. Before the container, big industrial complexes would manufacture products from
start to finish. Nowadays, smaller specialised plants ship components and half-finished
1Donovan and Bonney (2006)
2Levinson (2006) page 2
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goods to one another in ever lengthening supply chains. Containerisation went hand-in-
hand with a new world economic order. Poor and emerging countries became suppliers
to wealthy countries and could climb out of poverty. Factories in Malaysia could deliver
blouses to Macy’s in New York more cheaply than could manufacturers nearby. The
United States imported four times as many varieties of goods in 2002 as in 1972. It is
no secret the container allowed for raw materials to be shipped to distant countries to
make use of their cheap labour to turn them into finished goods that are then sent by
containers to markets3.
It is rather fascinating that it remains cheaper nowadays to produce toys in China
and ship them thousands of miles than manufacture them locally. Feenstra (1998)
estimates that a Barbie doll costs only $2 to produce. The raw materials for the doll
are obtained from Taiwan and Japan. Assembly takes place in Indonesia, Malaysia, and
China. Of the $2 export value for the dolls when they leave Hong Kong for the United
States, about 35 cents covers Chinese labour, 65 cents covers the cost of materials, and
the remainder covers transportation and overhead. The dolls sell for about $10 in the
United States.
The modern (container) port is a factory. Major ports have dozens of berths that
accommodate mammoth containerships up to 1,100 feet long and 140 feet across, car-
rying nothing but metal boxes, thousands of them. On the wharf, enormous cranes go
into work as soon a ship docks. The cranes themselves are engineering masterpieces.
They rise 200 feet into the air and weigh more than 2 million pounds. Their legs are
50 feet apart to allow several truck lanes and even train tracks to pass beneath. Within
24 hours, the ship is discharged of its thousands of containers, takes on thousands more
and moves on its way4.
The result of the new system is that a container can leave a factory in Malaysia,
be loaded aboard a ship, and journey the 9000 miles to Los Angeles in 16 days. A day
later, the same container is on a unit train to Chicago, where it is transferred onto a
truck headed for Cincinnati. The 11,000-mile trip from door to door can take as little
as 22 days, at a cost lower than a single first-class air ticket. Significantly, no one has
touched the contents or even opened the container along the way5.
3Levinson (2006) page 3
4Donovan and Bonney (2006)
5Levinson (2006) page 7
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We start our investigation into the effects of containerisation in this chapter with a
historical account of the container. The narrative is very important to our analysis as
will become clear in the ensuing chapters. The outline for this chapter is as follows. In
section 2.2, we present the problems that existed in ports from damage to the goods,
pilferage and labour issues which were the main motives behind the development of
containerisation. In section 2.3, we present a historical account of the container to
better understand the conditions in which the container technology was developed and
the sort of problems that it came to deal with. We believe that it is important to
present a brief historical account of containerisation since our analysis will be driven by
the narrative as will become clear and to understand our container variables better in
ensuing chapters. In section 2.4, we discuss the effects of containerisation on economic
geography and how it impacted the previous maritime centres of New York, London,
and Liverpool. We outline how containerisation meant that the geography of ports was
a determinant of whether a port could become a container port or go out of business.
In section 2.5, we present some evidence on the effects of the container mainly from the
business literature. Comprehensive quantitative evidence in the economics literature
remains lacking, we argue.
2.2 The Scene in Ports Before Containerisation: Damage,
Pilferage, and Labour Issues
Except for the use of steam-powered winches and cranes, shipping was still a primitive
industry in the 1950s before containerisation set in. Longshore gangs were handling
breakbulk cargo the same way the Phoenicians did thousands of years ago6. The process
still relied heavily on muscle and manpower. Ships remained in ports for days while
longshoremen wrestled individual boxes, barrels and bales into and out of tight spaces
below decks.
At the factory gates, goods would be loaded piece-by-piece, crate by crate on trucks
or railcars. The trucks or rail would deliver the thousands of pieces to the port. Each
piece had to unloaded separately, accounted for on a piece of paper, and stored in transit
6
Bulk and Breakbulk are terms used in shipping. Bulk cargo refers to commodities such as grain,
coal, metal ores, and others that are loaded in the holds of ships without packaging or sorting. Breakbulk
cargo, also known as general cargo refers to individual items that are packaged and handled separately.
A more formal definition of bulk and breakbulk cargo is presented in chapter 4
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sheds along the docks. When a ship had been loaded, each item had to be brought out
of the sheds and warehouses, counted once more, and moved to shipside. The scene
at the docks was that of a beehive. Crates, casks, bags, cartons, and drums lined the
dockside. There might be loose pieces of lumber, baskets of fresh produce, and even
exotic animals among the cargo awaiting loading. In one footage of the port of London
Docks from back in the days, one could even see elephants being used to carry heavy
cargo7.
The loading part was the role of longshoremen, also known as dockers. On the pier
side, a gang of dockers would assemble part of the cargo on top of a wooden pallet. The
pallet would carry stacks of loose cartons and bags and the longshore workers would warp
cables around the cargo and tie the ends together. There would be a winch installed on
the deck of the ship operated by a deck man. The deck man would lower a hook with his
winch and the dockers would connect the cables to the hook. The deck man would then
hoist the cargo and manoeuvre it over an open hatch and lower it into the ship’s hold.
The hook is released immediately and deployed quickly to grab the next load. Another
gang of men would be waiting in the dim and usually moist hold of the ship to secure
the cargo in place. Piece by piece, bags and crates are tucked and pushed in the empty
spaces that fit them in the ship’s hold. Moving the goods off the sling board was done
using carts, forklifts, and in many cases brute force. Every docker was equipped with a
steel hook with a wooden handle that would be used to handle heavy bags to jerk them
into place.
Unloading was just as labourious. It is almost impossible to avoid damaging the
goods in the circumstances. Damage was frequent and expensive. There was another
problem looming on the docks that daunted shippers and port authorities alike. The
antagonistic labour-management relationships meant that theft was the rule rather than
the exception. Labour found that the deteriorating work conditions should be met with
theft and pilferage as a means of retaliation. The problem worsened when trade in
high-valued products started to gain momentum after World War II. Dockers would tap
whiskey from sealed casks and steal electronic devices for home use8.
Ports in the 1950’s were highly inefficient places. The problem was more evident
7London’s Lost Docks, DVD, Timereel Studios
8Levinson (2006) page 28
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in ports where labour unions were very active. Dockers’ unions resisted anything that
would endanger the security of the existing jobs. Mechanisation was met with fierce
resistance. Ports were plagued with strikes. Any attempts to increase productivity were
met with protest. Even absurd practices such as the welt - a practice under which half
of each gang would leave work often to the nearest pub and then an hour or two later
the other half would alternate with the first half - was very difficult to eliminate. Labour
productivity was low as a result9. The result of these problem was obviously very high
labour costs. Possibly the greatest threat to containerisation came from labour unions
who saw in it a great menace to their job security.
The solution to the above problems was obvious as will become clear in the next
section: instead of loading, unloading, shifting, and reloading thousands of loose items,
why not put cargo into big boxes and just move the boxes?
2.3 A Historical Account of the Container
None of the previous attempts to introduce sealed boxes in which goods can be trans-
ported gained commercial ground. It took a trucking magnate to launch the idea of the
container in its current form. Malcolm McLean from North Carolina was keen on ex-
panding his trucking business. His company faced congestion on the American highways
as well as in ports where trucks delivered and picked up shipments.
McLean had figured out that by moving loaded trailers onboard ships, he would
avoid repeated cargo handling and the related high labour costs that were characteristic
of traditional shipping. Also turnaround time would be greatly reduced, and so would
be losses from breakage and pilferage.
When McLean decided to move trailers on ships, he started to look for appropriate
space to run his proposed operations. The Port of New York Authority which runs the
ports of New York and New Jersey was looking to revive its slumping business. The port
of Newark, New Jersey, was perfectly positioned across the harbour from New York City
and offered ample space for McLean’s trucks. The port authority was very receptive of
McLean’s concept of moving trailers by sea and the two sides struck a deal.
To realise his plans to move trailers by sea, McLean succeeded in acquiring Waterman
9Levinson (2006) page 28
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Steamship Corporation and its daughter company Pan-Atlantic Steamship Corporation.
Waterman was one of the world’s largest shipping companies at the end of World War
II. The acquisition provided him the rights to operate between the Gulf and East Coast.
As soon as McLean took control over the shipping giants, he sent two of their surplus
World War II tankers to the shipyard for conversion into trailerships. In September 1955,
McLean received his much sought-after legal endorsement to operate his trailerships.
The Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC) which oversaw domestic shipping as well
as trucking and railways granted Pan-Atlantic preliminary approval to use ships to move
truck trailers. With the new authorisation, experimentation with containers would start
in the USA in 1956.
2.3.1 The First Containerships
McLean was concerned that trailers’ wheels and undercarriages would occupy space that
otherwise might be used to carry cargo. Even better, trailer bodies could be stacked,
whereas trailers with wheels could not. He found a company that was ready to build
reinforced aluminium containers. The containers were being stacked two-high and were
locked onto trailer chassis upon reaching their destination.
On April 26, 1956, the first container was loaded onto the Ideal X at Port Newark,
New Jersey. The Ideal X was a converted World War II tanker that was redesigned to
carry trailers on its deck while still being able to carry oil at the same time. The trailers
being hauled on the top deck had been separated from their wheels and chassis10. The
container as a mere box was being used for the first time. The boxes were reinforced
metal structures designed to withstand harsh weather and rough seas. The Ideal X
left Newark with 58 containers bound for Houston and made history for being the first
containership to ever sail.
Experts estimated that the cost of loading the Ideal X stood at 15.8 cents per ton.
Comparatively, loading cargo breakbulk style on a medium-sized ship cost $5.83 per ton
in 195611.
With the idea of stacking containers on top of each other, McLean realised that
economies of scale could be exploited. A new crane system was developed to enable the
10The container as a term was still not widely used at the time.
11Levinson (2006) page 52
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automisation of the loading and oﬄoading of containers.
By the end of 1956, 67,000 tons of containerised freight had been moved through
Newark. Soon the converted tankers that were employed in the beginning were replaced
by former military freighters that offered more room for containers. Each of the newly
converted ships was redesigned to carry 226 containers stacked in cells below and on
deck. The ships were equipped with onboard cranes to handle the lifting of containers
in the tight confines below deck. Again this was a new innovation in shipping12.
In August 1958, Pan-Atlantic started a new service to San Juan, Puerto Rico13.
Prior to the successful sailing of Fairland, McLean had a standoff with the San Juan
longshoremen who refused to unload his ship, the Bienville. When the first contain-
ership arrived in San Juan, the longshoremen refused to unload it. Four months of
negotiations ensued while two ships sat idle at port. The union requested that Pan-
Atlantic use two large 24-man gangs to handle containerships. McLean finally bent to
the union’s demands. Service to Puerto Rico was thereby resumed and crisis averted.
This however marked the beginning of the resistance movement to containerisation and
the long process of weakening the longshoremen unions.
On the West Coast, Matson Navigation Company started container service between
San Francisco and Hawaii. Matson explored the disadvantages of operating from an
already congested big port such as the old piers of San Francisco. Matson opted to
operate its container services from the much smaller but more spacious Alameda, on
the east side of San Francisco Bay. On January 9, 1959, the world’s first purpose-built
container crane went into operation in that port. The crane could load one 40,000-pound
(18 tons) container every three minutes. At this rate, the Alameda terminal would be
handling 400 tons an hour or 40 times the productivity of one longshore gang using ship
winches14.
2.3.2 Expansion of Containerisation in the USA
TheWest Coast-Hawaii service proved very successful. Matson reported that ”70 percent
of Hawaii cargo that was amenable to containerisation was moving in containers” by
12Levinson (2006) page 56 and page 132.
13Puerto Rico is not effectively an independent nation but rather an ”unincorporated territory” of the
United States
14Levinson (2006) page 65
15
1963. Shipping costs in the market had been reduced by 25%.15. Hawaii benefited
from containerisation with more varieties being available on the market. Fresh produce,
meat, eggs, and dairy could be transported in refrigerated containers from the mainland.
The pineapple production Hawaii is also said to have benefited greatly from the new
developments. Fresh Hawaiian pineapple was now readily available in US supermarkets
in big volumes and at affordable prices.
In 1960, McLean’s Pan-Atlantic Steamship Corporation changed its name to Sea-
Land Service Inc. At that time, the Port of New York authority was building a new
terminal in the New Jersey marshes that became known as Port Elizabeth. McLean
was quick to move his company’s operations to the new terminal. The new terminal
provided ample space for handling and storing containers. The new investment proved
to be a smart one. As containerisation advanced, New York’s old piers started to lose
traffic to the deeper and more spacious New Jersey terminals. The same happened on
the West Coast where San Francisco was losing to the nearby Oakland.
In the early 1960’s, McLean was still trying to establish himself in the domestic
market. However, at that time, the US military was in dire need for extra capacity for
military shipments to its numerous bases and operations around the world. McLean’s
new innovation represented in containerisation would become very popular in the mili-
tary cargo market.
Puerto Rico was an attractive market for American carriers. The economy of the
island nation was growing at 8 to 10% per year due to US government’s development
programme, Operation Bootstrap. The programme enticed US manufacturers to take
advantage of the cheap labour and set up manufacturing facilities on the island. They
brought their raw materials to the island and shipped their finished products out to
the mainland. The demand for shipping was exploding as a result. The Puerto Rico
experiment provided the world with the first model of offshoring and fragmentation of
production and the container was key in this experiment.
Also, economic development in the island meant that many workers on the island
enjoyed steady income for the first time. Demand for merchandise from the mainland
increased, filling the ships making their way to Puerto Rico. Total trade between Puerto
15Donovan and Bonney (2006) p.81
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Rico and mainland USA trebled during the 1960s and it all went by ship16 . The island
would soon serve as a hub for feeder services to the US Virgin Islands. This was the
precursor of what became known as the hub and spoke system.
2.3.3 Containerisation on the Atlantic
After experimenting on US domestic routes which gained ground, US carriers were
racing to launch international container services. Two American carriers were the first
to succeed in launching the much-anticipated trans-Atlantic container service. These
were United States Lines and naturally Sea-Land of McLean. The North Atlantic route
was the busiest shipping route on the planet at the time.
On March 1966, the American Racer departed from New York for Europe (London)
with only containers onboard. Sea-Land was not far behind. Its cellular containership
Fairland departed from Port Elizabeth, New Jersey on April 23, 1966 to Rotterdam,
Bremen, and Grangemouth, Scotland. The ship was carrying 226 35-foot-long contain-
ers. The ship was also equipped with deck cranes. Containerised freight for England
would be transported to Felixstowe by a feeder service from Rotterdam. London’s port
was notorious for its strained labour relations and its congested docks that did not leave
much room for container handling.
Following the successful launch of transatlantic containerisation in 1966, many more
shipping lines became keen to join in. By June 1967, 60 companies were offering con-
tainer services to Europe.
In June 1967, another important milestone in the history of containerisation was
reached. The International Standards Organization (ISO) agreed to standardise the
dimensions of the container. This was an important development because land and sea
carriers are now able to handle one another’s containers. Also corner lifting devices were
standardised. The following container sizes were adopted: 8 ft. wide x 8 ft. height x
10 ft., 20 ft., 30 ft., or 40 ft. long. Standardisation of the container (ISO agreement)
provided a stimulus to the container.
16Levinson (2006) page 73
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2.3.4 Containerisation in the Pacific
It took a major war, the VietnamWar, to prove the merit of containerisation according to
many commentators. The US military embraced containerisation at an early stage. The
Defence Department was sending large shipments of pilferage-prone military goods and
equipment by container for its bases in Europe. Since many of these bases were located
in Germany, Bremen and Bremerhaven flourished as container ports. The military
shipment market was also prosperous on the Pacific market where the US was increasing
its presence in Southeast Asia.
McLean signed contracts to carry Army freight from the West Coast to Okinawa,
the Philippines, and Vietnam. The Vietnam contract was a 2-year contract worth $70
million. The Defence Department estimated that it had saved more than $200 million
on transportation costs to Vietnam from containerisation by mid 1968, a witness to the
cost savings brought about by containerisation17.
At the time, Japan, Korea, Taiwan, the Philippines, and Hong Kong were manu-
facturing consumer electronic products, watches, and clothing and exporting these to
the US. Such products were vulnerable to damage on the high sea and pilferage and
therefore ideal for containerised shipping.
Kobe was the fastest port in Japan to adopt containerisation. Three container ter-
minals had been built there. The early investment proved very wise as containerisation
caught on and Kobe became the biggest Japanese port. Yokohama was a different story.
Failure to invest early on in the process led the port to lose the race to Kobe.
2.3.5 Containerisation and Intermodal Transport Infrastructures
Subsequent integration of rail and ocean liner container services encouraged the growth
of intermodal coordination. As transportation companies began to reach beyond the
modal boundaries that had limited their earlier operations, the benefits of containerisa-
tion became increasingly obvious (Donovan (2004)).
The British Rail freightliner service began operations in 1966. The system gained
great success quickly and was able to handle an estimated 600,000 containers in 1971.
In the beginning, London was connected with Glasgow, Liverpool, Manchester, and
Aberdeen but the network grew considerably and quickly thereafter. The majority of
17Levinson (2006) page 180.
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freightliner business originated in the UK but a considerable 40% came from interna-
tional trade18.
British Rail was quick to realise the potential of the container and extended its
inland system with the introduction in 1968 of British Rail containerships operating
from Harwich to Zeebrugge and Rotterdam.
In response to containerisation, and in an effort to avoid being left out, the railways
of Europe came together in 1967 and formed Intercontainer, The International Associ-
ation for Transcontainer Traffic. This company was formed to handle containers on the
Continent and compete with traditional shipping lines. At the time, British Rail was
already operating a cellular ship service between Harwich, Zeebrugge, and Rotterdam
and a freightliner service between London and Paris. Initially 11 European lines signed
to Intercontainer, and soon after 8 other country lines joined the league. The coun-
tries represented in the new system were: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, France, West
Germany, East Germany, Great Britain, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Yugoslavia,
Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, and Switzerland19.
Intercontainer started operation in May 1968 and it handled almost all international
container traffic traveling by rail in Europe. The new company was represented in each
country by the railway administration concerned. The company made matters simple
for the shippers looking to have their goods transported over the borders. Door-to-door
tariffs were being quoted and one consignment note per box was issued. Invoicing was
centralised in Basel and the Swiss Franc was being used and Intercontainer became the
’European Railway’ as a result.
Containerisation International estimated that the cost of Cost of moving 1 twenty-
foot equivalent units (TEU) between Paris and Cologne was FFr 1,025. This was es-
timated to be around 75% of the equivalent road costs. The traffic handled by the
company amounted to around 18,500 TEU containers per month in the early 70s20.
18Containerisation International Yearbook 1973, page 58
19Containerisation International Yearbook 1971 page 43
20Containerisation International Yearbook 1972 page 41
19
2.3.6 Further Developments in Containerisation: The Oil Crisis and
the Computer
Containerisation turned shipping lines into companies that offered a transportation ser-
vice. They no longer cared only for the port-to-port transport but had to take re-
sponsibility for inland transportation of containers by rail and truck. It was no secret
that containerised shipping required heavy capital investments. The largest cost to the
carriers is the ship and ships were growing bigger. In the early 1970’s, a fully container-
ised 50,000 gross ton vessel cost about 8 million pounds plus another 3 million for the
containers 21.
To make matters worse, the Yom Kippur War broke out in 1973 between Syria and
Egypt on one side and Israel on the other side. Israel was backed by some European
countries and the United States, and the Arab oil countries retaliated by imposing an
oil embargo on the US, Western Europe and Japan. The action led to what became
known as the oil crisis and oil prices shot up dramatically.
The price of oil increased four-fold on what it had been before the war. Most shipping
lines felt the pain of the high oil prices in their margins. Many ships that were designed to
steam at higher speed for quicker delivery were deemed uneconomical. Hummels (2007)
suspects that high oil prices could have reversed some of the cost savings introduced by
the container.
It is true that prior to containerisation, shipping companies viewed themselves as
port-to-port service providers. That was about to change however. Containerisation
introduced what later became known as intermodal transportation. Containerisation
was designed to make door-to-door service, between the exporter and the importer,
possible. This meant that container lines had to coordinate the inland leg of the trip as
well. This also meant that many shipping lines had to partner up with railway companies
and truckers to arrange for inland transportation. As a result, many shipping lines did
not have a grasp on what happened to their containers beyond the port gates.
American President Lines (APL) realised the problem early on when bad weather in
the winter of 1977 closed rail lines across much of the United States, and railways were
unable to track the containers. APL, being a subsidiary of an oil and gas exploration
company, started applying automation to its shipping operations and installed a tracking
21Whittaker page 18
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system for its containers on the sea. The carrier quickly came to realise that expanding
its tracking system inland would be necessary. This was the first attempt to combine
the power of computers with containers.
The increase in efficient rail-water services made it easier for Asian goods to be
delivered to US markets. Stacktrains are said to have ”hastened the shift in the world’s
trade axis toward Asia”. Goods would be delivered in container ships to the West Coast
where they are transported by rail to their destination within the US. The growth
of these shipments turned the ports of Los Angeles and Long Beach into the fastest-
growing US container ports. In 1987 Long Beach became the busiest US container port
surpassing the port of New York-New Jersey.
With the emergence of new trade and transportation patterns, APL no longer found
it necessary to restrict its ships’ designs to fit through the Panama Canal. After all, it
saves money and time to ship the goods from Asia to the West Coast and then deliver
inland by rail. The Panama Canal locks were 110 feet wide, 1,000 feet long and 39.5
feet deep. APL announced what it called ”post-Panamax” ships in 1986 and the ships
entered service in 1988. The ships had a capacity of 4,300 TEU .
The door was now wide open for even bigger ships. In the 1990’s, orders were
placed for ships with capacities of 5,000 and 6,000 TEU. This would not be the end of
it however. In 2005, ships in excess of 10,000 TEU were built and put in service. By
comparison, McLean’s Ideal X, hailed by many as the first container ship, carried only
58 33-foot containers, or the equivalent of 95.7 TEU.
2.4 Changing Fortunes: Containerisation and Ports Eco-
nomic Geography
The changing economies of shipping meant that the late containerisers faced potentially
serious consequences. McKinsey’s recommendations to the British government (McK-
insey and Company (1967)) advised that the new economies of scale introduced by
containerisation meant that Britain required only a couple of large container ports for
all its imports and exports. Also shipowners wanted to keep their expensive container
ships on the sea transporting goods for as long as possible to recover the high costs.
This meant that containerships made one or two stops only on their journeys. Ports
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that invested early on in container ports were more likely to attract shipping lines to
call at them. Secondary ports would not see transatlantic ships but would get only
feeder services. Other ports were disadvantaged by their geographical location such
as London. Given the new industry dynamics, some ports disappeared, some rose to
prominence, and some were built from scratch. Some of the world’s great port cities saw
their ports decline and disappear, while insignificant towns found themselves among the
great maritime centres.
Nowhere was the transformation more apparent and turbulent that in New York in
the USA and London and Liverpool in Britain. We discuss below how containerisation
affected what used to be the world’s maritime centres.
2.4.1 The Port of New York and containerisation
New York was a world maritime and shipping centre. That was before containerisation
came. The onset of containerisation proved to be disastrous for New York City. The
changes in the shipping industry were beyond the city’s capacities to handle. Despite
spending enormous sums of money to update and keep its piers operational, New York’s
piers were bound to become obsolete. This was a perfect example of how a new tech-
nology would change the fortunes of a geographic location to the advantage of another
location.
In the early 1950s, the Port of New York handled one-third of America’s seaborne
trade in manufactured goods. The good fortune of NY was even bigger with high-
valued goods. New York as a port had significant disadvantages though. The piers -
NY had 283 of them at mid-century - were located along the Manhattan and Brooklyn
waterfronts. The location was far from ideal for commuting freight to and from NY from
the rest of the country. The railroad tracks were across the harbour and the Hudson
River in New Jersey. This meant that freight railcars had to be moved from New Jersey
to the NY piers in barges and lighters pushed by tugboats. The situation was only
made economically viable by a ruling of the ICC that required rates for Brooklyn and
Manhattan that are similar to the rates for New Jersey bound freight. The railroad
companies had to throw in the lighter trip for free.
A metropolitan city such as NY housing one of the busiest ports in the world at its
heart clearly had another big disadvantage. This disadvantage became more apparent
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as the trucking industry overtook railway as the first choice of domestic freight trans-
portation. Trucks had to navigate through the congested streets of Manhattan to reach
the piers. It became normal for trucks to queue for an hour or two to enter a pier for a
delivery or a pickup.
The port was an important employer and a source of job creation in the city. In 1951,
it was estimated that 100,000 New Yorkers worked in water transportation, trucking,
and warehouses. Then there were the manufacturers that located near the port for
ease of shipping. The Hudson River and the Brooklyn waterfront housed many food-
processing plants and dozens of factories in the chemical and pharmaceutical industries.
The manufacturing jobs that associated with the factories ran in the thousands. In
short, the stakes were very high.
But none of the above disadvantages threatened the position of the Port of New
York as the labour issues did. The docks were frequently prone to labour strikes. The
high risk of labour disruptions encouraged shippers to use other ports. Crime and theft
also contributed to the demise and drove shippers away.
Most of the New York piers were decaying. Many dated back to the end of the
nineteenth century and some were very narrow that a large truck could not turn around.
Other ports were literally collapsing in the water. The costs of building new piers were
prohibitive.
The Port of New York Authority is a bistate agency of New York and New Jersey.
The plans to modernise and rebuild the New York piers were faced by fierce resistance
from New York officials and the International Longshoremen’s Association (ILA), the
labour union of the port. New York officials considered the piers to be a gold mine.
They thought that if they modernised the city piers themselves, the piers would earn
the city big money.
The city of Newark, New Jersey, did not have similar objections. Its docks were
obsolete and desperate for an overhaul. The city agreed to lease its docks to the Port
Authority in 1947. Between 1948 and 1952, $11 million were spent to rebuild wharves
and deepen the channels. Waterman Steamship Company agreed to move from Brooklyn
to a newly built terminal at Newark. Late in 1953, McLean made his desire to build a
terminal on New York Harbour known to the Port Authority. His plans to drive trucks
onto ships was never heard of before. The Port Authority was however very eager to
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attract new business to its new investment. Besides, the new facilities at Newark could
cater to McLean’s ambitions with their open spaces and easy access to the railway
tracks and highways. All of these were advantages that New York was not in a position
to provide.
Soon another project was announced. A new port would be built just south of
Port Newark. Port Elizabeth would become the largest port project ever undertaken in
the United States. The Port Authority was preparing for the age of containerisation.
Newark was already attracting business away from New York and the announcement of
the new port sounded alarm in New York.
In 1955, before McLean had started his container service out of Port Newark, New
York started pumping cash into its old piers in an attempt to keep its shipping business.
The stakes were very high after all and New York could not afford losing more business
to New Jersey. The spending programme was estimated at $130 million, the equivalent
of $800 million in 2004 dollars.
The problem was that the new plans did not address the disadvantages inherent to
the city of New York. Costs were simply too high for shippers and shipping lines in
comparison with other ports. Geographic disadvantage was still an issue and trucks
would still have to deal with severe congestions in Manhattan and Brooklyn. Labour
problems were not addressed either. In fact, the opening of one of the first rebuilt
piers was delayed by a dispute between the port and the ILA. None of the city’s plans
envisaged any role for containerisation, a mistake that would prove fatal for the port.
With the start of its container service, Pan-Atlantic was attracting increasing trade
to its terminal in Newark and it was expanding its operations in the port very fast. A
government study at the time estimated that container shipping cost 39 percent to 74
percent per ton less than conventional shipping 22.
Cargo tonnage handled at Newark continued to surge while tonnage on New York’s
side dwindled. In just four years, New Jersey’s share of total port traffic doubled from
9% to 18%. Port New York was still expanding without an eye for containerisation. It
was clear that the investments were going to waste as the New York piers slowly started
to shut down. Port Elizabeth on the other hand was designed as a container port from
the start. When Port Elizabeth finally opened for business, Pan-Atlantic, now named
22Levinson (2006) page 91
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Sea-Land opened its own terminal at the new port in 1962.
As shipping lines started looking to take containerisation internationally, the Port of
New York Authority was still expanding. In 1965, several carriers announced plans for
containerised ships to Europe. It was clear that their choice would fall on Port Elizabeth
to launch their services. Only Port Elizabeth had the space for the container handling
facilities.
In 1960, containerised freight accounted for 8% of the port’s general cargo tonnage.
In 1966, one third of the port’s total tonnage came to New Jersey and 13% was con-
tainerised tonnage23. In 1970, New Jersey’s share of the port’s general cargo reached 63
percent. Two years later, more than half a million containers made it to the New Jersey
docks24.
With regards to labour, in 1963-1964, Manhattan docks used 1.4 million labour days.
The figure slipped below a million in 1967/1968, 350,000 in 1970/1971, and dropped to
127,000 in 1975/1976 - a 91% decline in employment in 12 years25. On the New Jersey
side, there was a period of shortage of labour. Forty ship lines were operating from Port
Newark and Port Elizabeth in 1973.
By the mid 1970s, the New York piers were mostly shut. In 1974, the New York
docks handled only one fiftieth as much as in 196026. The effects of the collapse of the
shipping industry in New York rippled through the local economy. Manufacturing was
hit hard. In 1964, New York housed over 30,000 manufacturers employing close to a
million workers. Two-third of the manufacturers were located in Manhattan. Between
1967 and 1976, New York lost a fourth of its factories and one-third of its manufacturing
jobs27.
2.4.2 The Scene in Great Britain: London and Liverpool
In the early 1960’s, London and Liverpool were by far Britain’s biggest ports. By the
early 1970’s, London Docks completely shut down and Liverpool had become almost
entirely irrelevant to shipping lines.
On the labour scene, the labour union under which dockers and stevedores fell was
23Levinson (2006) page 94
24Levinson (2006) page 96
25Levinson (2006) page 96
26Levinson (2006) page 97
27Levinson (2006) page 99
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the Transport and General Workers Union (TGWU). In March 1966, United States
Lines carried the first large containers along with other freight en route from New York
to London. London was not equipped with container loading and unloading facilities at
the time. Containers had to be transferred from ships onto lighters to bring them to
port from deep waters.
In April 1966, Sea-Land’s Fairland carrying only containers made a trip across the
Atlantic to Rotterdam, Bremen, and Grangemouth. With barely a year’s notice, Rot-
terdam and Bremen had lengthened docks, deepened channels and begun installing
container cranes. London did not and so Fairland did not even bother calling there.
London’s once formidable docks were clearly not well suited for container shipping.
London’s geographic location was a clear disadvantage. The docks were grouped in
sheltered enclosures off the Thames. Large vessels had to unload into lighters nearer the
mouth of the river. Moreover, the prospect of having hundreds of lorries congesting the
narrow streets of East London was daunting.
Liverpool’s ageing docks were no more attractive than London’s. The dismay in
London and Liverpool had alarmed the British Transport Docks Board (BTDB). The
Board turned to McKinsey and Co for advice.
McKinsey came back with a much-discussed report titled “Containerisation: Key to
Low Cost Transport” in 1967. The McKinsey Report predicted freight savings of 50%
through containerisation. The report also forecasted an eventual 70% reduction in cargo
ships (vs. containerships) and a 90% reduction in the number of dockers and stevedores
handling general cargo. McKinsey forecasted that container shipping would consolidate
around a few companies using gigantic ships carrying standardised containers. Ports
have to be very big therefore to cope with the sizes of the ships and the increased
trade effect. The report also anticipated that containerisation would cut Britain’s ocean
freight bills in half but only if intermodal transport is used to link a few container ports
to the rest of the country by rail and road.
In reaction to the report, the BTDB began a major port upgrade programme that
would lead to spending £200 million between 1965 and 1969. The Port of London
Authority had also ordered the building of a £30-million container complex at Tilbury,
20 miles down the Thames from London. Government had hoped that Tilbury would
become Europe’s Container Port. Another container port was built at Southampton.
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As for Liverpool, Mersey Docks and Harbour Board began a container terminal at Sea
Forth north of the city.
Tilbury opened in 1967 but not for too long. The labour union was not happy with
the government’s policy of encouraging permanent employment at the docks rather than
daily hiring which was the norm before the container. A ban on containers at Tilbury
was imposed by the Union from January 1968 in the hope that this would deter the
government.
At the same time Tilbury was being furnished by the latest in container transport
systems, a new port was being rebuilt at Felixstowe, 90 miles northeast of London on
the North Sea. Felixstowe was a privately owned port controlled by an importer of
grain and palm oil. The owners of Felixstowe could foresee the opportunity presenting
itself due to containerisation. They spent £3.5 million to reinforce a wharf and install
a container crane.
In July 1967, a small ship of Sea-Land shuttling containers back and forth to Rotter-
dam started a service to Felixstowe. Soon after, Sea-Land added ships calling directly
from the US. The good fortunes of Felixstowe did not materialise until Tilbury closed
due to strike in 1968. Overnight, Felixstowe had become Britain’s biggest container port
and this is still the case until today.
In 1969, Felixstowe was already timetabled for 2-3 trips across the North Atlantic
and several feeder services to Rotterdam. In total, 1.9 million tons of general cargo was
processed in Felixstowe in 1969, every bit of it in containers. The productivity gain due
to containerisation was estimated at 66% higher average tonnage per man-hour in just
4 years28.
The London Docks started closing one after the other in the wake of containerisation.
As Tilbury opened, the East India Docks closed in 1967. The St. Katherine Docks were
shut in 1968. The nearby London Docks followed immediately, and the Surrey Docks
closed in 1970. Of the 144 wharves that had operated in London before 1967, 70 closed
by the end of 1971 and all of the rest followed soon after. The number of dockers fell
from 24,000 to 16,000 in 5 years. Factories and warehouses which located near the
docks for easier access to material and export markets began to move away and as a
consequence, the waterfront communities tied to the port began to disintegrate.
28Levinson (2006) page 205.
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By the time Tilbury was finally allowed to open its docks to container ships, London
had lost its position as the maritime centre of Europe to Rotterdam. Rotterdam is the
perfect example of how technological change provides opportunities if taken advantage
of. The Dutch were very quick to equip the port with container facilities as soon as
the opportunity presented itself. Rotterdam spent $60 million to build the European
Container Terminus which paved the way for Rotterdam to become the largest container
centre in the world.
Tilbury had lost its potential of becoming Britain’s biggest port to Felixstowe, which
was by the time Tilbury reopened for business already the calling port for most major
shipping lines. Felixstowe would continue to grow exponentially in the future. In 1968,
18,252 containers made their way through Felixstowe. In 1974, this figure would grow
to 137,850 containers.
The story in Liverpool was quite different. With the opening of new container ports
across Britain, Mersey Docks and Harbour Board experienced immense financial troubles
that the parliament had to approve a financial bailout in 1971 and the government took
over the city’s docks. In 1972, after major constructions, the Royal Sea Forth Docks
opened with a new pier complex including 3 terminals for containers. But Liverpool had
lost its competitive advantage in the process of containerisation. In 1973, Britain joins
the EEC (European Economic Community) and its trade becomes more associated with
the continent rather than the US and its (former) colonies.
2.5 Some Evidence of the Effects of Containerisation
While anecdotal evidence on the effects of containerisation in the business literature
may differ enormously in their estimations, the evidence points in the direction of major
savings brought about by containerisation. In this section, we look at several pieces of
evidence, many of which are taken from Levinson (2006).
A US government sponsored study in 1954 was conducted to investigate the status
quo at ports. It was well understood that ports/docks were the bottleneck in the goods
transportation system. The subject of the study was a ship traveling between Brooklyn
and Bremerhaven in Germany carrying mixed cargo typical to an oceangoing merchant
vessel at the time. The ship was loaded and unloaded by longshoremen/dockers, also
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typical of the time. The researchers had access to detailed information about the cargo
and journey.
The ship, the Warrior, was loaded with 5000 long tons of cargo, mainly food items,
household goods, mail, machine parts and 53 vehicles. Astonishingly, the ship carried
194,582 individual items of every size and description. The goods arrived in the Brooklyn
docks in 1156 separate shipments from 151 different US cities, with the first shipment
arriving more than a month before scheduled sailing. The items were placed on pallets
which were stored in transit sheds. Upon loading, the pallets would be lowered into
the hold where the items were removed from the pallets to be stowed using more than
$5000 worth of lumber and rope to hold everything in place. The dockers worked one
eight-hour shift per day and required 6 calendar days to load the ship. The journey to
Germany took 10.5 days and at the German end, it took the dockers 4 days of around
the clock work. In other words, the ship spent an equal amount of time to the duration
of the voyage docked in port. The last of the cargo arrived at destination 33 days after
the ship had docked at Bremerhaven, 44 days after departure from New York, and 95
days after the first cargo was dispatched from its US point of origin.
The total cost of moving the goods by the Warrior came to $237,577, not counting
the cost of the return trip or time of inventory in transit. The sea voyage accounted
for only 11.5% of the costs. Cargo handling at both ends accounted for 36.8%. The
researcher concluded that reducing the costs of receiving, storing, and loading the out-
bound cargo in the US port offered the best method of reducing the total cost of ship-
ping29.
Trading goods was so expensive that in many cases it did not make any sense to
trade internationally. Such was the state of matters in the 1950s and 1960s. Shipping
steel pipe from New York to Brazil cost an average of $57 per ton in 1962 (13% of the
value of the pipe being exported - this is not including the inland transport cost from
the mill to the port). The cost of shipping one truckload of Medicine from Chicago to
Nancy (France) in 1960 was $2,386 (14% is the cost of getting freight to US port city,
49% port costs, 24% ocean shipping fees, and around 9% European inland freight)30.
Five years after containerisation was introduced internationally, McKinsey & Co
29Levinson (2006) pages 33-34
30Levinson (2006) p. 9, taken from the American Association of Port Authority data.
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produced a report on the state of containerisation titled ’Containerisation - A 5-Year
Balance Sheet’. The consultancy firm noticed that container movement has spread
around the world rapidly. Containers were quickly adopted for land transportation
and the reduction in loading time and transshipment cost lowered rates for goods that
moved entirely by land31. It is no secret that the container along with automation made
it possible for companies like Toyota and Honda develop their well-known just-in-time
manufacturing strategies. Retailers applied the same strategies to their supply chains
with great success (Wal-Mart, Home Depot, etc.).
Time as a trade barrier is well recognised in the trade costs literature. Hummels
(2001) found that every additional day in ocean travel reduces the probability of out-
sourcing manufactures by 1 percent. Also, he found that firms are willing to pay ap-
proximately 1 percent more for a shipment for each day saved in ocean shipping.
With the container, the profession of the dockers would become obsolete and labour-
intensity of the industry would decline. Shippers can now load their goods directly
into a container and have the container transferred to the nearest port either by truck
or rail. The process of getting the container onto a ship is now done by specially
installed cranes at the terminal. Also the journey of the ship to its destination no longer
requires a big crew to take care of shifting loads. So all in all, labour has become only
a minor component in shipping. One would expect that labour costs, which made up
a substantial part of total shipping costs, have declined due to the introduction of the
container.
Labour productivity in UK ports was very low prior to 1966. McKinsey and Com-
pany (1967) estimated that for import cargo at a general cargo berth in the UK, a gang
of around 26 men is used per ship per shift in 1967. The work rate is usually about 20
freight tons per hatch per hour. For a 5-hatch cargo liner, the discharge rate is usually
100 freight tons per hour using 130 men. Assuming double shifts for 5 days, the total
quantity of cargo handled is 8,000 freight tons per week. The number of workers re-
quired for the week is 260 men. Output per man, working full shifts without any breaks
or lost time, is therefore approximately 30 freight tons, or 0.75 ton per hour (based on
an 8-hour shift). As for export cargo, the average output per man hour is 0.625 ton or
25 tons per man week.
31Levinson (2006) page 10
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In 1967, after the introduction of containerisation, a typical container berth has up
to three high-speed container cranes and associated equipment. Assuming a crane cycle
of 3 minutes to complete one container discharge/load operation, and a crane availability
of 22.5 hours per day, each crane can handle 450 containers each way per day. Maximum
output per berth is therefore 1,350 containers per day each way. Labour requirements
based on a 3-shift system (to cover for around the clock operation) would be 4 gangs
of 36 men each to operate the cranes and handle containers to and from warehouses.
This means that theoretically, the weekly output of 144 men is 9,450 containers each
way per berth. However, to make a conservative estimation, it is assumed that each
berth can only handle 1,800 containers each way per week. The gangs mentioned above
can therefore operate on more than one berth. Assume labour utilisation of 40%. This
means that 144 men can operate on 2 berths handling a total of 3,600 containers each
way per week. An ISO container of 20’ has an average cargo of 10 metric tons or
15 freight tons. Allowing for UK trade imbalance (as of 1967), the average cargo per
container falls to 12 freight tons. Total cargo handled per week for the 2 berths by 144
men is therefore about 86,000 freight tons. Output per man week is therefore 600 freight
tons, or 15 freight tons per man hour. This means that labour productivity will increase
by at least 24-fold. This is only the lower-end estimate.
But labour is only part of the story. The approximate time spent at port for a
conventional break bulk cargo vessel was 60% of its lifetime before containerisation.
About half of that time in port was due to awaiting labour and handling equipment. The
container introduced new efficiencies in handling the shipments. The time a ship spends
in port has decreased substantially with automisation. This means that ships can spend
more time on route earning money. All of the above suggest that shipping costs should
have declined since the introduction of the container. The United Nations Conference
on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) reported in 1970 that costs of moving freight
on containerships were less than half those on conventional ships32. However, there is
evidence that shipping lines did not pass all the savings on to the customers. Also,
shipping prices were subject to cartel agreements (conferences) to ward off competition
especially on the North Atlantic routes. It seems that published prices were actually
never paid as shippers could negotiate contracts with individual shipping lines.
32From Levinson (2006), source:UNCTAD
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Besides, just as containerisation was gaining momentum, the world was faced with
two main events that had crippling effect on the world economy. On June 5, 1967,
Egypt unexpectedly ordered the shut down of the Suez Canal on the day the Six Day
War erupted between Israel and its neighbouring states Egypt, Jordan, and Syria. The
Canal would stay shut in the face of shipping traffic for exactly 8 years. Ships from
Europe were no longer able to take the shortcut through the Suez Canal but had to
circle Africa to reach their markets of Asia. Of course, this shock to distance only
affected Europe-Asia trade routes. The increase in distance between 1967 and 1975
automatically translates in higher freight rates that could have undone any rate savings
brought about by the container. Feyrer (2009) estimates the effects of the closing of the
Suez Canal on world trade and income.
In 1973, just as the closure of the Suez Canal was still underway, a second major
event occurred. The Yum Kippur War erupted on October 6, 1973 when Syria and
Egypt launched an attack on Israel to free land that was captured by Israel during the
1967 Six Day War. The war was fought from October 6 to October 26. On October
16th, Arab oil-exporting countries agreed an oil embargo against the United States and
several other states for their support to Israel during the war. The oil crisis would last
until March 1974. During the crisis, the price of oil quadrupled in a matter of months.
As one would expect, shipping companies had to transfer the increase in their fuel costs
to the shippers. Freight rates soared as a result. It seems that these events may have
undone any savings the container delivered. Also, many freight rates had to reflect the
high inflation that affected industrial countries in the 1970s. Hummels (1999) finds no
evidence of a decline in liner shipping prices in the post war era of globalisation (1950
onwards) based on shipping freight indices.
Ocean freight is not the only cost involved in transporting imports and exports.
The total freight bill involves not only ship rates, but also land transport to and from
ports, packaging, storage and port charges, damage, theft and insurance, and the cost
of money tied up in goods that are in transit. These are aspects not included in the
freight bill. Containerisation is likely to have affected all of those. This introduces us





This chapter raises the research question and motivates the research. We also review
the relevant literature. We start the discussion by motivating the research in the first
section before we move to discuss what the economics literature says about the research
question.
3.1 Motivation and Research Question
Between 1948 and 1993, world trade has grown by an average of 150% annually in
nominal terms. In real terms, world trade has grown by an average of around 21%
annually between 1962 and 1990. Refer to figures 3.1 and 3.2.
In the decade after 1966 when the container made its international debut, the volume
of international trade in manufactured goods grew more than twice as fast as the volume
of global manufacturing production, and two and a half times as fast as global economic
output (Krugman (1995)). Economic expansion was sluggish in that period and the oil
shocks made things worse. Nevertheless, international trade was expanding as the data
show. What was driving this acceleration in trade growth?
Krugman (1995) raises the same question. What was driving the growth in interna-
tional trade after World War II? He realizes that this question remains very much dis-
puted. He identifies two world views. The two views belong to journalists/commentators
and professional economists. Most journalistic discussions emphasise the role of techno-
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Figure 3.1: World Trade 1948-1990 (Deflated)
Figure 3.2: World Trade 1948-1990 (Nominal)
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logical improvements in transportation and communication as the driving force behind
global integration. International economists, however, tend to view much of the growth
of trade as a result of the reversal of protectionism that had restricted world markets
since 1913. World markets achieved an impressive degree of integration during the sec-
ond half of the nineteenth century mainly due to the opening of the Suez Canal, the
switch to steamships from sail, and railroads. World trade as a share of world output
does not recover to its 1913 level until the mid 1970s. Only since the 1970s that growth
truly represents a new phase of globalisation and integration, he argues.
Economists make a distinction between two waves of globalisation. The first wave
takes place between the 1850s and World War I. This wave was notably marked by the
switch from sail to steam in shipping (Harley (1973)) and the introduction of railway
(Fogel (1964), Hurd (1975), Donaldson (2008)). The second wave of globalisation starts
after World War II. This wave is marked by the switch from break-bulk shipping to
containerisation (Hummels (2007)). This is where our research comes. In the early 1990s,
it was marked by cheaper air cargo (Harrigan (2010)). Between the two waves/eras, there
was a period of reversal of globalisation in which countries reverted to protectionist
policies.
While many economic studies explored the effects of the switch from sail to steam
and the introduction of the railway/steam train in the first globalisation era, very few
studies in the economics literature exist that look at the role of technological progress in
the second globalisation era. Despite claims about the significance of containerisation in
contributing to the growth of world trade, systematic evidence on the effects of the adop-
tion of container technology on world trade appears to be missing. This is where this
research comes to fill the gap. We are mainly concerned with how much containerisa-
tion contributed to the second wave of globalisation. Namely, in this thesis, we attempt
to estimate the effects of containerisation on international trade. Containerisation is a
technological change that arises from shipping goods via containers rather than through
the traditional break-bulk method which characterised international shipping since an-
tiquity. Do we find any evidence to support the claims that containerisation made major
contributions in promoting international trade in the second era of globalisation?
This research is related to two literatures. The first literature pertains to the empir-
ical estimation of changes in transportation technology. The second related literature
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pertains to trade costs and its effects on the volume of trade mainly in the framework
of the gravity equation which we introduce and discuss here.
In the transportation technology literature, scholars distinguish between two waves of
globalisation. The first took place between the second half of the nineteenth century and
the eve of World War I while the second commences after World War II and accelerates
in the early 1970s as shown in figure 3.1.
The defining features of the first era of globalisation (1850-1913) are the introduction
of the steam engine in shipping, the dramatic expansion of the railroad networks, and
the telegraph.
Starting with North (1958) who finds evidence of decline in freight rates between
1815 and 1913 of the major (bulk) commodities, he explores possible causes for the
decline. Citing technology (switch from sail to steam) as playing a role, North was of the
opinion that reasons for this decline lie mainly in the development of external economies
which greatly reduce port costs and turn around time, the gradual reorganization of
international shipping, and the gradual development of the volume of backhaul freight
as the new regions expand in population and income as a result of this new export
commodity.
In examining freight rates between 1740 and 1913 - the eve of World War I, Harley
(1988) similarly finds evidence for a long decline in freight rates starting in 1850 based
on several shipping indices. By the early 1900s, he finds that rates are only about
a third of what they were before 1850. In exploring the reasons for this decline, he
challenges the findings of North. He conducts a productivity gains calculation on a new
freights index. He finds that the switch from sail to steam as metallurgical advances were
applied to ocean transport was the main contributor to this decline. The use of metal in
building the ship hulls and the steam engines signalled a technological departure from
sail ships. The new vessels resulted in strong economies of scale and less factor inputs
which resulted in steadily declining freight rates.
Mohammed and Williamson (2003) similarly find evidence for drastic declines in
freight rates between 1869 and 1913 by constructing new freight rate indices from pre-
viously unused data. They find that rapid technological change drove the decline in real
freight rates before World War I and the slow down in technological change contributed
to the stability in rates during the interwar period.
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The first wave of globalisation was not only characterised by the switch from sail to
steam. Another big technological change in that period was the introduction of rail and
the steam train. In Britain, which was the pioneer, this took place between 1830 and
the 1850s. By the 1850s, Britain had over 7000 miles of railway. In the USA, the years
between 1850 and 1890 saw exponential growth in US railroads which at its peak made
up one-third of the world total railroad mileage1.
In the economics literature, railroad and its economic impact received a good deal
of attention. Starting with Fogel’s (1964) pioneering study on the effects of US rail-
roads on economic growth, a number of studies have investigated the effects of railroad
construction on economic performance and market integration.
Hurd (1975) investigates the behaviour of prices of food grains in India from 1861
to 1921 in relation to railway expansion during this period. In comparing food grain
prices between Indian districts, the author finds the prices in some districts were eight
to ten times higher than the prices in others in the 1860s (before railway). He argues
that transportation problems and high transport costs were the reasons for this dispar-
ity. Railway expansion in India was very rapid and occurred on a massive scale. In
1910, India had the fourth longest total track mileage in the world ahead of the United
Kingdom. With the expansion of the railway system, distant isolated markets were con-
nected and separate markets became part of the same market. By analysing variation
in prices, they find that prices of wheat and rice converge between 1870 and 1921 across
all districts. The correlation between the decline in price variation and the expansion
of railway was clear in the study. He concludes that railway expansion was the main
reason behind the convergence in grain prices across India.
Based on detailed archival data from colonial India, Donaldson (2008) provides a
comprehensive general equilibrium analysis of the impacts resulting from the expansion
of India’s railroad network during 1853-1930. By collecting archival data from colonial
India, the author estimates the impact of India’s vast railroad network. The main
findings of the paper can be summarised as follows. Railroads decreased trade costs and
interregional price gaps and as consequence stimulated interregional and international
trade. Railroads also eliminated the responsiveness of local prices to local productivity
shocks but increased the transmission of these shocks between regions. With respect to
1Wolmar (2009) page 94.
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income, railroads increased the level of real income and decreased the volatility thereof.
These results suggest that transportation infrastructure projects can improve welfare
signifcantly and the main channel of transmission is trade.
Exploiting spatial dispersion of 19th century grain prices, Keller and Shiue (2008)
evaluate the relative impacts of railroad technology (steam trains) versus tariff reduc-
tions on market integration in the German Zollverein 2. Market integration is measured
by the differences in wheat prices across markets in Europe. They collect prices in 68
market locations across 5 European countries and 15 different German states. In in-
vestigating the effects of the new transport technology, the authors employ pair-specific
information on the establishment of rail connections between two markets. The customs
union (the German Zollverein) which took over half a century to complete - between
1828 to 1888 - is measured with a 0/1 variable . This is also the case for currency unions,
which were introduced gradually in the different German States between 1837 and 1871.
Using time-series variation in the adoption of the technology and institutional poli-
cies, they estimate the effects of steam trains, customs union, and common currency on
the dispersion of wheat prices. To control for potential endogeneity, they instrument
each of the relevant variables with two geographical variables each. They find that both
institutional change (currency agreements and customs liberalisations) and the adop-
tion of steam trains were important in increasing the size of the market in 19th century
Europe. However, the impact of steam trains is found to be larger than the institutional
changes. They estimate that the introduction of steam trains reduced price gaps by
about fourteen percentage points; trade liberalisation by about seven percentage points
and currency agreements by about six percentage points.
While the introduction of rail and steamships were the main changes in transporta-
tion technology that underpinned the first wave of globalisation (1840s-1914) Krugman
(1995) raises the question about what was driving the growth in international trade after
World War II? As we mentioned in the previous section, he identifies two world views.
The first view belongs to journalists who attribute the latest wave of globalisation to
technological improvements in transportation and communication. The second view of
2The Zollverein, or German Customs Union, was a coalition of German states formed to manage
customs and economic policies within their territories. Established in 1818, the original union cemented
economic ties between the various Prussian and Hohenzollern territories, and ensured economic contact
between the non-contiguous holdings of the Hohenzollern family, which was also the ruling family of
Prussia. It expanded between 1820 to 1866 to include most of the German states.
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the international economists tends to emphasise the role of bilateral and multilateral
trade liberalisation.
Krugman also identifies four new aspects of modern world trade. These are the rise of
intra-industry trade or the trade in similar goods between similar countries; the creation
of production chains, the breaking of the production process into many geographically
separated steps; the emergence of supertraders, countries with extremely high ratios of
trade to GDP such as Hong Kong and Singapore; and finally the emergence of large
exports of manufactured goods from low-wage to high-wage nations.
Other economists suggested other potential candidates for explaining the rise of in-
ternational trade. Convergence in economic size was suggested by Helpman (1987) and
Hummels and Levinsohn (1995). Yi (2003) suggested the role of vertical specializa-
tion/outsourcing in increasing world trade through increasing intermediate and final
goods trade.
The answer to Krugman’s contentious question is likely to be a combination of all of
the above. Baier and Bergstrand (2001) try to disentangle the different potential causes
of the growth in international trade. Namely, they disentangle the relative effects of
transport-cost reductions, tariff liberalisation, and income convergence on the growth of
world trade. They do so for several OECD countries between the late 1950s and 1980s.
They find that income growth explains about 67%, tariff-rate reductions about 25%,
transport-cost declines about 8%, and income convergence virtually none. This is not
necessarily in favour of containerisation.
Jacks et al. (2008) challenge the findings of Baier and Bergstrand (2001) by deriving
a measure of aggregate bilateral trade costs based on the structural gravity equation.
They find that trade cost declines explain 33% of the trade growth between 1950 and
2000.
Lundgren (1996) finds that bulk freight rates have decreased by about 65% during
the period 1950s to the 1980s mainly due to increased economies of scale.
Students of transportation technology and prominent commentators link the post
World War II growth of world trade to containerisation. For example, Paul Krugman
writes (Krugman (2010), p.7):
The ability to ship things long distances fairly cheaply has been there since
the steamship and the railroad. What was the big bottleneck was getting
39
things on and off the ships. A large part of the costs of international trade
was taking the cargo off the ship, sorting it out, and dealing with the pilferage
that always took place along the way. So, the first big thing that changed
was the introduction of the container. When we think about technology that
changed the world, we think about glamorous things like the internet. But if
you try to figure out what happened to world trade, there is a really strong
case to be made that it was the container, which could be hauled off a ship
and put onto a truck or a train and moved on. It used to be the case that
ports were places with thousands and thousands of longshoremen milling
around loading and unloading ships. Now longshoremen are like something
out of those science fiction movies in which people have disappeared and
been replaced by machines.
Despite claims in the business and transportation literature about the alleged im-
portance of ’containerisation’ in stimulating world trade, the trade literature has been
surprisingly silent about the impacts of containerisation3. Two noteworthy exceptions
are Hummels (2007) and Blonigen and Wilson (2007).
Hummels (2007) looks at transportation costs in the second era of globalisation, i.e.
the post-war era of trade. Between 1950-2004, world trade grew at a rapid average
rate of 5.9% per annum. He investigates the explanations for the rise in international
trade. One prominent explanation is the decline in transport costs. The decades since
World War II witnessed technological changes in shipping, namely the introduction of
the container and the development of the jet engine. However, evidence of decline in
shipping costs in recent decades has been lacking.
In the first part of his study, Hummels looks at how goods move in international
trade. He finds that roughly 23% of world trade by value occurs between countries
that share a border. For trade with non-adjacent partners, nearly all merchandise
trade moves via ocean or air modes. However, air cargo remains very limited. Air
shipments represent less than one percent of total tons and ton-miles shipped in 2004.
Bulk commodities such as oil, iron ores, coal, and grain are shipped almost exclusively
by sea. Bulk trade constitutes the majority of international trade when measured in
3We draw on the relevant business literature where necessary especially in the narrative section but
we will not review this literature here as it is not necessary for our economic analysis
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weight, but much smaller and shrinking share of trade in value terms. Manufactured
goods are the largest and most rapidly growing portion of world trade.
In looking at changes in transport costs, he examines customs data from New Zealand
and the US on shipment freight expenditures. He finds that freight costs exhibit no clear
trend in the New Zealand case, meaning no change, and a steady decline in the US data.
The New Zealand data cover the period 1963-1997. The US data cover the period 1974-
1997. In the US case, costs declines from about 8% of the value of total imports in 1974
down to about 4% in 1997. However, the decline possibly masks shocks to prices due to
the oil crisis in 1974. A problem with this measure is that it does not distinguish between
bulk, container, or break-bulk shipments. Also, since goods with high transport/freight
costs are less traded, then aggregating shipment freight expenditures naturally gives
lower weights to these goods.
To answer the question whether technological changes resulted in lower ocean ship-
ping prices, Hummels exploits price indices for tramp (bulk) and liner shipping (con-
tainer and break-bulk). For liner shipping, the author uses an index constructed by the
German Ministry of Transport. The index suggests an actual increase in ocean shipping
rates during the time period 1974-84 that coincides with the period of major container-
isation. This is also the period of high oil prices. The index includes both general
cargo moved as break-bulk and in containers. It is however not clear what percentage of
goods is moved in containers. The index is not representative of world shipping prices
as it focuses only on shipping lines operating in Germany and the Netherlands. Using
commodity data on US trade flows, Hummels finds that freight cost reductions from in-
creasing an exporter’s share of containerised trade have been eroded by the increase in
fuel costs resulting from the 1970s hike in oil prices. Nevertheless, running regressions to
study the determinants of transport costs in the US, he finds that increasing the share of
containerised trade lowers shipping costs between 3 to 13%. Hummels (2007) concludes
then that ”the real gains from containerisation might come from quality changes in
transportation services...To the extent that these quality improvements do not show up
in measured price indices, the indices understate the value of the technological change”.
Building on Clark et al. (2004) in examining the effects of port efficiency measures on
bilateral trade flows, Blonigen and Wilson (2007) also estimate the effects of increased
container usage on reducing the import charges for US imports during 1991-2003. They
41
find that increasing the share of trade that is containerised by 1 percent lowers shipping
costs by only 0.05 percent.
It is perhaps no surprise that the state of infrastructure in a country has a direct effect
on trade. Limao and Venables (2001) examine the determinants of transport-cost factors.
Using data on shipments from Baltimore, Maryland to various destinations, they found
that transport-cost factors were both marginal and fixed cost factors. Marginal costs
include distance and borders which have economically and statistically significant effects
on transport costs. Regarding fixed trade costs, the higher the quality of infrastructure
of both the exporting and importing countries the lower cost. For landlocked countries,
the higher the level or quality of infrastructure of the country used for its ocean port the
lower the cost. We investigate the effects of allowing landlocked countries to use their
rail to ship containers overseas in this thesis.
Another secondary strand of literature that could be linked to our research is the
literature of technology change and the effects thereof. Head et al. (2009) investigate
whether technological advances in communication leads to imminent offshoring of ser-
vices and loss of jobs as a result. They provide a model for international services trade
that generates a gravity-like equation for services. They find that distance still matters
in services trade unlike what other models have suggested. Distance shields workers to
a significant extent from the threat of offshoring.
Trade costs, broadly defined, are all the costs that are incurred in shipping a good
from a producer to a final user other than the production cost of the good itself. Ander-
son and van Wincoop (2004) define trade costs as ”all costs incurred in getting a good
to a final user other than the marginal cost of producing the good itself: transporta-
tion cost (both freight and time costs), policy barriers (tariffs and nontariff barriers),
information costs, contract enforcement costs, costs associated with the use of differ-
ent currencies, legal and regulatory costs, and local distribution costs (wholesale and
retail)”. Traditionally, the literature has focused on protectionist border policies, like
tariffs and non-tariff barriers to trade. More recently, the literature has paid more at-
tention to ’natural trade costs’, like transportation costs, time or other factors affecting
communication (like language, culture).
One strand of the literature examines empirical regularities regarding changes in
trade costs over time (Moneta (1959); Hummels (2007)). The other major strand exam-
42
ines the impact of changes in trade costs on trade flows or other performance variables,
mostly in the context of an econometric gravity specification. We describe the gravity
equation, its origins, and its theoretical foundations below.
Theoretical Foundations of the Gravity Equation
The gravity equation has long been used successfully in empirical economics. It relates
bilateral trade flows to GDP, distance, and other factors that determine trade. It has
been widely used to estimate the effects of changes in measurable and non-measurable
trade costs such as customs and currency unions, language, and border effects (see
Bergstrand and Egger (2011) for a good survey). The traditional gravity model is
inspired by Newton’s Law of Gravitation. A mass (country j) attracts goods (demand
Ej) from another mass (country i with supply Yi) and the potential flow is reduced by





The formula gives the predicted movement of goods between i and j (Xij). The
gravity equation was first used by Ravenstein (1889) for migration patterns in the 19th
century United Kingdom (UK). Tinbergen (1962) was the first to use gravity to ex-
plain trade flows between two regions. Estimating the Newtonian-type gravity for trade
flows is considered to be one of the most successful empirical models in Economics. In
international trade, the gravity equation surfaced as a statistical model to explain vari-
ation in aggregate bilateral trade flows among pairs of countries for cross-sections using
Ordinary Least Square (OLS).
The gravity equation however remained without any theoretical foundations to jus-
tify its use in Economics until 1979. The first formal general equilibrium based gravity
equation was first proposed by Anderson (1979). The model is based on two main as-
sumptions. First, each country is assumed to specialise in the production of its own
good. Second, identical Cobb-Douglas preferences are assumed.
Anderson and van Wincoop (2003) expanded the derived gravity equation to the
constant elasticity of substitution (CES) case to reflect ’love for variety’. The derived
gravity equation suggests that econometric estimation of the empirical gravity equation
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which incorporates the usual control variables such as income and distance may be
biased. Namely, the gravity equation suggests that trade flows between countries i
and j do not only depend on trade barriers between the two countries but also on
the trade barriers of each of the two countries with the rest of the world. This is
what Anderson and van Wincoop (2003) term as multilateral resistances. They define
multilateral resistances as the average barrier of two countries to trade with all their
partners. Intuitively, the more resistant to trade with all others a region is, the more it
is pushed to trade with a given bilateral partner.
Traditionally, economic evaluations of trade costs using the gravity method have ig-
nored the multilateral resistances. The implications of keeping them out econometrically
is that any such estimates will suffer from omitted variable bias in so far that the in-
dependent variable in question is correlated with the multilateral terms which is almost
always the case (the multilateral terms are functions of trade costs - see expressions 2.3
and 2.4 below). Anderson and van Wincoop (2003) demonstrate by deriving a simple
gravity equation from a CES utility function and homothetic preferences how ignoring
the multilateral resistances can bias the estimations. To demonstrate how omitting the
multilateral resistances can bias estimations, they use the example of the border puzzle
of McCallum (1995). McCallum found that border matters and the effects of borders
are extremely large. Using the traditional gravity equation, he estimates that the US-
Canadian border led Canadian provinces to trade 22-fold more than Canadian and US
states.
Anderson and van Wincoop found that by ignoring the general equilibrium effects
and hence the multilateral resistances, the Canadian-US border reduced international
trade by 80%. By applying the theoretically founded gravity equation and accounting
for multilateral resistances, the border reduced Canadian-US trade by only 44%.









The price indices Pi and Pj are the multilateral resistance variables and they depend
on all bilateral resistances tij . Yi and Ej are income of country i and expenditure of
country j relative to world income Y and σ is the elasticity of substitution parameter.
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The gravity equation 3.2 tells us that bilateral trade depends on bilateral trade
barrier between i and j relative to the product of their multilateral resistance terms,
after controlling for size. For a given trade barrier between i and j, higher barriers
between j and its other trading partners will reduce the relative price of goods from i
and thus raise imports from i.
The key implication of the theoretical gravity equation derived by Anderson and van
Wincoop is therefore that trade between countries i and j is determined by the trade
barrier between them relative to average trade barriers that both regions face with all























It is clear from equations 3.3 and 3.4 that the multilateral price terms are both
functions of trade costs. This is why omitting the multilateral terms from the esti-
mated gravity equation leads to biased estimates. An alternative approach to estimating
equations 3.2-3.4 is to estimate equation 3.2 using country-specific FE (exporter- and
importer-year FE in the panel setting) to generate unbiased gravity equation parameters.
Anderson and van Wincoop (2004) calculate the bias present in traditional gravity
equations that omit the multilateral resistance terms. They also discuss the aggregation
bias that arises when estimating gravity with aggregate trade data and recommend using
disaggregate product level data.
Anderson (2011) gives a theoretical background into the gravity equation and high-
lights some of the problems that arise when estimating the structural model. He argues
that while gravity has been mostly used to study aggregate bilateral trade flows, the
model is more fit to be used for disaggregated goods because the frictions ”are more
likely to differ markedly by product characteristics”. More specifically, aggregation in
estimating the traditional model causes two problems. There is aggregation bias because
of sectorially varying trade costs and sectorially varying elasticities of trade with respect
to costs. Anderson and Yotov (2010b) and Anderson and Yotov (2010a) find evidence
of downward bias due to aggregation. The second aggregation problem is specification
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bias due to the use of GDP in the estimations which is a value-added concept with
variable relationship to gross trade flows. The author argues that disaggregation and
use of sectorial output and expenditure variables fixes the problems. In this thesis, we
will use aggregate trade flows to estimate gravity equations and then move to estimate
disaggregate product level models in line with the literature.
Following the derivation of the gravity equation by Anderson (1979), Bergstrand
(1985) proposed another general equilibrium theory for the gravity equation derived
from ’nested’ CES utility function in an endowment economy. He assumes that out-
put by exporter is not costlessly substituted among foreign markets (unlike Anderson
(1979)). The exporter is assumed to have a constant elasticity of transformation (CET)
production function. The gravity equation derived from these assumptions included
multilateral price terms. Therefore, Bergstrand finds that the price indices influenced
bilateral trade flows.
Similarly, the gravity equation could also be derived from monopolistic competition,
Ricardian, and Heckscher-Ohlin models. Feenstra et al. (2001) find that the different
models that are used to derive a gravity-type equation have different implications for
the coefficient estimates.
Krugman (1979) assumes a one-sector economy with one factor of production (labour)
and CES preferences where each exporter has an endogenous number of varieties of goods









Maximising equation 3.5 subject to a budget constraint yields a demand function







where Pj is the consumer price index of j.
Krugman assumes a monopolistic competitive market structure, increasing returns
to scale for the production of the firm, and a single factor of production (labour).
Under monopolistic competition, zero economic profits are assumed in equilibrium. This











where the Y’s are income terms, L is labour endowment, and tij are trade costs
between countries i and j.
An alternative approach to the Krugman model focuses on the production side in the
Ricardian spirit. Eaton and Kortum (2002) model the trade of a continuum of goods
and assume countries have differential access to technology and perfect competition.
Allowing CES preferences and Ricardian technology with heterogeneous productivity for
each country and good, productivities are randomly drawn from a Frechet distribution.
The bilateral trade flows formula derived is similar to equation 3.2 except that instead of







where Ti denotes i’s state of technology which influences sales, ci denotes the unit cost
of inputs (labour).
Equations 3.2, 3.7 and 3.8 resemble each other, In all three equations, trade flow from
i to j is a function of importer j’s overall economic activity and the price of exporter i’s
output relative to a measure of the overall level of prices of goods facing importer j.
Empirical Applications
Gravity has been used extensively to estimate the impact of many other factors that
may affect volume of trade. The number of empirical studies is huge. Since some of the
empirical estimations in this thesis include controls for what we call ’policy variables’, we
will discuss the efforts to isolate the effects of these variables here. The policy variables
that we control for are: FTAs, GATT membership, and currency unions.
One of the oldest uses of the gravity equation is to estimate the effects of economic
integration such as FTAs and the World Trade Organisation (WTO). In fact, Tinbergen
(1962), in the first application of gravity to trade, looked at the effects of membership in
the Benelux Free Trade Agreement (FTA) and the British Commonwealth on members’
trade.
Early estimations of the effects of FTAs ignored multilateral resistances (Aitken
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(1973), Bergstrand (1985)). In the last decade or so, researchers have used panel data
to estimate the effects of FTAs. Egger and Pfaffermayr (2003) argue that the proper
specication of a panel gravity model should include time invariant country-pair and
time FE. This is because country-pair effects account for a large part of the variation.
Similarly, Cheng and Wall (2005) demonstrate that estimates are biased when country-
pair FE are omitted. In our analysis, we therefore include country-time FE to control
for multilateral resistances as well as country-pair to take into account the suggestions
made by Egger and Pfaffermayr (2003) and Cheng and Wall (2005).
Several recent studies in the effects of FTAs have consequently incorporated the
theoretical and econometric considerations discussed here. One of the most prominent
studies is that of Baier and Bergstrand (2007). We review this paper in detail here since
we draw on its econometric methodology in this thesis.
Baier and Bergstrand (2007) address econometrically the endogeneity of FTAs. They
argue that FTA dummies in the context of gravity are not exogenous random variables.
Countries usually select endogenously, perhaps for reasons correlated with the level of
trade. If FTAs are endogenous, then previous cross-section empirical estimates of the
effects of FTAs on trade flows may be biased. Some attempts have been made to solve
the endogeneity problem by using instrumental variables such as Baier and Bergstrand
(2002) but the results were mixed. Using an econometric analysis of treatment effects,
they estimate the effects of FTAs on bilateral trade flows using panel data at 5-year
intervals from 1960 to 2000 for 96 countries. The empirical results in this paper suggest
that effects of FTAs using the standard cross-sectional gravity equation are biased. They
estimate that traditional estimates of the effects of FTAs on bilateral trade flows have
been underestimated by as much as 75-85%. They demonstrate that the most plausible
estimates of the average effect of an FTA on bilateral trade flows are obtained using
panel data with bilateral fixed and country-time effects or first-differenced panel data
with country-time effects. Doing this, they find that an FTA approximately doubles two
members’ bilateral trade after 10 years.
Using country FE to account for multilateral resistances helps to account for the
endogeneity bias created by prices and the influence of FTAs among other countries on
the trade from i to j, but it does not correct for the bias introduced if countries select
into FTAs. Potential sources of endogeneity bias generally fall under three categories:
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omitted variables, simultaneity, and measurement error. They argue that omitted bias
is the most important source of endogeneity bias caused by FTA effects using cross-
sectional data. Policymakers’ decisions to select into an FTA are likely related to the
level of trade (relative to its potential level), and not to recent changes in trade levels.
Thus, the determinants are likely to be cross-sectional in nature. With panel data, FE
and first differencing can be employed to treat endogeneity bias.
As a FE estimation, they estimate an equation with the log bilateral trade flows
as the dependent variables using bilateral (ij) FE to account for variation in distance,
border, and language along with country-time (it, jt) effects to account for variation in
real GDP and multilateral price terms. Their estimation equation becomes:
lnXijkt = β1 + β2FTAijt + θit + δjt + φij + uijkt (3.9)
Based on this specification, they estimate an FTA coefficient of 0.46 which suggests
that an FTA increases trade by about an average of 58%. This specification should
generate unbiased estimates for the coefficient of the treatment variable FTA. This is
less than the estimated coefficient of 0.68 when multilateral resistances are not controlled
for.
The authors argue that FTAs are usually phased in slowly and the nature of the
0-1 FTA variable does not reflect this. The 0-1 FTA variable was constructed using
the ”Date of Entry into Force” of the agreement. Thus it is reasonable to include one
or two lagged levels of the FTA dummy (FTAij,t−1 and FTAij,t−2). The results after
including the lags reveal that FTA has statistically significant lagged effects on trade
flows. The cumulative average treatment effect with one lag is 0.65; with two lags, the
total average treatment effect is 0.76. This is equivalent to an increase of trade due
to an FTA of around 114%. To test for strict exogeneity, they include a future level
of FTA to the estimation equation (FTAij,t+1). If FTA is strictly exogenous, then the
lead variable should be uncorrelated with the concurrent trade flow. This is confirmed
in their estimation where the coefficient of the lead variable is economically negligible
and not significantly different from zero.
Baier and Bergstrand (2007) argue that they expect first-differenced data to provide
better estimates of the average treatment effect. This is because the error terms in the
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FE model are likely to be serially correlated and this produces an inefficient estimator.
This is not the case with the first-differenced estimator. Also, aggregate trade data are
likely to be close to unit-root processes. When estimating the first-differenced version
of the above equation, they find that cumulative treatment effects without any lags is
0.3; including 1 lagged change in FTA increases the cumulative effect to 0.52 and with 2
lagged variables, this becomes 0.61. This is equivalent to an increase of 84% in trade due
to FTAs 10 years after signing. This result is only slightly smaller than the FE estimate
above (0.76). Thus FTA essentially doubles the level of members’ international trade
after 10 years.
We will use a similar econometric methodology in this thesis since the effects con-
tainerisation, we argue, are likely to be felt many years after introduction.
Similar in spirit to Baier and Bergstrand (2007) , Baier et al. (2007) use the same
technique to find credible effects of various Latin American FTAs on members’ trade
flows. Baldwin and Taglioni (2007) employ exporter-time, importer-time, and country-
pair FE and found smaller effects of EU integration and no effect of Eurozone member-
ship on members’ trade.
Rose (2002) uses the gravity equation to answer the question as to whether member-
ship of WTO or its precursor GATT actually increase the member’s trade. He estimates
a traditional gravity model (i.e. without accounting for multilateral price terms) in a
large panel data set covering over fifty years and 175 countries. He tries different FE
specifications (year effects, year and country FE, and year and country-pair effects).
Rose tries a variable that indicates unilateral and another that indicates bilateral mem-
bership in any trade relationship. The search reveals little evidence that countries joining
or belonging to the GATT/WTO have increased their trade.
Tomz et al. (2007) criticise the results of Rose (2002) and find that GATT and
WTO membership actually increases trade if one accounts for the role of non-member
participants. This is because GATT created rights and obligations not only for signing
members but also for colonies, newly independent states, and provisional members.
They find effects of GATT and WTO on trade that are economically substantial and
statistically significant. This paper however does not make any criticism on the empirical
strategy in Rose (2002). Rose (2007) responds to the criticisms raised by Tomz et al.
(2007).
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Similarly, Rose (2005) finds some effect for WTO/GATT membership on trade when
using a within estimator to identify those effects. However, similar to most studies, this
paper and the above-mentioned studies failed to account for multilateral resistances that
is suggested by the structural gravity equation. This means that their findings should
not be taken at face value.
Head et al. (2010) in a paper that investigates the erosion of colonial trade linkages
estimate a gravity specification that accounts for time-varying importer and exporter
effects and dyadic effects. The purpose of the paper is to examine the effect of inde-
pendence on post-colonial trade. However, one of the controls in their specification is
bilateral GATT membership. They find that GATT membership has an economically
and statistically significant effect on trade in the magnitude of around 11% to 12%.
This result is more credible since it takes into account country time-variant effects that
control for multilateral resistances. With respect to the main findings of this paper, the
authors find that trade with the coloniser has contracted by about 65% after 4 decades.
They also find that trade between two former colonies of the same empire erodes as
much as trade with the coloniser.
Rose (2000) started a strand in the literature of estimating the effects of currency
unions on trade using the gravity equation. Estimating a traditional gravity equation, he
finds that membership in a common currency union increased bilateral trade by 235%.
Rose only included year dummies in his gravity estimation. Frankel and Romer (1999)
investigate the effects of trade on economic growth. Combining the two studies, Rose
and Frankel (2000) estimate the effect that currency union has, via trade, on output
per capita. Glick and Rose (2002) use the time-series variation available in a large
panel setting to identify the effect of common currency. By using a within estimator
(controlling for country-pair effects), they find that joining/leaving a currency union
leads to a near doubling/halving of bilateral trade. The drop of the currency variable
coefficient from 1.3 to 0.65 when including country-pair FE is rather dramatic and hints
that the estimates in Rose (2000) could be biased.
The large size of the effect estimated by Rose (2000) spurred considerable debate and
critique. Baldwin (2006) summarised several of the arguments that have been raised to
explain the results of Rose. The first obvious problem was omitted variable bias due to
the omission of multilateral price terms as we discussed above at length. The second
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problem is that currency unions in the data set are dominated by small, poor, and open
economies. Other concerns are possible model misspecification and potential reverse
causality since countries that choose to use common currencies usually already trade a
lot with each other.
Rose and Stanley (2005) uses a meta-analysis of 34 (recent) studies into the effect
of common currency on trade to investigate the rather diverging estimates of this effect.
He concludes that a currency union increases bilateral trade by between 30 and 90%.
Head et al. (2010) estimates an effect that is between 13% and 34% on international
trade when accounting for country-time and country-pair effects which control for mul-




Data and Constructing the
Container Variable
4.1 Introduction: Intermodality of Containerisation
Experts in the transportation and shipping sectors are of the opinion that containerisa-
tion’s real value is in its intermodality, i.e. its capacity to be used in all transportation
modes indiscriminately. Intermodal transport is the term used for allowing goods to
be shifted among the three main transport modes with relative ease. Containerisation
allowed goods to be transported quickly to and from the port by rail or truck. The
standard container can be transported as a trailer on wheels by trucks and lorries or on
wagons by trains. In order to benefit the most from containerisation, countries had to
link their ports by rail and roads. In fact, one of the reasons why container ports are
inhibitively expensive is the need to have the container ports connected to main cities
and industrial areas by rail and road. Also containerisation was putting pressure on the
existing road networks as trucks have become bigger to transport 20 foot and 40 foot
containers.
Standardisation of the container and the handling equipment enables shippers to
search for the cheapest possible total transportation route. This caused a realignment
of the relative uses of sea, rail, and road modes of transport. Figure 4.1 shows how
allowing for interchanging modes of transport leads to considerably cheaper transport.
In this figure, (inland) intermodal transport is achieved by allowing trains between
major centres and local distribution by road. The local distribution is assumed to be
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10% of the rail journey (with a minimum of 20 miles). One observes that trains provide
the lowest cost mode of inland transport for journeys above 100 miles. Trains would
only operate between major container ports and inland depots. The advantage of road
transport is flexibility to operate on any route. But there are usually limitations on the
distance that can be covered in road transport (usually relatively small distances)1.
Figure 4.1: Cost Savings in Intermodal Transport in 1967 (reproduced from McKinsey
Report)
Intermodal transport does not only occur between inland modes of transport. Unit
trains can compete with sea transport on some routes. This is why European Railways
were very quick to adopt containerisation on their trains in 1968 (section 2.3.5). Figure
4.2 shows how intermodal transport between sea and rail can be achieved2. Costs of
transporting containers on rail are always below those of ships with capacity of 600
containers or less. For ships with capacity of 1200 containers, economies of scale are
activated and ships become cheaper for trips above 3300 miles. This means that it is
cheaper for the UK to export to US East Coast and have the goods transported by
rail to the West Coast instead of transporting directly by sea to West Coast (distance
between East and West Coasts of the US is around 3000 miles whereas the sea distance
via Panama is over 6000 miles). This is what one sees in modern shipping as well where
European exports call at East Coast ports in the US and are moved by trains to the West
1Source: McKinsey and Company (1967) based on calculation for the UK in 1967
2Source: McKinsey and Company (1967), projections for UK trade
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coast or the Mid-West. Evidence from this figure and the previous one suggests that
sea and rail are likely to be very important for international trade and trucks perhaps
more important for internal trade.
Figure 4.2: Costs of Transporting Containers by Ship Vs Train in 1967 (reproduced
from McKinsey Report)
Given the above evidence, we present data on containerisation that take into consid-
eration this rather important feature of containerisation which is its intermodality. The
data we present in this chapter however may give a rather incomplete picture about the
timing of the adoption of the container. This is because we identify containerisation in
ports and rail. We have no information about cargo transport by truck. This is one of
the reasons why we consider international trade outcomes in our analysis.
In the countries that could afford to equip their ports to handle containers, we
observe that containerisation is a process that mostly starts with the port but quickly
progresses to engulf other parts of the transportation network of a country. What we
usually see is that ports have to be connected to the road and rail networks to the rest
of the country to avoid congestion at the port. Congestion in the port of New York and
Manhattan was one of the main reasons why New Jersey was chosen as a location for
the new container port.
In section 2 of this chapter, we describe our data sources and construct a measure
for port containerisation. In section 3, we present and discuss evidence on the speed
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of adoption of containerisation in some countries. In section 3, we present our data
on railway containerisation. Since containerisation develops into a comprehensive in-
termodal transport system, and due to the nature of our container measure, we hold
a discussion on what we are likely to be capturing with our variable in section 5. In
sections 6 and 7, we discuss the data set on trade flows and present some descriptives.
Since not all trade can be moved in containers, we describe how we classify products
as containerisable/non-containerisable in section 8 and explore trends in the trade data
based on this classification in section 9. In section 10, we describe other relevant data
to our analysis.
4.2 Quantitative Assessment of Containerisation: Construct-
ing the Port Container Variable
We construct our containerisation variables from data obtained from Containerisation
International Yearbook 1970-1992. This is a publication dedicated to container shipping.
The main purpose of the publication is to offer experts in the transportation industry
with the latest information regarding the progress of the new technology as well as tech-
nical information about cranes, ships, and ports. Containerisation International has
been publishing annual yearbooks and periodical publications since 1969 with the sole
focus on containerisation. The yearbooks, which we use as our source, publish informa-
tion about container ports around the world and report statistics on containerised trade
passing through them since the start of containerisation.
The published information gives a summary of the state of containerisation in the
world. Once a country starts processing containers, the publication names the con-
tainerised port and gives information on the facilities that are available in port at the
time of adoption. An example of an entry in the publication is given in figure 4.3.
In this entry, we are presented with information on containerisation in New Zealand,
namely Auckland. In the case of Auckland, the port has invested in a new container
terminal and the port started handling containers in 1971. The information presented
include facilities available at the terminal, future plans for expansions/investments,
whether the port is connected by rail, and container tonnage moved through the port.
Not all countries invest in new container terminals, however, mainly due to the
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Figure 4.3: Container Adoption in Auckland - New Zealand (Source: Containerisation
International Yearbook 1973)
high costs of such an investment. For example, in Greece, containerisation started by
appointing one or more berths in an existing port - the port of Piraeus. Container
berths need to be deepened and equipped with cranes to handle containers. In figure
4.4, the container entry for Greece suggests that only two berths have specialised for
containers in the port and several cranes are available to handle containers. This port
started handling containers in 1970 and we have statistics on container tonnage through
port.
Hence, we observe different degrees of adoption in ports. The highest degree would
be to build a container port from scratch such as Tilbury and Felixstowe in the UK.
A lesser degree of adoption would be to build a container terminal in an existing port
such as Rotterdam. The least degree would be to make some adjustments on existing
berths to make them suitable for containers and add cranes to handle containers such
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Figure 4.4: Container Adoption in Piraeus - Greece (Source: Containerisation Interna-
tional Yearbook 1973)
as in Greece.
The source of the information reported by Containerisation International is the
ports themselves. The publication only reports on ports that have facilities to handle
containers. Ports that lack container berths (the minimum) are not considered con-
tainer ports. The information on facilities and container tonnage through ports is not
comprehensive and can vary greatly in reliability. Since the source of the information
is the ports themselves, ports do not report the same information in all years and some
ports are inconsistent in their reporting over the years. This makes it extremely difficult
to reconcile the data or information on the facilities available at each port. This is one
of the reasons why we choose the qualitative variable approach. Future research could
look at ways how we could improve the measure of containerisation.
We observe that many countries containerise gradually with only one or two ports
adopting the technology. Most countries add more container ports in subsequent years,
perhaps to accommodate increasing container trade. The United States, the United
Kingdom, and other large countries are an exception to this as many ports were equipped
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simultaneously to handle containers.
In constructing our container measure, we consider a country to have adopted con-
tainerisation in ports once at least one port is equipped to handle containers. Based on
the data described above, we construct country specific (port) containerisation indicator
variables. We call this the port container variable since it is specific to ports. Recall
that containerisation is an intermodal transportation system that affects all modes of
transport. Later in this chapter, we discuss containerisation on the rail. A country-
specific container variable switches from 0 to 1 when at least 1 port in that country has
started processing containers. This makes our container variable country-time variant
(it).
For example, we know that the UK started processing containers when Sea-Land’s
Fairland called at the port of Grangemounth in Scotland in one of the first container
services on the North Atlantic route. From there, containerisation gained momentum in
the UK. In the case of the UK, our container dummy would switch to one in 1966 and
remains on thereafter. The US had been experimenting with container shipping for over
a decade when the first containerships sailed to Europe from the East Coast. The US
container services were on domestic routes, however, including the West Coast-Hawaii
and East Coast-Puerto Rico routes. Since the first containerships to carry US goods to
foreign markets sailed in 1966, containerisation of US trade started in that year. Similar
to the UK, the US container dummy switches to 1 in 1966.
After identifying the year of adoption for the countries that have adopted containers,
we find that the introduction of container ports - outside the innovation country of the
US - occurred exclusively between 1966 and 1983. Fortunately, the container adoption
period 1966-1983 preceded the period of international airline deregulations of the early
1990s which -in tandem with aircraft innovations- resulted in dramatic reductions in the
costs of air transport3. This provides a cleaner environment for our analysis.
After constructing the port container measure for the countries that adopt container-
isation by 1990, we find that the number of countries that port-containerise between
1966 and 1983 are 119. Figure 4.5 shows the timeline of port containerisation for these
countries.
There is clear variation in cross-section and time in the adoption of containerisation
3Harrigan (2010); Hummels (1999)
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Figure 4.5: Port Containerisation Timeline by Country
around the world. Our analysis will take advantage of this variation in identifying the
effects of containerisation.
Our port container measure therefore allows us to identify whether a country in a
given bilateral trade relationship has adopted containerisation. It is worth mentioning
that at the start of containerisation, only a handful of countries were equipped to handle
containers. Shipping lines had to install carry-on cranes onboard containerships4. This
way, ships could call at ports that are not equipped with special cranes to handle con-
tainers. This was necessary in the beginning to give containerisation time to advance
and mature. With time, onboard cranes became obsolete as more countries entered con-
tainerisation. We mention this here because in the next chapter, we introduce container
variables for the originator and destination countries in some of the estimations.
From the timeline, we can see that containerisation was exclusive to developed coun-
tries in the early years (with the exception of a few countries). However, the bulk of
the countries containerised in late 1970s. This is due to the fact that containerisation
requires very high capital investments that may not be readily available for many de-
veloping countries. Also, this could be because it is the developed countries that trade
the most in ’containerisable’ products. To get a clearer picture about containerisation
by income group, we show the timeline for each income group separately.
We classify containerising countries as high-income, mid-income, or low-income. To
classify the countries according to their income, we use GDP per capita data from the
Penn World Tables for the year 1962. We regard a country as high-income if its income
(GDP per capita) falls in the top 75% percentile as of 1962, low-income if they fall in
4Levinson (2006) pages 56 and 132
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the lowest 25% percentile, and mid-income if they fall in between.
Figure 4.6 illustrates the timeline for containerisation of high-income countries. The
first countries to adopt containerisation are perhaps unsurprisingly also the richest coun-
tries.
Figure 4.6: Containerisation Timeline - High Income Countries
Mid-income countries don’t portray a clear pattern in their containerisation. Figure
4.7 shows that mid-income countries containerised between 1968 and 1983. However,
the bulk of these countries in this category containerise in the late 1970s and early 1980s.
Figure 4.7: Containerisation Timeline - Middle Income Countries
As for low-income countries, they started containerising in 1975 (figure 4.8) . Based
on this, the world’s most developed countries containerised first. Low-income countries
adopted the new technology last. Most mid-income countries started their switch to
containerisation after developed countries had already containerised.
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Figure 4.8: Containerisation Timeline - Low Income Countries
4.3 Speed of Adjustment
The use of a zero-one indicator assumes that once containerisation started, the switch
to containerisation was instantaneous. This means that all trade that can be moved in
containers was moved in containers upon introduction. This is implausible. However,
evidence on the speed of adoption is difficult to generate.
In order to construct a measure of speed of adoption, we need information on con-
tainerised trade going through ports and total containerisable trade in each country. We
define the degree of containerisation in a given year as containerised trade going through
ports in a given country divided by total containerisable trade conducted by a country.
Since the data on containerised trade handled in ports is available in tonnage (from
Containerisation International Yearbook), we need to collect data on total containeris-
able trade in tonnage too for each country. Containerisable trade is the trade in goods
that can be moved in containers. For instance, shoes are containerisable whereas natural
gas isn’t. We discuss the containerisability of products in detail in section 4.8. The only
source that has information on trade in tonnage (weight) for some countries is the Or-
ganisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) Commodity Trade5.
Also, since the data we collected from Containerisation International is for ports only,
we had to limit our calculations to countries that trade mainly by sea. This is because




trade with their neighbours by land. The most obvious country that meets the criteria
is the UK since it is an island country. The UK trades almost solely by sea. Figure
4.9 shows that almost 99% of UK trade went by ship between 1965 and 1979 whereas
only very little trade travelled by land or air6. Given this, the UK would be the model
country. Also for availability of data, we make a similar calculation for the speed of
containerisation in Japan.
In figure 4.10 we plot the degree or speed of adoption calculated for the UK and
Japan. The UK started containerising in 1966. The degree of containerisation in the
UK ranges between around 10% in 1967 to around 80% by 1973. Japan started con-
tainerisation in 1969, and by 1970, 20% of containerisable goods traded were being
transported in containers. Five years after the start of containerisation, around 60% of
Japan’s containerisable trade was being moved in containers. The two countries portray
similar speed of adjustment to containerisation. Five years into containerisation, more
than half of the containerisable trade in being moved in containers.
Figure 4.9: UK Trade by Mode of Transport 1965-1979
Based on the evidence, and to mitigate the effect of differences in the speed of adop-
tion as well as to allow trade to adjust to the new technology, we identify the effect
of containerisation at 5-yearly intervals in some of the empirical exercises in ensuing
chapters. In doing so, we therefore assume that much of the adoption process of con-
6Source: Graph produced by author based on data taken from Digest of Port Statistics published by
UK National Ports Association (National Ports Council)
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tainerisation is complete within 5-years of the adoption. But we will also relax this
assumption in some other exercises and examine lagged effects of containerisation in
chapter 7.
Figure 4.10: Degree or Speed of Containerisation in the UK and Japan
To get a feel for how much was being traded in containers in the early years of
containerisation, we plot containerised tonnage for several countries on which we have
data. In figure 4.11, we plot containerised trade in tonnage for the USA, Japan, and
the UK between 1967 and 1979. Containerisation witnessed very rapid growth in the
UK registering an increase in tonnage of almost 9-fold between 1967 and 1979. This is
compared to an increase of only 33% in UK total trade other than fuels (tonnage) over
the same period. The rapid progress of containerisation is not unique to the UK. In the
USA and Japan, container tonnage increased 4- and 9-fold respectively between 1970
and 1980.
Also in smaller countries - some of which are developing countries at the time,
containerisation tonnage witnessed rapid growth. In figure 4.12, we plot containerised
tonnage for Belgium, the Netherlands, Hong Kong, and Singapore. Containerised trade
tonnage increases 4-fold in Belgium, 5-fold in the Netherlands, 25-fold in Hong Kong,
and a staggering 300-fold in Singapore between 1970 and 1980. Interestingly, Hong
Kong and Singapore became major maritime centres in what is known as hubs and
spokes systems. This suggests that containerisation gained popularity among shippers
and shipping lines alike very quickly in these countries.
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Figure 4.11: Containerised Tonnage in Some Countries
4.4 Intermodality and Railway Containerisation
As we have discussed in the introduction of this chapter, containerisation was not exclu-
sive to ports. Railways were especially keen on capturing some of the container cargo,
probably more so in Europe. Being able to carry containers meant that they can com-
pete with shipping lines as a viable means of transport of goods in the new age of the
container. They could also compete with trucking companies for inland transport to
and from the port (figure 4.1). Many countries saw railways in a race against the clock
to build inland container terminals and depots to process containers over the rail. In
the UK, British Railways were very quick to adopt the new technology. They started
transporting containers on what is known as unit trains very early in the process in
1966, the year that the first containers made their way to the UK by ship7. British rail-
ways adapted their tracks and trains to containerisation on several routes, built inland
depots for processing containers, and commissioned their own shuttle ships to get the
containers to mainland Europe.
Upon the British experiment, the railways of Europe came together to coordinate and
facilitate the transportation of containers between European countries. Intercontainer,
the European association for container transport by rail, saw themselves as competing
with shipping lines for intra-European trade. This is due to the nature of European
7Containerisation International Yearbook 1973 page 58
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Figure 4.12: Containerised Tonnage in Some Countries
geography. Containers can be shipped by sea between France and Scandinavia. But
Intercontainer saw itself as a viable alternative to sea shipping in intra-European trade8.
McKinsey calculates that moving containers by train can be cheaper than shipping them
by sea on shorter routes (figure 3.2). Intercontainer advocated the building of terminals
and depots all over Europe to allow for containerisation on rail.
In a similar fashion to port containerisation, we gather information about when coun-
tries started using containers in railways. In Europe, this happened almost concurrently
in all countries due to the establishment of the Intercontainer system in 1968. In other
countries, railway containerisation came as a development to support in transporting
containers to and from ports. Containerisation International Yearbook, the source of our
information, reported data on railway containerisation by devoting a separate section
about railways in each yearbook. The publication also reports whether each of the con-
tainer ports were connected by rail to the rest of the country (figures 3.3 and 3.4). Based
on this information, we are able to identify when containers are being carried on trains
in the countries that invest in railways. In figure 3.13, we trace railway containerisation
adoption in many countries that invested to move containers by rail.
One striking case in figure 3.13 is India. In India, the story was different to Europe.
Government and ports were not quick to containerise. Indian ports started process-
ing containers in 1975. Indian railways, however, were very quick to adopt the new
8Containerisation International Yearbook 1972 page 168
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Figure 4.13: Railway Containerisation Per Country
concept. This is probably due to the comprehensive railway system that India already
possessed9. It is also known that India was a closed economy in the 1960s and there was
not an immediate need for port containerisation, therefore. India started building in-
land container facilities in 1966. They saw in containerisation a way to transport goods
between the different provinces and states. Most countries witnessed an improvement in
their transport infrastructure after their ports had started containerising. It is obvious
that railway containerisation is contingent on an existing comprehensive railway system.
In the ensuing chapter we will incorporate this information in studying the effects of
containerisation.
Our data thus covers two of the three main modes of cargo transport: port and rail.
Our data does not cover roads and is therefore limited since we are not able to capture
containerisation on the roads. If we combine port and rail containerisation to allow
for intermodal transport between the two modes of transport, we identify the time of
containerisation of the different countries whether in port or on rail. We call this ’full
containerisation’ in this thesis. An obvious advantage of the merged measure is that we
allow landlocked countries such as Austria and Switzerland to adopt containerisation by
rail and move containers overseas through neighbouring countries. Another advantage
is that we allow some countries that did not invest in container ports early on to use
their neighbours’ ports to shift containers. An example was Norway which delayed
its investment in container facilities because it could easily move containers by rail
to Gothenburg in Sweden where there is a major container port since 1969. Figure
3.14 combines the information in figures 3.5 and 3.13 and reports the timeline of full
9For a good historical and economics study of India’s railway, refer to Donaldson (2008)
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containerisation in the world. The asterix next to some countries indicated that these
countries containerised by rail first rather than in ports.
Figure 4.14: Full Containerisation Timeline
4.5 Discussion on the Container variable and what it is
capturing
We measure containerisation with a binary variable to indicate that a country started
handling containers in ports or by rail. Since containerisation is an integrated system of
transportation, our measure captures many aspects that characterised containerisation.
In part of the analysis, we choose data points which are 5 years apart to allow for
adjustment to containerisation. The result is that we develop a measure that is in effect
a proxy for the integrated transportation system that resulted in many qualitative and
quantitative improvements in shipping. Some of the savings were direct (labour costs)
and some indirect (inventory costs of goods in transit). We list here the most important
savings/improvements induced by the container and that are likely to be captured by
our container measures.
1. Reductions in pilferage, damage, and theft
Before the container, it was usual that goods would go missing on the docks while
awaiting loading or delivery. Dockers also used this as a means of retaliation
against management decisions if these were unfavourable to them. They would be
taking home what they thought was their right. The joke on New York piers was
that dockers’ wages were ’twenty dollars a day and all the Scotch you could carry
home’. Also, it was not unusual that goods are damaged in the process of loading
and oﬄoading owing to the manual nature of the job. Goods were subjected to
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multiple handlings from origin to their destination. This increased the probability
of getting damaged on the way. The container came to solve these problems for
goods that move in containers. Goods are only handled twice now; once when
loading the goods in the container on site by the shipper and once when emptying
the container by the recipient. This reduced both pilferage and damage.
2. Savings in insurance premia
The reduction in pilferage and damage claims resulted in reductions in insurance
premia. McKinsey and Company (1972) reports that claims paid in 1972 were
running at only 15% of their level before containerisation.
3. Improved Port efficiencies
The nonstandard characteristics of general cargo transport were the main source
of inefficiency in the port industry. They resulted in the employment of a large
labour force that was poorly utilised. The large number of small units of cargo
demanded individual handling. The wide variety of sizes and shapes did not
allow effective mechanisation in the industry. Also, the large number of separate
origins and destinations required extensive rehandling and sorting for forwarding.
This in turn led to wide fluctuations in work load and aided in the poor labour
productivity.
The productivity of the berth is thus linked to that of the labour working on
it. There is a practical limit to the number of men working simultaneously on
any ship or berth. Prior to the container, general cargo berths were not usually
worked around the clock. In many case, labour refused working in shifts. This
had resulted in very low utilisation of the assets (berths).
Using new methods, such as high-speed cranes with small crews, labour productiv-
ity increased by more than a factor of 20 as estimated by McKinsey and Company
(1967). The productivity of general cargo berths were to increase from the present
average of 100k-150k annual tons to 2 million tons per year. The new efficiencies
were achieved by:
• Transferring several functions away from ports such as the sorting depots,
customs, warehousing etc.
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• Implementing new methods of high-speed loading and discharging (cranes).
• Avoiding congestion by rapid transit of containers away from the port area
by unit trains and trucks.
Efficiency of the ports is critical for achieving low-cost shipping. The large capital
investment represented by the ship was being poorly utilised in the past. Lack of
efficiency resulted in very long ship turnover times and consequently ships spent
the majority of the time being idle in ports. Even on many long distance routes
such as the UK/New Zealand, ships spent over 50% of their life in port (McKinsey
and Company (1967)) .
Another channel through which port efficiency was improved was the separation
of container trade from all other trade. Wheat bales are no longer mixed with
coffee bags and baskets of fruit. The picture on the docks changed radically. Bulk
trade and non-containerisable general cargo is now separate from goods that fit in
containers. Most ports transformed some berths to handle pure container cargo
and some ports opted to build container terminals from scratch.
4. Intermodal Transportation
This is perhaps the single most important element of containerisation. Industry
experts were of the opinion that the true value of containerisation is its inter-
modality (Donovan (2004); McKinsey and Company (1967)). A container can be
transported by truck, rail, and ship from origin to destination and the shift be-
tween the three modes can be done effortlessly and cheaply. Low-cost intermodal
transfer makes it economic to switch modes to take advantage of the lowest cost
alternative.
This intermodality allowed for new patterns of trade. A manufacturer shipping
machines from Chicago to Korea is indifferent as to whether the goods went by
truck to Long Beach or by rail to Seattle, much less whether the goods entered
Korea at Busan or Inchon. Imports for Scotland may be moved there on train from
southeast England. Intermodality of the container gave shippers and shipping lines
room to choose the best combination of land and sea transport that would minimise
the total cost per box. Refer to the introduction for a discussion on intermodality.
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5. Time savings
Before containerisation, it took close to a week to work a medium-sized break-
bulk ship. This was mainly due to poor productivity in ports as outlined above
in the item about port efficiency. It took two gangs of some twenty-plus men
to load/oﬄoad a ship. Business commentators observed that a ship would spend
most of its time in port instead of voyaging transporting goods and making money.
With the container, crates and bags of goods are no longer pushed and jerked in
place by dockers to utilise space in the holds of ships. The ship would be turned-
around in less than 24-hours a day. McKinsey and Company (1972) estimates that
the percentage of a ship’s life in port dropped from 75% to less than 20% on the
North Atlantic route due to the onset of containerisation. Annual voyages were to
go up 3-fold as a result.
6. Inventory costs
McKinsey and Company (1972) in their 5-year review about containerisation re-
port that ships traveling between Europe and Australia had previously spent weeks
calling at any of the eleven European ports before making the trip South. Con-
tainerships, on the other hand, collect cargo only at the huge container ports
(Rotterdam, Felixstowe, Hamburg). Previously, shipments took a minimum of 70
days to get from Hamburg to Sydney, with each additional port call adding to the
time. Containerships now travel between the two continents in 34 days, eliminating
at least 36 days worth of carrying inventory that is held up in transit. Insurance
claims for Europe-Australia service were 85% lower than before containerisation
as a result.
7. Labour costs / Union Powers
Poor labour productivity and frequent strikes affected the entire shipping industry.
Labour was a contentious issue in shipping. Management-labour relations were
mostly hostile. Ports like New York were crippled by labour strikes. Labour
unions were so strong in Europe and the United States that they dictated work
conditions on the docks. Even absurd practices such as the welt - a practice
under which half of each gang would leave work often to the nearest pub and
then an hour or two later the other half would alternate with the first half - was
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very difficult to eliminate. On the United States’ Pacific coast, one formal rule
provided that a trucker delivering palletised cargo to a pier would have to remove
each item from the pallet and place it on the dock only to be put back on a pallet
later by the dockers for lowering into the ship where it is removed again from
the pallet10. All of this resulted in highly inefficient working conditions and high
trade costs. Containerisation came to break the power of dockers’ unions albeit
perhaps not immediately. The new technology redefined the profession of the
docker or stevedore. Large gangs of dockers are no longer needed to work a ship.
Only a few dockers are now needed to work one ship and their work is no longer
physical. They are mostly operating cranes or driving forklifts and machines to
drive containers to and from the docks. Potential savings on labour costs are not
exclusive to trade that moves in containers as dockers are no longer needed to sort
out mixed cargo in the holds. Ships can now specialise in either bulk or container
cargo and loading/oﬄoading cargo is no longer as labour intensive.
8. Economies of Scale
Economies of scale could be achieved in many of the parts that make up the
integrated container system. In ports, economies of scale can be achieved from the
high utilisation of port facilities. McKinsey and Company (1967) estimated that
port costs can be as low as 3 per container - from 15 per equivalent container load
before containerisation - when annual throughput of the berth is about 2 million
tons.
In shipping, conventional ports were the limiting factor of the size of general cargo
vessels. Berths could accommodate ships up to certain size and depth. But also,
doubling a cargo ship’s capacity would almost double its time in port with break-
bulk technology. McKinsey and Company (1972) estimated that vessels were able
only to grow in size by 14% during the period 1950-1966. Compare that with
tanker sizes which grew by 82% during the same period.
The improved efficiency in cargo handling due to containerisation allowed for larger
ships. With no constraints on size, containerships doubled in size and capacity
between 1968 and 1972. As ships got bigger, ports got bigger too. New York
10Levinson (2006) page 107
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handled 7 times more containers in 1980 than in 1970. Also, port facilities could
be used more intensively. Under such conditions, the reduction in dock labour
requirements was dramatic. McKinsey reported massive improvements in labour
productivity on container berths; 30 tons per man hour versus only 1.7 tons per
man hour for a conventional berth (McKinsey and Company (1972)).
McKinsey also calculates that as capacity of ships increases from 300 to 5000
containers, per ton cost drops by over 50% for a 5000 miles voyage (one way).
This includes cost of ports, ships, containers, and cargo in transit (capital and
operating costs). The longer the trip, the bigger the savings due to economies of
scale available on bigger ships. Thus, increasing ship capacity from 300 to 3000
containers reduces per unit cost by 42% on the North Atlantic route and 55%
on the Australian route. Figure 3.15 illustrates how economies of scale can bring
about substantial savings.
Figure 4.15: Economies of Scale in Container Shipping (reproduced from McKinsey
Report)
Also, economies of scale can be achieved in ports since one container berth can
replace up to 20 break-bulk berths due to productivity improvements. This means
that only a few ports are needed to handle the entire container trade of the UK.
9. Hubs and Spokes
Very interesting industry dynamics came about after containerisation was intro-
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duced. Soon after containerisation spread, many shippers started realising that
unbalanced trade meant that their ships would be carrying full containers on one
leg of a journey only to return with empty boxes. This meant that the forwarder
had to pay for both legs of the journey. This wiped out some of the savings in-
troduced by the container. Slowly but steadily, some ports were developing into
mega-ports that were handling not only domestic trade but also foreign trade.
Shipping lines figured that if they could consolidate trade bound for adjacent
countries, they could fill ships that would call at a mega-port and then dispatch
the goods to their respective destinations by smaller ships or rail. This system
has become known as the hub and spoke system in international shipping. This
was a direct consequence of the economies of scale the containerisation allowed. In
Northern Europe, for example, the port of Rotterdam has become a hub for West-
ern European trade. Large oceangoing containerships call at Rotterdam with trade
bound for Germany, the UK, France, and even Austria and Switzerland. Many
such systems exist elsewhere such as Singapore and Hong Kong in Southeast Asia.
Thus an opportunity arose to minimise costs by either choosing one port of call
supplied by feeders or more ports of call at either ends of the trans-oceanic voyage.
McKinsey and Company (1972) calculates that a 500 mile round trip voyage by
a 300-containers feeder ship costs £6300, whereas diverting a container ship 500
miles to pick up 300 extra containers would cost a 2000-containers ship £9,800,
and a 1000-containers ship £5,600.
10. Offshoring and just-in-time manufacturing
It is no secret the container allowed for raw materials to be shipped to distant
countries to make use of their cheap labour to turn them into finished goods
that are then sent by containers to markets. The frequency and reliability of the
container service led the likes of Toyota and Honda to develop their just-in-time
manufacturing. The result was lower inventories. This was clearly demonstrated
in 2002, when a strike by the ILWU closed US Coast ports for 10 days. The
shutdown of ports was almost immediately visible resulting in empty store shelves
and idle assembly lines. Containerisation and just-in-time manufacturing is a topic
for future research.
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Based on the above, it should be understood that containerisation instigated a com-
prehensive transportation system that changed how shipping is conducted. The effects
were felt not only in container trade but throughout the transportation industry. The
implications of this is that the variable that we constructed measures/captures many
aspects of the new technology that affected trade. The nature of the constructed con-
tainerisation measure that we use - the binary variable - means that there are limitations
on the information necessary to separate between the different aspects of the new tech-
nology that we listed above. This is especially the case when we choose data points in
the sample that are 5 years apart in part of the analysis.
What is perhaps worth mentioning (again) is that our container measure does not
capture inland transport of containers by road. Containerisation became a compelling
force in international trade that no country could avoid it. Being uncontainerised in port
or rail does not mean that a country wasn’t receiving containers. Not having a container
port is clearly a disadvantage. We were surprised to find pictures on the internet that
show containers being oﬄoaded on the high sea onto smaller boats to get them to shore
in the Comoros Islands which remained uncontainerised in the late 1980s (Figure 3.16).
Our measure of containerisation does not capture this. The data that we present in this
chapter does not cover cases such as the Comoros Islands.
Figure 4.16: Containerisation in the Comoros Islands (late 1980s)
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4.6 Trade Data
The world trade flows data set used in this thesis is compiled by Feenstra et al. (2005)
and is available from NBER. The data set is constructed from United Nations trade
data. The data set covers the period 1962-2000. The set of countries covered in the
data set is not uniform across the entire period however. The period 1962-1983 covers
most if not all of the world countries and territories. For the period 1984-2000, the data
set covers trade of 72 countries only. This means that only bilateral trade flows of the
72 countries with the rest of the world and among each other are included. Here too,
the panel data set is unbalanced. Since we are interested with the period 1962-1990,
the number of countries for which is data is available becomes 63. The list of the 63
countries is provided in the appendix (table A.5). The panel data set is unbalanced
and some observations are missing. We have confirmed with the authors that these
observations are missing. It is therefore not known whether the missing observations
are positive trade flows or zeros, although the authors stressed that it is safer to assume
that observations are missing rather than zero.
The advantage of this data set is that it is the most comprehensive bilateral trade
flows data set out there for our purposes. Feenstra et al. depend mainly on importer
data in compiling the data set but use exporter data where importer data is missing.
Also many corrections and additions are made to the UN data. Another advantage of
this data set is that it has a product dimension as well. The data set makes available
trade flows at the 4-digit SITC Rev 2. This will be key to our study as will become
clear later in this thesis.
The data set reports trade as small as 1000 USD for the period 1962-1983 and the
minimum trade value reported is 100,000 USD between 1984-2000 (only a few observa-
tions with values less than 100,000 USD). With regards to the country aggregate trade
data, when asked whether it was safe to assume the missing observations are all zero
trade values, the authors confirmed that this was not a good assumption. They con-
firmed that it would be safer to assume that the data is missing and non-zero rather
than zero. One of the authors gives the following example. It was noticed that the
data indicated that there was no trade (no data/missing) between the United States
and Mexico for a number of years (either from the UN data or the Stats Canada data).
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This could not have been the case of course. They had to revert to the U.S. trade data
to supplement that missing part. In addition, the authors confirmed that missing trade
could be because the value of the trade was very low. For many countries, trade values
of less than 100,000 were missing.
From this data set, we choose a sample period between 1962-1990. Containerisation
as an international phenomenon started in 1966 with the first Sea-Land ship crossing the
Atlantic between New York and Europe. The last countries to containerise in our data
set were Bermuda, Ethiopia, Guinea, Malta, and Myanmar in 1983. Since containeri-
sation started internationally in 1966, our chosen period thus includes 4 years of pre-
containerisation period for the first containerisers and 7 years of post-containerisation for
the latest entrants. This should allow sufficient time for adjustment to containerisation.
We choose to include years up to 1990 since the fall of the Berlin Wall caused the
political map to be redrawn. Many countries disappeared and others emerged. The
Soviet Union collapsed giving rise to 15 new countries. Also, Germany was reunified.
The 1990s was a decade in which Europe’s map was redrawn. In 1993, Czechoslovakia
split to form the Czech Republic and Slovakia. Yugoslavia started disintegrating from
1991 and was eventually broken up into 6 independent republics (not to count Kosovo).
The geographic and political changes that took place in the 1990s makes it difficult to
conduct a controlled study of containerisation beyond 1990. Another reason why we
use data up to 1990 is that air freight was still expensive around this time and very
limited trade, mainly high value goods in the most developed countries, were being
flown in or out (see Hummels (2007). This allows for a controlled environment to study
containerisation.
4.7 Bilateral Trade Data: Descriptives and Graphs
We start exploring our data by plotting world trade between 1962 and 1990 based on
bilateral trade flows from the data set described above. In figure 3.17, we plot nominal
total trade. Between 1962 and 1990, world trade increases from 130 billion USD in 1962
to 3.47 trillion USD in 1990, an increase of around 26-fold. In figure 2.1, we showed
world trade deflated by US GDP deflator. In real terms, world trade increases more
than 6-fold between 1962 and 1990 from around 500 billion USD to 3.47 trillion (1990
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USD).
Figure 4.17: World Trade 1962-1990 non-deflated
Recall that 119 countries port-containerise between 1966 and 1983. In our trade
data set, we have an additional 18 non-landlocked countries that are non port/rail-
containerised in the period 1962-1990. In addition, we have a total of 21 countries that
are landlocked and thus naturally non port-containerised. Refer to the appendix for
a list of these countries (table A.4) . This gives us a sample of 157 countries. This
means that we have 157*156 or 24,492 potential aggregate bilateral trade relationships
per year.
In figure 3.18, we plot the value of the individual trade observations in our data
set between the years 1962-1990. This shows us the dispersion of values per year. The
plot indicates significant increase in dispersion over the years. In the 1960s and early
1970s, most of the observations are clustered at the bottom. This changes in the late
1970s and the 1980s where individual observations larger than $1 billion in value are
not infrequent.
The percentage of missing observations at the country-pair level is around 68% of
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Figure 4.18: Plotting individual bilateral trade flows
total potential observations in 1962, around 50% in the mid 1970s, and again around
two-third in the late 1980’s. We know the reason for the increase of missing observations
in the late 1980’s is because of data set coverage described above. Of all non-missing
observations, 33% have a trade value of less than $100,000 in 1962, and 42% have a value
of more than $1 million. Only 12 observations for that year are $1 billion or higher. In
1983, only 21% of the observations are $100,000 or lower. But 73% of all observations
are now higher than $1 million and 300 trade relations are higher than 1 billion USD.
In Figure 3.19, we plot total world trade (exports and imports) as well as total
trade of containerised countries. We make a distinction between observations in which
only one of the partner countries is containerised and those in which both countries
are port-containerised. Total trade of containerised countries where both countries are
port-containerised account for almost all of international trade. Also total trade where
only one country is containerised is highly correlated with total international trade.
This plot seems to support the claim that containerisation played a role in encouraging
globalisation in the period after the 1960s.
Figure 3.20 plots trade series by decade of containerisation, i.e. trade of countries
that containerised in 1960s versus those that containerised in the 1970s and 1980s. Here
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too we consider port containerisation only. Trade of countries that containerised in the
1960s - and there are only 17 of them - accounts for most of international trade. This
is followed by countries who containerised in the 1970s, and these form the bulk of our
sample. Surprisingly, countries that containerised in the 1980s did not increase their
trade between 1980 and 1990.
Figure 4.19: Plot of Total Trade against Containerised Countries’ Total Trade
The data set described above provides bilateral trade flows at the 4-digit SITC Rev
2 product classification. Between 1962 and 1990, there are 19,519,708 positive trade
flows. At the 4-digit SITC classification, there are 1058 product categories. The 4-digit
trade flows will be used to investigate the effects of containerisation at the product level
in chapters 6 and 7.
4.8 Containerisability of Products
Not all products can be moved in containers. In modern shipping, there are two types
of cargo: Bulk and Containerised cargo. ’Bulk’ in shipping refers to cargoes that are
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Figure 4.20: Plot of Containerised Countries’ Trade by Decade
shipped in complete shiploads. Before the container, the trade that did not move as bulk
was known as general cargo. To move as bulk, the trade should be big enough to make it
feasible to transport in entire shiploads rather than as ’general cargo’. This is generally
the case for oil, grain, coal, ores, fertilisers, etc. Other products have to be moved in bulk
because they are unsuitable for containerisation owing to their nature. One could think
of live animals, explosives, precious metals and stones, etc. Also, maritime transport
literature classifies heavy machinery as unsuitable for the container, which is intuitive
due to size and weight constrictions.
Stopford (2009) lists four main categories of bulk cargo:
• Liquid bulk: transported in tankers such as oil, oil products, liquid chemicals,
vegetable oils, and wine.
• The five major bulks: iron ore, grain, coal, phosphates and bauxite. These are
transported in shiploads in the holds of ships.
• Minor bulks: This category covers many other commodities that travel in shiploads.
Most important are steel products, cement, gypsum, non-ferrous metal ores, sugar,
salt, sulphur, forest products, wood chips and chemicals.
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• Specialist bulk cargoes: Motor vehicles, steel products, refrigerated cargo, and
abnormally large structures such as offshore installations.
Containerisation International Yearbook (1971, pages 70-71) defines bulk cargo as
’cargo defined by its kind and weight or volume only, and conveyed loose in separate,
reserved wagons, vehicles, or ship’s hold sections’. From the above, it is clear that not
all products are moved or can be moved in containers. In the next section, we explore
further the containerisability of goods traded.
4.8.1 Containerisability of Products at the 4-digit SITC Disaggregate
Product Level
Containerisation International Yearbook (1971) classifies goods at the SITC product
level into three grades: suitable for containers - Class A, goods of limited suitability for
containers - Class B, and goods not suitable for containers - Class C. The classification
is based on the German Engineers’ Society analysis from 1968. The classification looks
at the physical properties of goods entirely. The good is classified as suitable for the
container if its nature allows it to be transported in containers without being damaged.
For instance, wheat cannot be containerised because it locks humidity easily and hence it
is transported in specially equipped ships. Some other products cannot be containerised
because their size won’t allow it. One can think of cars, large installations, etc.
This classification is based on a 1968 study. In this study, the products that are
classified as suitable for containerisation were readily transportable in containers without
any adjustment. Unfortunately, this is the only classification available to us.
One caveat of this classification is that products that are classified as unsuitable
for containerisation might become containerisable later on as containerisation caught
on. One can think of perishable foods. These became containerisable as refrigerated
containers were introduced. Some products were only sometimes suitable for container-
isation or were strongly affected by containerisation because their intermediate inputs
were containerisable (such as cars). On the other hand, some products are not and will
never be moved in containers such as oil or gas. Ideally, one would like to have a clas-
sification that is updated as more products become containerisable. This information
does not exist as far as we are aware.
82
Another disadvantage is that this classification does not take into account the volume
of trade. The volume of trade (shipment) is a determining factor in deciding whether
a shipment is to be transported in bulk or in container. However, in order to take the
volume of trade into consideration, one requires individual shipment data. It is therefore
possible to classify products according to their containerisability by considering their
physical properties only.
This classification of containerisation that we use has the advantage that it is based
on a classification made at the start of the period of containerisation. This makes our
analysis less prone to endogeneity (simultaneity bias) when we restrict our sample to
those products that were classified as containerisable in 1968. Other products may have
been adjusted to be transported in containers because of their trade volumes and can
thus benefit from containerisation. This could introduce an element of endogeneity into
the analysis because the products classified as ’not suitable’ or ’of limited suitability’
include endogenous components.
Under the 1968 classification, we are able to place goods in one of the 3 categories of
containerisability at the 4-digit SITC level. The product containerisability classifications
are listed in the appendix (tables A.7-A.9). In these tables, we sometimes list products
at the 1-, 2-, or 3-digits level for convenience. For instance, all products at the 4-digit
level under the 1-digit industry 3 (Mineral fuels, lubricants and related materials) were
classified as not suitable for containerisation, we just list industry 3 as not suitable for
containerisation in the table.
Moving forwards, for convenience, we call ’containerisable’ trade that trade in prod-
ucts that are classified as suitable for containers in 1968. ’Non-containerisable’ trade
refers to trade that is classified as of limited suitability or not suitable for containers
although the term ’non-containerisable’ might be misleading for reasons discussed above.
4.8.2 Containerisability at the 1-digit SITC Product Level
At the 1-digit industry level, we have 10 product categories. In order to classify whether
an industry is containerisable or not at the 1-digit level, one can count the number
of sub-products that are suitable for containers and those that are non-containerisable
and then classify an industry as containerisable if the number of products suitable for
containers exceeds the number of non-containerisable products.
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Table 4.1: Shares of Containerisable Trade in Total Trade at the 1-digit industry level
- USA 1962
SITC Description Containerisability % Containerisability
0 Food and Live Animals Non-Containerisable 46%
1 Beverages and tobacco Containerisable 100%
2 Crude materials, inedible, except fuels Containerisable 56%
3 Mineral fuels, lubricants and related materials Non-Containerisable 0%
4 Animal and vegetable oils, fats and waxes Containerisable 100%
5 Chemicals and related products, n.e.s. Containerisable 59%
6 Manufactured goods classified chiefly by material Containerisable 95%
7 Machinery and transport equipment Containerisable 60%
8 Miscellaneous manufactured articles Containerisable 100%
9 Commodities and transactions not elsewhere classified Non-Containerisable 0%
It is however more appropriate to give products different weights within the 1-digit
industry. To do so, we choose the US as the reference country since containerisation
started in the US and we choose 1962 as the year of reference (before containerisation
entered international trade). In practice, we sum up trade volumes (both imports and
exports) of the US in 1962 based on the containerisability of the products under each
1-digit industry. We then calculate the percentage or share of containerisable trade in
total trade in the 1-digit industry. Doing this results in the percentages/shares presented
in table 4.1.
Based on this simple calculation, we identify 3 industries that are 100% containeris-
able. These are industries 1, 4, and 8, or Beverages and tobacco, Animal and vegetable
oils, fats and waxes, and Miscellaneous manufactured articles. Industry 6 (Manufac-
tured goods classified chiefly by material) is almost fully containerisable (95%). Two
industries that are fully non-containerisable are industries 3 (Mineral fuels, lubricants
and related materials) and 9 (Commodities and transactions not elsewhere classified).
The remaining industries range in their containerisability between 40% and 60%.
Based on this classification, we consider a 1-digit industry containerisable if it has a
weight of 50% or higher and non-containerisable if it has a weight of less than 50%. This
means that we have 7 industries that are considered containerisable and 3 industries are
classified as non-containerisable11.
4.9 Containerisability and Trade : Descriptives
Based on our containerisability classification of products at the 4-digit product level
as discussed above, we plot some relationships and graphs to explore the evolution of
products or commodity trade.
11We test the robustness of the empirical results to the choice of the 50% threshold in chapter 6 where
we use this classification and the results are robust to the 40% and 60% thresholds.
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In figure 3.21, we plot world containerisable and non-containerisable trade between
1962 and 1990, deflated by US GDP deflator and based on the trade data described
above. We notice that the two trade series are very close to each other and move
together until 1983 where containerisable trade becomes higher than non-containerisable
trade. Removing fuels from non-containerisable trade (figure 3.22), containerisable trade
becomes strictly higher than non-containerisable trade for the entire period.
When we plot the ratio of containerisable to non-containerisable trade, we see that
this ratio is around 1.3 in 1962 and is slowly downward sloping to 1.2 in 1973, then
drops sharply below 1 in 1974 due to the oil crisis and the rise in oil prices, then rises
again above 1 in 1978 to drop back below 1 in 1979 in the wake of the second oil crisis
to remain below 1 until 1983. Between 1983 and 1990, there is a clear increase in the
ratio. Looking at the plot in figure 3.23, we can conclude that this sharp increase is
mainly due to containerisable trade increasing at a higher rate than non-containerisable
trade after 1983. This could indicate a transition in the composition of trade in the
wake of containerisation. Also, interestingly, the early 1980s is the period when just-in-
time manufacturing was introduced and started gaining ground. Also, in that period,
computer were being employed more frequently in the logistics of shipping12.
In figures 3.22 and 3.24, we replicate the plots in 3.21 and 3.23 respectively while
excluding fuels. Without fuels, the spikes and troughs in non-containerisable trade due
to the volatile oil prices are not evident in figure 3.22. There is a slight concave shape in
non-containerisable trade between 1974 and 1980, perhaps due to increase in real prices
of some commodities due to the increase in oil prices. Non-containerisable trade recovers
to its previous trend after 1983. Figure 3.24 suggests that the ratio of containerisable
trade to non-containerisable trade minus fuels is stable, around 1.6 between 1962 and
1983. This ratio increases after 1983 to reach a value of 2 in 1987.
After plotting the trends and behaviour of the two trade series that result from
classifying products according to their containerisability, we would like to understand
what was being traded and how the composition of trade fares in the period of con-
tainerisation. To do so, we list the top twenty containerisable and non-containerisable
products at the 4-digit SITC disaggregate product level before containerisation started
12The phenomenon of just-in-time manufacturing and its relationship to containerisation deserves
more researching on its own but this is not researched in this thesis. It will be the subject of future
research.
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Figure 4.21: Development of Containerisable vs. Non-Containerisable Trade
in 1962 and after containerisation was largely completed in 1990. Comparing tables 4.2
and 4.3, the top 20 traded non-containerisable products in 1962 and 1990 include basic
commodities such as oil and its derivatives, wheat, iron, and coal. They also include
manufactures that are large in size such as passenger cars, ships and aircraft. The dif-
ference between 1962 and 1990 is that manufactures gain prominence in the rankings in
1990 (aircraft and transport vehicles) compared to 1962 where basic commodities are
relatively higher in ranking.
In tables 4.4 and 4.5, we list the top 20 containerisable products in 1962 and 1990 re-
spectively. Unlike tables 4.2 and 4.3, the differences between these two lists are striking.
In 1962, the top 20 containerisables list is dominated by containerisable commodities
such as coffee, cotton, copper, natural rubber, wool, sugars and tea. Only a few man-
ufactures feature in the list and these include telecommunications equipment, machine
tools for working metals and internal combustion engines. On the other hand, in 1990,
the top 20 containerisables list features exclusively manufactures and most of them
are high-tech manufactures such as microcircuits, computers and consumer electronics.
Also, it is interesting that many of products listed as containerisables in 1990 include
parts and accessories of non-containerisables such as cars and aircraft. It is argued that
containerisation allowed for this trade and the fragmentation of the production process.
These two tables suggest that the composition of trade changed after containerisation
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Figure 4.22: Development of Containerisable vs. Non-Containerisable Trade excluding
Fuels
and there is a clear move towards trade that is dominated by manufactures and parts.
Table 4.2: Top 20 non-containerisable products by value in 1962
Rank SITC code Description
1 3330 Petrol.oils & crude oils obtained from bituminous minerals
2 7810 Passenger motor cars, for transport of pass.& goods
3 0410 Wheat (including spelt) and meslin, unmilled
4 9310 Special transactions & commod., not class.to kind
5 2810 Iron ore and concentrates
6 3344 Fuel oils, n.e.s.
7 2482 Wood of coniferous species, sawn, planed, tongued etc
8 3220 Coal, lignite and peat
9 7932 Ships, boats and other vessels
10 7928 Aircraft, n.e.s.balloons, gliders etc and equipment
11 7920 Aircraft & associated equipment and parts
12 7200 Machinery specialized for particular industries
13 0440 Maize (corn), unmilled
14 3343 Gas oils
15 3341 Motor spirit and other light oils
16 0111 Meat of bovine animals, fresh, chilled or frozen
17 7220 Tractors fitted or not with power take-offs, etc.
18 7821 Motor vehicles for transport of goods/materials
19 3340 Petroleum products, refined
20 3345 Lubricating petroleum oils & other heavy petrol.oils
After listing the top 20 traded containerisable and non-containerisable products, we
plot the trade series for the top 5 traded products from the lists in figures 3.25 to 3.28.
In figure 3.25, the top 5 containerisable products in 1962 are all basic (industrial)
commodities. In 1990 (figure 3.26), this is completely different. Four out of the five top
containerisable products are manufactured parts or finished products. It is interesting
here that except for diamonds, the other 4 products were not traded before 1975. It has
been suggested that containerisation allowed for the trade in parts/intermediates and the
creation of new trade. This figure gives the impression that just after containerisation
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Table 4.3: Top 20 non-containerisable products by value in 1990
Rank SITC code Description
1 3330 Petrol.oils & crude oils obtained from bituminous minerals
2 7810 Passenger motor cars, for transport of pass.& goods
3 9000 Commodities and transactions not elsewhere classified
4 3341 Motor spirit and other light oils
5 7924 Aircraft exceeding an unladen weight of 15000 kg
6 9310 Special transactions & commod., not class.to kind
7 7821 Motor vehicles for transport of goods/materials
8 3344 Fuel oils, n.e.s.
9 7932 Ships, boats and other vessels
10 3343 Gas oils
11 3222 Other coal, whether/not pulverized, not agglomerated
12 3413 Petroleum gases and other gaseous hydrocarbons
13 2482 Wood of coniferous species, sawn, planed, tongued etc
14 0111 Meat of bovine animals, fresh, chilled or frozen
15 3414 Petroleum gases and other gaseous hydrocarbons nes
16 0360 Crustaceans and molluscs, fresh, chilled, frozen etc.
17 0412 Other wheat (including spelt) and meslin, unmilled
18 6727 Iron or steel coils for re-rolling
19 3342 Kerosene and other medium oils
20 3345 Lubricating petroleum oils & other heavy petrol.oils
Table 4.4: Top 20 containerisable products traded by value in 1962
Rank SITC code Descr
1 0711 Coffee, whether or not roasted or freed of caffeine
2 2631 Cotton (other than linters), not carded or combed
3 7842 Bodies for the motor vehicles of 722/781/782/783
4 6821 Copper and copper alloys, refined or not, unwrought
5 2320 Natural rubber latex; nat.rubber & sim.nat.gums
6 2681 Seep’s or lambs’ wool, greasy or fleece-washed
7 7640 Telecommunications equipment and parts
8 6522 Cotton fabrics, woven, bleach.mercerized dyed, printed
9 7360 Mach.tools for working metal or met.carb., parts
10 6411 Newsprint
11 7244 Mach.for extruding man-made textiles and parts
12 1210 Tobacco, unmanufactured; tobacco refuse
13 0611 Sugars, beet and cane, raw, solid
14 7130 Internal combustion piston engines & parts
15 7000 Machinery and transport equipment
16 7499 Other non-electric parts & accessories of mach.
17 6530 Fabrics, woven, of man-made fibres
18 7230 Civil engineering & contractors plant and parts
19 7430 Pumps & compressors, fans & blowers, centrifuges
20 6746 Sheets & plates, rolled; thickness of less than 3mm.
Table 4.5: Top 20 containerisable products traded by value in 1990
Rank SITC code Description
1 7849 Other parts & accessories of motor vehicles
2 7764 Electronic microcircuits
3 7599 Parts of and accessories suitable for 751.2, 752- (Calculating machines/Automatic data processing machines)
4 7284 Mach.& appliances for specialized particular ind.
5 6672 Diamonds, unwork.cut/otherwise work.not mounted/set
6 8510 Footwear
7 7721 Elect.app.such as switches, relays, fuses, plugs etc.
8 7649 Parts of apparatus of division 76— (Telecommunications, sound recording apparatus)
9 5417 Medicaments (including veterinary medicaments)
10 7523 Complete digital central processing units
11 8939 Miscellaneous art.of materials of div.58
12 8942 Children s toys, indoor games, etc.
13 7525 Peripheral units, including control & adapting units
14 7929 Parts of heading 792– (Aircraft), excl.tyres, engines
15 7788 Other elect.machinery and equipment
16 5989 Chemical products and preparations, n.e.s.
17 8219 Other furniture and parts
18 8983 Gramophone records and sim.sound recordings
19 7611 Television receivers, colour
20 7524 Digital central storage units, separately consigned
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Figure 4.23: Ratio of Containerisable to Non-Containerisable Trade
started, products that were not traded previously now dominate world trade. How much
containerisation contributed to the creation of new trade is subject to future research.
In figures 3.27 and 3.28, oil dominates non-containerisable trade in 1962 and 1990.
Other highly traded products include heavy manufactures that are not containerisable
but whose manufacture and trade might have been aided by the containerisability of
their parts such as cars and aircraft.
4.9.1 What are North South Trading Before and After Containerisa-
tion?
We define North countries as OECD countries minus Turkey13. Of the four new aspects
of modern world trade highlighted by Krugman (1995), the creation of production chains
or the breaking of the production process into many geographically separated steps
and the emergence of large exports of manufactured goods from low-wage to high-wage
nations are perhaps the most affected and enabled by containerisation. We explore these
trends and aspects in our data set. We do so by restricting the trade flows at the 4-digit
SITC product disaggregate level to North-South trade in containerisable products.
13While Turkey is a founding member of the OECD, Turkey is a late containeriser. Twenty two coun-
tries are classified as North in our sample. These are: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark,
Finland, Fm German FR, France, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, New Zealand,
Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, UK, and USA
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Figure 4.24: Ratio of Containerisable to Non-Containerisable Trade
Table 4.6: Top 20 North-South containerisable products traded by value in 1962
Rank SITC code Description
1 0711 Coffee, whether or not roasted or freed of caffeine
2 2631 Cotton (other than linters), not carded or combed
3 6821 Copper and copper alloys, refined or not, unwrought
4 0611 Sugars, beet and cane, raw, solid
5 2320 Natural rubber latex; nat.rubber & sim.nat.gums
6 7842 Bodies for the motor vehicles of 722/781/782/783 (tractors/cars/trucks/busses)
7 6522 Cotton fabrics, woven, bleach.mercerized dyed, printed
8 0741 Tea
9 1210 Tobacco, unmanufactured; tobacco refuse
10 0721 Cocoa beans, whole or broken, raw or roasted
11 7244 Mach.for extruding man-made textiles and parts
12 2681 Seep’s or lambs’ wool, greasy or fleece-washed
13 7130 Internal combustion piston engines & parts
14 7230 Civil engineering & contractors plant and parts
15 7499 Other non-electric parts & accessories of mach.
16 1121 Wine of fresh grapes (including grape must)
17 0813 Oil-cake & other residues (except dregs)
18 5417 Medicaments (including veterinary medicaments)
19 0460 Meal and flour of wheat and flour of meslin
20 6530 Fabrics, woven, of man-made fibres
In tables 4.6, we list the top 20 containerisable traded products in North-South
trade before containerisation (1962) and after containerisation (1990). What we find
is that in 1962, the top 20 containerisable products traded between South and North
countries are dominated by basic commodities. The top 5 commodities traded are all
basic commodities: coffee, cotton, copper, sugars, and natural rubber. Fast forward to
1990 and only 3 of the top 20 traded containerisable products in North-South trade are
basic commodities (table 4.7). The remaining 17 products are all manufactured products
and many of them are hi-tech or parts of non-containerisable finished products. It is
clear that the composition of trade has changed radically in the 28-year period.
Is it true that South countries have become suppliers to North countries of products
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Figure 4.25: Trade in Top Containerisable Products(1962)
Table 4.7: Top 20 North-South containerisable products traded by value in 1990
Rank SITC code Description
1 7764 Electronic microcircuits
2 6672 Diamonds, unwork.cut/otherwise work.not mounted/set
3 8510 Footwear
4 7849 Other parts & accessories of motor vehicles
5 7284 Mach.& appliances for specialized particular ind.
6 7649 Parts of apparatus of division 76— (Telecommunications, sound recording apparatus)
7 7599 Parts of and accessories suitable for 751.2-, 752– (Calculating machines/Automatic data processing machines)
8 8942 Children s toys, indoor games, etc.
9 7721 Elect.app.such as switches, relays, fuses, plugs etc.
10 8439 Other outer garments of textile fabrics
11 8451 Jerseys, pull-overs, twinsets, cardigans, knitted
12 6821 Copper and copper alloys, refined or not, unwrought
13 0711 Coffee, whether or not roasted or freed of caffeine
14 7788 Other elect.machinery and equipment
15 7525 Peripheral units, including control & adapting units
16 7929 Parts of heading 792– (Aircraft), excl.tyres, engines
17 7611 Television receivers, colour
18 7731 Insulated, elect.wire, cable, bars, strip and the like
19 7524 Digital central storage units, separately consigned
20 5989 Chemical products and preparations, n.e.s.
other than the traditional basic commodities? To answer this question, we restrict our
data sets to exports from South countries and North countries and explore any patterns
there.
In tables 4.8 and 4.9, we list the top 20 containerisable exported products from South
to North countries before containerisation (1962) and after containerisation (1990).
What we find is that all except one of the top 20 containerisable exports from South to
North countries before containerisation are basic commodities. This confirms that South
countries were mainly suppliers of basic commodities for the manufacturing sectors of
North countries before containerisation. After containerisation in 1990, the change is
striking. South countries no longer only supply basic commodities. South countries
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Figure 4.26: Trade in Top Containerisable Products(1962)
have also become suppliers of manufactures - basic and hi-tech. The top exported con-
tainerisable product is footwear and the second is electronic microcircuits. Of the top
20 exported products by South countries, only 4 are basic commodities in 1990.
This evidence supports the claim that the new patterns in trade especially the frag-
mentation of the production process and the emergence of manufacturing power houses
in South countries might have been enabled by containerisation. We investigate the
effects of containerisation on North-South trade in ensuing chapters.
Table 4.8: Top 20 containerisable exports from South to North by value in 1962
Rank SITC code Description
1 0711 Coffee, whether or not roasted or freed of caffeine
2 2631 Cotton (other than linters), not carded or combed
3 6821 Copper and copper alloys, refined or not, unwrought
4 2320 Natural rubber latex; nat.rubber & sim.nat.gums
5 0611 Sugars, beet and cane, raw, solid
6 0741 Tea
7 0721 Cocoa beans, whole or broken, raw or roasted
8 1210 Tobacco, unmanufactured; tobacco refuse
9 2681 Seep’s or lambs’ wool, greasy or fleece-washed
10 0813 Oil-cake & other residues (except dregs)
11 1121 Wine of fresh grapes (including grape must)
12 6871 Tin and tin alloys, unwrought
13 2221 Groundnuts (peanuts), green, whether or not shelled
14 6545 Fabrics, woven, of jute or of other textile bast fibre
15 2231 Copra
16 2640 Jute & other textile bast fibres, nes, raw/processed
17 2120 Furskins, raw (including astrakhan, caracul, etc.)
18 8420 Outer garments, men’s, of textile fabrics
19 0814 Flours & meals, of meat/fish, unfit for human food
20 2654 Sisal & other fibres of agave family, raw or proce.
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Figure 4.27: Trade in Top Non-Containerisable Products(1962)
Table 4.9: Top 20 containerisable exports from South to North by value in 1990
Rank SITC code Description
1 8510 Footwear
2 7764 Electronic microcircuits
3 6672 Diamonds, unwork.cut/otherwise work.not mounted/set
4 8942 Children s toys, indoor games, etc.
5 8439 Other outer garments of textile fabrics
6 8451 Jerseys, pull-overs, twinsets, cardigans, knitted
7 0711 Coffee, whether or not roasted or freed of caffeine
8 6821 Copper and copper alloys, refined or not, unwrought
9 7599 Parts of and accessories suitable for 751.2-, 752–
10 8310 Travel goods, handbags, brief-cases, purses, sheaths
11 7524 Digital central storage units, separately consigned
12 8423 Trousers, breeches etc.of textile fabrics
13 8481 Art.of apparel & clothing accessories, of leather
14 8459 Other outer garments & clothing, knitted
15 8441 Shirts, men’s, of textile fabrics
16 7525 Peripheral units, including control & adapting units
17 7611 Television receivers, colour
18 8435 Blouses of textile fabrics
19 8462 Under garments, knitted of cotton
20 6841 Aluminium and aluminium alloys, unwrought
4.10 Other Relevant Data
GDP per capita data are obtained from the Penn World Tables (version 6.3)14. The
Penn World Tables are missing GDP data for the period 1962-1970 for some countries.
We fill in the gaps where available from the World Development Indicators of the World
Bank 15. GDP figures are at current prices adjusted for PPP. After consolidating the
GDP data with the trade flows and the information about containerisation data, we
end up with 127 countries in our sample. A list of these countries is presented in the
appendix (table A.6).
14Source: http://pwt.econ.upenn.edu/
15These countries are: Afghanistan, Bahamas, Belize, Bermuda, Cambodia, Kuwait, Oman, St. Kitts
and Nevis, Sudan, Suriname.
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Figure 4.28: Trade in Top Non-Containerisable Products(1990)
Main gravity variables (distance, language, border, etc) are all taken from CEPII
and have been compiled and used by Head et al. (2010) 16. In the ensuing chapters, our
empirical specifications allow for a comparison of the effects of the container variable
with the policy variables FTAs, GATT membership, and common currency.
The three policy variables are also taken from CEPII but we mention their sources
here. FTAs are taken from table 3 of Baier and Bergstrand (2007) supplemented with
the WTO web site and qualitative information contained in Frankel (1997).
GATT membership of different countries over time comes from the WTO web site.
The data on currency unions are an updated and extended version of the list provided




Econometric Estimation of the
Effects of Containerisation on
International Trade Flows at the
Country Level
5.1 Introduction
This thesis attempts to measure the extent to which containerisation contributed to the
rise in international trade. In this chapter, we move to investigate empirically the effects
that containerisation has had on international trade flows. Using trade data and the
container measure constructed in the previous chapter, we attempt various empirical
specifications to try to pin down the right specification in order to identify the effects
of containerisation. The dimension of the investigation in this chapter is the bilateral
country aggregate trade flows.
In order to answer the question as to what the effects of containerisation were on
international trade, we try to separate the effects of containerisation from other deter-
minants of trade. Some of the observable determinants of trade are income and policy
variables such as FTAs and common currency. The most obvious setting in which we at-
tempt to identify the effects of the container is the gravity model. The gravity equation
and its theoretical underpinnings have been discussed in the literature review.
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This chapter is an initial investigation into how the effects of containerisation should
be modelled: is it annual, 5-year intervals? is it port, port and rail? Also, how robust
are the different model estimations?
Following the literature, and as an initial exploration, we begin this empirical chapter
by estimating a traditional gravity model in which we identify the effects of containeri-
sation in ports. The (port) container measure is initially a country-year specific variable
in section. In sections 5.2-5.6, we consider annual aggregate trade outcomes. Some of
the econometric problems faced in this setting are addressed. Namely, we discuss and
deal with omitted variables and endogeneity in sections 5.3 and 5.4. We then explore
evidence for additional effects for intermodality of containerisation between sea and rail
in section 5.6.
As discussed in the literature review, a key implication of the derivation of the gravity
equation is that the empirical estimation of traditional gravity equations may be biased.
This is because the ’traditional’ estimations ignored the multilateral resistance terms.
The literature has come to terms with the problems that arise when omitting the
multilateral resistances. Empirically, this has been dealt with by introducing country-
year FE. We follow the literature and introduce fixed effects to control for multilateral
resistances in section 5.7. In doing so, we consider a pooled panel of 5-year intervals
to identify the effects of containerisation. We argue that inclusion of country-time and
country-pair FE solves omitted variable bias as a source of potential endogeneity and
controls for multilateral prices. We also estimate a first-differenced model. We argue that
the first differenced model is the preferred model of estimation as it is less restrictive.
We consider the measure for port containerisation but also merge port and railway
containerisation - we call this full containerisation - to allow for intermodal transport
in our estimations. We also consider bilateral trade outcomes as well as manufacturing
trade separately.
We investigate the effects of containerisation in a balanced panel of bilateral trade
flows and consider subsamples of North-North, North-South, and South-South trade
flows in section 5.8. We argue that estimates of North-North trade are likely to be less
prone to bias caused by missing trade observations or measurement error. We also study
the effects of the container on (manufacturing) trade separately. Finally, we conclude
in section 5.9.
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5.2 Containerisation and Bilateral Trade Flows: A Country-
level Analysis
5.2.1 Specification and Estimation
Recall that we are interested in studying the effects of the container on international
trade. How much of the increase in international trade can be explained by containerisa-
tion? We follow the common practice of modelling expected trade using a specification
based on the gravity framework. We use annual trade data to identify the effects of con-
tainerisation in this section. Given the broad scope of our data, our estimation use panel
data methods to take advantage of time and cross-sectional variation in the adoption of
the container available to us.
In this section, we only investigate the effects of containerisation in ports on trade
flows. In later sections, we include rail containerisation and intermodal transport. In
doing so, we estimate a reduced form gravity equation. The reduced form log-linearised
gravity equation can be written as:
lnXijt = β0 + β1portcontit + β2portcontjt + β3Vijt + β4Dijt + uijt (5.1)
The equation describes the value of total trade (denoted by X) from country i to the
destination country j at time t, Xijt as a function of a host of ij-, it-, jt-, ijt-dimensional
observable variables (summed by the vector Vijt) and non-observable variables or dum-
mies (summed by the vector Dijt). Port containerisation is captured by the variables
portcontit and portcontjt in the above equation. These capture the adoption of con-
tainerisation by the originator country i and the destination country j respectively.
Information on the container variable and how it is constructed is presented in chapter
4.
Our estimation strategy is to start with a simple estimation of equation 5.1 and then
add in more variables and fixed effects to pin down the most appropriate specification.
5.2.2 Country and Country Pair FE
In the first set of regressions, we have 29 years of data points, from 1962-1990 (annual
data). The regressors that we use are GDP per capita adjusted for purchasing power
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(from Penn World Tables) for both countries to capture the supply and demand sides
and population to control for the size of both countries. To make use of the time
and cross-section variation found in the adoption of containerisation, we introduce two
variables to capture containerisation, one for the originator and one for the destination
country.
In table 5.1 column 1, regression 1 is estimated with country dummies while re-
gressions 2-9 are estimated with country-pair FE. In all cases we include a set of year
dummies to control for year-specific shocks such as the oil crisis and the Suez Canal
Closure in 1967-1975. Country dummies in regression 1 capture country time-invariant
characteristics such as landlockedness and area among others. With country-pair FE, we
are capturing all time invariant country-pair effects. One can think of distance, shared
border, common language, common heritage, and other observed and unobserved time-
invariant bilateral covariates. Also in columns 2-9, standard errors are clustered by
country-pair.
Table 5.1: First estimations of the effects of port containerisation























ln gdp per capita(i) 0.638*** 0.703*** 0.703*** 0.681*** 0.916*** 0.816*** 0.742*** 0.372*** 1.462***
(0.0214) (0.0429) (0.0429) (0.0430) (0.0675) (0.0598) (0.0471) (0.0711) (0.1910)
ln gdp per capita(j) 0.741*** 0.821*** 0.821*** 0.808*** 0.896*** 0.888*** 0.866*** 0.605*** 1.042***
(0.0207) (0.0377) (0.0377) (0.0379) (0.0474) (0.0446) (0.0451) (0.0622) (0.1883)
ln pop(i) 0.542*** 0.687*** 0.688*** 0.825*** 0.946*** 0.542*** 1.174*** 0.548*** 0.183
(0.0479) (0.0832) (0.0832) (0.0875) (0.1285) (0.1102) (0.1025) (0.1857) (0.2172)
ln pop(j) 1.102*** 1.269*** 1.270*** 1.327*** 1.558*** 1.419*** 1.425*** 1.138*** 1.088***
(0.0465) (0.0783) (0.0832) (0.0817) (0.0993) (0.0940) (0.1027) (0.1729) (0.3805)
portcont(i) 0.213*** 0.156*** 0.149*** 0.156*** 0.221*** 0.205*** 0.185*** 0.200*** 0.083**
(0.0157) (0.0183) (0.0214) (0.0211) (0.0300) (0.0279) (0.0249) (0.0377) (0.0388)
portcont(j) 0.130*** 0.112*** 0.104*** 0.128*** 0.124*** 0.066** 0.069** 0.244*** -0.002
(0.0157) (0.0182) (0.0226) (0.0227) (0.0320) (0.0305) (0.0269) (0.0424) (0.0440)
portcont(i)*portcont(j) 0.014 -0.091*** -0.080** -0.052 -0.029 -0.099* -0.012
(0.0276) (0.0276) (0.0350) (0.0338) (0.0325) (0.0552) (0.0466)
trend portcont(i) 0.020*** 0.000 0.005* 0.022*** 0.030*** 0.003
(0.0029) (0.0031) (0.0030) (0.0035) (0.0061) (0.0039)
trend portcont(j) 0.012*** 0.005 0.006* 0.013*** 0.017*** -0.011**
(0.0030) (0.0033) (0.0033) (0.0036) (0.0062) (0.0054)
Countries 127 127 127 127 127 127 127 127 22
Country Pairs 13385 13385 13385 13385 5244 6430 10062 5379 506
Observations 231917 231917 231917 231917 132737 145984 164780 76061 14626
overallR
2 0.5185 0.4282 0.4280 0.4287 0.4967 0.4570 0.3935 0.3265 0.5354
Dummies i,j,t ij, t ij,t ij,t ij,t ij,t ij,t ij,t ij,t
Clustering none ij ij ij ij ij ij ij ij
Balanced No No No No No No No No No
Standard errors in parentheses
∗
p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
The results presented in columns 1 and 2 in table 5.1 suggest that containerisation
has a positive and significant effect on trade. In column 1, our country FE estimation
suggests that trade is 24%(e0.213 − 1) higher after the originator containerises and 14%
(e0.129 − 1) higher after the destination containerises compared to pre-containerisation
trade levels. Adding both effects up suggests that when both partners containerise, trade
is close to 38% higher than before containerisation. When we control for country-pair
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FE in column 2, the total effect of the container on bilateral trade is 29% (adding up
the coefficients of portcont(i) and portcont(j). In regression 3, we add in an interacted
container term (portcont(i)*portcont(j)) to control for any additional effects resulting
from both countries containerising on a trade route. The result in regression 3 suggests
that there is no additional effect from containerisation when both countries containerise.
The coefficient of the interaction term is positive but insignificant. Total effect on
bilateral trade is 27% more trade compared to pre-container levels.
In the above results, we have two containerisation variables - one for the originator
and one for the destination. We are therefore able to capture an effect when one of the
two countries in a bilateral relationship adopts the technology. What does it mean to
have only one of the two countries in a trade link containerise? We have mentioned
previously that it was necessary to equip containerships with onboard cranes to allow
them to call at ports that did not have the facilities to handle containers. This was
especially the case at the start of containerisation when only a handful of countries were
equipped to handle containers.
Our container dummy captures what we call the level or base effect. To control
for any trends in containerisation and to avoid imposing any functional form on the
evolution of bilateral trade following containerisation and since we are using annual data,
we construct a trend variable. This trend variable acts like a counter and increases by
increments of one for each additional year of containerisation. The variable turns one
for a country once that country containerises and increases by one each year afterwards.
We will call this variable the container trend variable. By constructing this container
trend variable, our containerisation effect now comprises a base effect and a trend effect.
We insert our container trend variables in regression 4 and run the same estimation
with country-pair FE and year dummies as before. The results suggest a base effect of
31% when both countries adopt the technology. The coefficient of the interacter con-
tainer variable suggests is now negative. The negative coefficient indicates diminishing
savings in trade costs after one country had containerised. This is expected because
some of the savings attributed to containerisation especially the reduction in theft and
damage are achieved only once either trade partner has containerised. In other words,
once the goods have been placed in containers at the beginning of the journey, then
savings related to pilferage and damage are already achieved regardless of which coun-
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try operated a container terminal. As a total effect, when both partners containerise,
trade is 22% higher compared to pre-container levels. The estimated coefficients of the
trend variables suggest that trade increases annually at an average rate of 2% and 1%
respectively when the originator and destination countries containerise. The total con-
tainer effect becomes as follows. If both the originator and the destination containerise,
then the base effect on trade of the container is 22% and the trend effect is 3% annual
increase in trade. In other words, assume that two countries containerised in 1969,
our model estimates that their trade jumped by the base rate of 22% and continued to
grow at a rate of 3% annually thereafter. Also this would mean that by 1990, the two
countries’ trade would have increased by a total of 88% compared to 1968 level due to
containerisation.
Due to the nature of the estimator, the above results are average over the sample
countries. One expects that containerisation affected countries differently according to
geographical and income considerations. To explore any possible heterogeneities in the
sample and whether the results are driven by any sub-sample of countries, we restrict our
sample to groups of countries according to their incomes. We divide countries into three
groups: high-income, mid-income, and low-income. We regard countries as high-income
if their income (GDP per capita) falls in the top 75% percentile as of 1962, low-income
if they fall in the lower 25% percentile, and mid-income if they fall in between. Refer to
the previous chapter for more information on containerisation and income classifications.
We also consider OECD countries separately. In regression 5, we restrict the sample to
observations where either trade partner is an OECD country1. In regressions (columns)
6, 7, and 8, either partner is a high-income country, a mid-income country, or a low-
income country respectively. In regression (9), the sample is restricted to intra-OECD
trade only, i.e. observations in which both trade partners are OECD countries.
The results in columns 5 to 9 confirm that containerisation had a significant and
positive effect on the trade of all groups of countries when considered separately. The
largest benefactors of the introduction of the container seem to be, perhaps surprisingly,
low-income countries, followed by OECD countries, and then high and mid-income coun-
1OECD countries in our sample are those countries that had joined the OECD by 1990. These
are: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, West Germany, France, Greece, Iceland,
Ireland, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, UK,
and USA. We leave Turkey out since Turkey was a late containeriser unlike the other members.
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tries. The base effect of containerisation on the trade of low-income countries is in the
magnitude of 41%. In the case of the trade of OECD countries, the base effect on trade is
30%. This result does not hold for intra-OECD trade (column 9), where the base effect
of the container is estimated to be much lower at 8% only. This could be because many
OECD countries are European countries that trade mainly over land with each other
and we only look at port containerisation in this section. The effect of containerisation
on the trade of high-income countries is estimated to be 25%. And finally, the effect of
the container on the trade of mid-income countries with the rest of the world is around
24%, the coefficient of the interacted container term being insignificant.
As for the container trend coefficients, these seem to be largest for low-income coun-
tries as well; a trend of 3% annual growth rate in trade after the containerisation of
the originator and 2% after the destination’s containerisation. The second largest trend
coefficients belong to the mid-income regression. Trade grows at an average annual rate
of 2% and 1% after the introduction of the container by the originator and the destina-
tion respectively. As for the high-income regression, trade grows at a lower annual rate
of 0.5% due to the containerisation of both the originator and the destination. On the
other hand, there is no significant container trend in OECD trade.
So in summary to this section, the first estimations of the effects of the container
suggest a significant and positive effect of the container on trade in the FE specifications
with country and country-pair FE. The effect of the container consists of a base (level)
effect and a trend effect. Decomposing the container effect suggests a total base effect in
the range of 22%. When allowing for a trend effect, we find that trade grows at an annual
rate of around 3% after the introduction of the container by the two partners. This effect
is not uniform across all countries. As one might expect, different countries are affected
differently by the container. As a preliminary exploration of the heterogeneity of the
container effect, we find that containerisation had the biggest impact on low-income
countries’ trade, followed by OECD countries, and then high and mid-income countries.
We will explore the heterogeneity of the container further in the ensuing sections.
5.3 Omitted Variables
Omitted variable bias is an econometric problem that leads to biases in the estimates.
The problem occurs when an omitted variable from the regression is a determinant of
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Table 5.2: Omitted Variables and Alternative Specifications


























ln gdp per capita(i) 0.673*** 0.681*** 0.674*** 0.567*** 0.457*** 0.681*** 0.692*** 0.704***
(0.0429) (0.0430) (0.0494) (0.0426) (0.0462) (0.0431) (0.0430) (0.0429)
ln gdp per capita(j) 0.801*** 0.808*** 0.783*** 0.800*** 0.532*** 0.800*** 0.817*** 0.826***
(0.0377) (0.0379) (0.0423) (0.0352) (0.0362) (0.0380) (0.0378) (0.0378)
ln pop(i) 0.874*** 0.825*** 0.398*** 0.905*** 1.060*** 0.829*** 0.787*** 0.738***
(0.0882) (0.0875) (0.1382) (0.1157) (0.1315) (0.0868) (0.0887) (0.0892)
ln pop(j) 1.377*** 1.327*** 1.282*** 0.931*** 1.512*** 1.313*** 1.347*** 1.349***
(0.0821) (0.0817) (0.1201) (0.1015) (0.1142) (0.0805) (0.0830) (0.0838)
portcont(i) 0.154*** 0.156*** 0.124*** 0.031 0.085*** 0.041* 0.241*** 0.308***
(0.0211) (0.0211) (0.0243) (0.0200) (0.0207) (0.0232) (0.0207) (0.0208)
portcont(j) 0.127*** 0.128*** 0.142*** 0.091*** 0.076*** 0.078*** 0.142*** 0.134***
(0.0227) (0.0227) (0.0260) (0.0214) (0.0219) (0.0249) (0.0228) (0.0232)
portcont(i)*portcont(j) -0.084*** -0.091** -0.079*** -0.055** -0.078*** -0.051* -0.093*** -0.090***
(0.0276) (0.0276) (0.0280) (0.0254) (0.0249) (0.0285) (0.0287) (0.0294)
trend portcont(i) 0.018*** 0.020*** 0.013*** 0.032*** 0.027*** 0.023*** 0.010*** -0.003
(0.0029) (0.0029) (0.0033) (0.0039) (0.0040) (0.0027) (0.0032) (0.0034)
trend portcont(j) 0.011*** 0.012*** 0.001 0.005 0.016*** 0.016*** 0.008*** 0.004







Countries 127 127 127 127 127 127 127 127
Country Pairs 13385 13385 13385 13385 13385 13385 13385 13385
Observations 231917 231917 231917 231917 231917 231917 231917 231917
overallR
2 0.4271 0.4287 0.3938 0.4516 0.0263 0.4310 0.4237 0.4208










ij, t ij,t ij,t
Clustering ij ij ij ij ij ij ij ij
Balanced No No No No No No No No
Standard errors in parentheses
∗
p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
the dependent variable and the omitted variable is correlated with one or more of the
included independent variables/regressors. The problem can be summarised as follows.
One of the classical assumptions of the linear regression model for best linear unbiased
estimators is that the error term is uncorrelated with the regressors, i.e. E(Xu)=0.
When the omitted variable is not included in the model, then it is moved to the error
term. If one of the included variables is correlated with the omitted variable, then the
assumption that the regressors and the error term are uncorrelated is violated. This
renders the OLS estimator biased and inconsistent. The direction of the bias depends
on the estimators as well as the covariance between the regressors and the omitted
variables.
In our model, our container variables could be correlated with observable components
in the error term such as some policy variables. One can think of FTAs, common
currency, and GATT membership. This could be the case if countries that subscribe to
a FTA are more likely to containerise for instance. In this case, the OLS estimator may
be overestimating the true value of the estimator.
More worryingly is the correlation with unobservable components - for example,
a shock to the demand for trade between two countries that causes the countries to
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containerise. Traditionally, the literature has tended to deal with this problem by intro-
ducing FE.
In this section, we will first control for observable omitted variables such as the policy
variables and then move to control for unobservable by introducing more FE, other than
country-pair and time FE that are already introduced.
Containerisation in equation 5.1 is measured as a country-year specific event. To
investigate whether we have any omitted variables, we introduce additional controls for
FTAs, common currency, and bilateral GATT membership. We refer to these variables
as ’policy variables’ in this thesis. The FTA dummy indicates whether the two countries
in a given observation belong to the same regional free trade block or are in a free
trade agreement in a specific year. For example, before 1973, the UK belonged to
the European Free Trade Association (EFTA) which was founded in 1960 by Austria,
Denmark, Norway, Portugal, Sweden, Switzerland, and the UK. The UK’s membership
in EFTA was terminated when the UK joined the European Union in 1973. So our FTA
dummy is one for trade between the UK and any of EFTA’s other members between
1960 and 1972. In 1973, the dummy would switch to one for trade between the UK and
the European Union (EU) members at the time and switch to zero for trade with the
remaining EFTA members2. The common currency control switches to 1 to indicate
whether countries i and j share a common currency in a specific year. We also include
an indicator for bilateral membership of the GATT, the precursor of the WTO. The
GATT was formed in 1949 and lasted until 1993 when it was replaced by the WTO. The
dummy variable ’both GATT’ indicates whether both countries are GATT members.
We estimate equation 5.1 with the additional policy controls mentioned above as
regressors. In column 1, we include country-pair and year dummies as in table 5.1. The
results in column 1 table 5.2 confirm that adding the above controls does not affect
the container estimates. The estimates of the coefficients of the container variables are
practically unchanged compared to the regression 4 in table 5.1. The FTA estimate of
0.354 is somewhat smaller than Head et al. (2010) estimate of 0.45 and almost half of
the coefficient estimate of 0.68 found by Baier and Bergstrand (2007) when including
country-pair dummies. Membership to the GATT matters as well. We find that when
both countries are GATT members, trade is 15% higher than pre-membership levels.
2Denmark left EFTA and joined the EU in 1973 just like the UK.
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This is exactly what Rose (2002) obtains for the GATT memberships when he employs
country-pair effects. Adding the above country time variant controls does not have
any effect on the estimation of the container coefficients. This result suggests that our
container variables are not correlated with any of these variables.
In the remainder of this section, we introduce more FE to control for any omitted
variable bias coming from unobservable factors. In some sense, we add in more controls
to stress-test the results.
In regression 2, we control for country trends. The country trends act as counters
and increase by one for each additional years. Since our data set starts in 1962, then
the trend variable starts counting from that year. This should control for any trends in
trade before and after containerisation. So the container trend will now be significant
only if it differs from any pre-existing trend. The results in column 2 do not change at
all compared to what we see in table 5.1. Also, we still estimate positive and significant
coefficients for the container trends suggesting that the trend we pick up with these
variables is different from pre-existing trends.
Other unobservable factors that may have affected trade and may be correlated with
the adoption of containerisation are country- or region-time specific. Due to computing
capacity constraints, we are unable to include country-year (it and jt) dummies while
estimating annual data with the current specification. This would involve 127*29*2
or over 7000 dummies. We go around this in an ensuing section by picking points in
time (time intervals) in the panel set. In this section however we try different time
FE specifications to test the results further. In regression 3, we introduce region-year
effects. In using the region dummies, we identify the effects of the container from the
within region variation. We are also assuming that the omitted variables differ between
but not within regions. We divide our countries into 9 groups/regions: OECD, Europe
Other than OECD, Central and Latin America, Caribbean, Africa, East and South-East
Asia, South Asia, Southwest Asia, and Oceania-Pacific. The estimates do not change
much. Trade is in total 20% higher than before containerisation. The coefficient of the
container trend variables is around 1% for the originator but very small and insignificant
for the destination.
Regressions 4 and 5 introduce country-decade FE. Recall that we have a total of 29
years in our dataset. In regression 4, we divide the time period into 3 decades (1962-
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1970, 1971-1980, and 1981-1990) and introduce country-decade FE. We include country-
decade FE to control for unobservable country-time shocks and given data constraints,
this is the most detailed we can go.
The estimates are affected by the inclusion of the country-decade FE. The total
effect of the container on bilateral trade is only around 5%. This is substantially lower
than the estimates in table 5.1.
Containerisation started in 1966. This means that containerisation is an effect spe-
cific to the second half of the 1960s. Also, the years ending with 7,8, and 9 are the most
frequent years in which containerisation occurs. This means that splitting our decades
differently to account for this fact may be expected to return stronger results. To try
this, we divide the period 1962-1990 into 4 decades/time periods: 1962-1965, 1966-1975,
1976-1985, 1986-1990. This produces different results from regression 4. In column 5,
table 5.2, in total, trade increases by 9% when both countries containerise. The con-
tainer trend variables are positive and significant and indicate an annual growth rate
of 5% due to containerisation. By controlling for country-decade, we are restricting the
effect of the container to within decade (period) variation. The weaker results suggest
that our estimates are sensitive to the inclusion of country-time unobservable factors
that determine trade. In section 5.7, we introduce country-year FE in a different speci-
fication to control for any omitted variable bias coming from unobservable country-time
factors.
In the remaining part of the section, we check whether the container has any pre-
containerisation or lagged effects. In doing so, we move the containerisation indicators
backward and forward in time. In regression 6, we move the container indicators three
years backward for all countries. This should control for anticipatory effects of container-
isation. In other words, moving the container indicators 3 years backwards should test
whether any anticipation of the introduction of the container lead to any pre-container
increase in trade. The choice of 3 years is due to the fact that we have only 4 years
of pre-containerisation in our data set. The results suggest there is some evidence for
anticipatory effects on trade. However the container coefficients are much lower than the
contemporaneous container coefficients in previous regressions. In total, trade increases
by 7% due to pre-containerisation.
In regressions 7 and 8, we perform a similar exercise to regression 6 above but
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by moving the container indicators 3 and 5 years forward respectively. This allows
containerisation to have effects that are captured 3/5 years after adoption. The choice
of 5 years is based on the evidence presented in chapter 4 about the speed of adjustment.
The choice of 3 years is for robustness. We look more closely at the lagged effects of
containerisation in chapter 6 of this thesis.
In comparison to the contemporary effects of the container in table 5.1, both regres-
sions return stronger effects for containerisation suggesting that containerisation had
lagged effects 3 and 5 years later. In regression 7, total effect of the 3-year lagged con-
tainer variables is 33%. As for regression 8, total effect of the 5-year lagged container
variables is 41% which is higher than the total effect estimated for the 3-year lagged
effect. This is compared to a total contemporaneous effect of 22%. As for trends, we
pick up lower trend coefficients in regression 7 of around 1% for each the originator and
the destination. We pick up virtually no trends when containerisation is moved 5 years
forward in regression 8.
To summarise, in this section, we attempt to deal with potential omitted variable
bias. We do so by including policy variables that may be correlated with the container
measures. We find that controlling for FTAs, GATT membership, and common cur-
rency does not change the estimated effects of containerisation in equation 5.1. We also
attempt saturating the regressions by including more FE to control for unobservable
factors that may be correlated with containerisation. The evidence suggests that the
estimated coefficients are sensitive to the inclusion of unobservable region and country-
time FE. There is also evidence that containerisation may have small anticipatory effects
of trade but much larger lagged effects.
5.4 Endogeneity
In this section, we deal with the potential problem of endogeneity in our estimation
equation (equation 5.1). Is containerisation truly exogenous or does our estimation
suffer from endogeneity bias? Since we do not have an instrument, we restrict the
sample to consider parts of the data where endogeneity may be less of a concern.
A standard problem in econometric models is the potential endogeneity of RHS (right
hand side) variables. There are three possible sources of endogeneity: omitted variable
bias, simultaneity bias, and measurement error. We discussed the problems that can
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arise when relevant variables are omitted in the previous section and we turn back to
it in section 5.7 where we propose a different specification to account for them. The
source of endogeneity that we refer to here is simultaneity bias / reverse causality.
It can be argued that the decision to containerise in a given country depends partially
on the volume of bilateral trade flows. In other words, if France is one of Vietnam’s main
trade partners, would France’s containerisation make the Vietnamese containerise faster?
In order to answer this question, we need to recall some facts about containerisation.
Containerisation is a process that requires such high capital investments that it might
not make economic sense for a country to introduce it just because of one specific trade
route. Most countries trade with several countries and most countries have more than
one major trade partner. In our dataset, without accounting for missing observations,
each country trades on average with 63 other countries per year.
The investments in capital to allow containerisation to occur are large. Containeri-
sation started as a private endeavor by the shipping lines. In the early stages, shipping
lines had to bear most of the costs since many ports such as New York and London were
reluctant to spend on what could be a failing undertaking. Many shipping lines had
to operate from small and formerly unknown ports and install their own cranes. The
process was extremely expensive. The UK had to spend close to £200 million between
1966-1969 just on a few ports not to mention rail and road expansions (McKinsey and
Company (1967)). Rotterdam alone spent close to $60 million on its container terminal.
After the container gained ground on the major shipping routes, ports warmed up to
containerisation and a race started among ports to attract the most shipping lines by
building new terminals and providing the infrastructure to handle containers. There is
evidence that suggests containerisation led to the rise and fall of ports as we discuss in
chapter 2.
Certainly in the beginning, the decision to containerise by a port was a strategic
decision. Many ports in Europe and the United States raced to containerise to attract
shipping lines to call at them. In New York, the decision of the port not to containerise
led to its demise. Port Elizabeth and Newark in New Jersey became successful due to
their decisions to invest in container facilities. In Europe, the ports of Rotterdam and
Bremen were fast to adopt the new technology and this is why Sea-Land chose to call
at them on its first transatlantic trip. In the UK, the London Docks vanished while
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Felixstowe, a privately owned port, flourished following its decision to operate purely as
a container port.
In many countries, port authorities fall under the administration of the govern-
ment. Due to the high costs, careful planning and analysis had to be undertaken by
governments to study the feasibility of containerisation. In the UK, the government
commissioned McKinsey to make a cost and benefit analysis before it embarked on a
programme of containerisation that had cost hundreds of million pounds in that period’s
money. We were surprised to find that nowhere in the report was there a mention of
promoting a specific trade route being a reason to containerise. The McKinsey report
focused solely on cost savings and potential economies of scale brought about by the
container and how these would benefit UK trade in general.
5.4.1 Dealing with Endogeneity: Methodology
Although, as we argue above, the narrative does not suggest that our specification should
suffer from severe reverse causality, we still attempt to deal with any concerns however.
We do this mainly by addressing the sources of the possible reverse causality and then
restricting the sample to parts where endogeneity is less of a concern.
In our first exercise, we address the possible decision to containerise coming from
large bilateral trade flows. We calculate the share of bilateral trade flows in total trade for
all countries in our sample. Exports and imports are considered separately. Averages of
bilateral trade flows are calculated over the entire period of our sample (1962-1990). The
average bilateral flows are then divided by average total exports or imports of a country
to determine the shares of trade. We then remove trade observations relating to the top
5 exporters and importers of a given country. This leaves us with those observations that
are less likely to have big impact on a country’s decision to containerise. For instance,
Belgium’s top 5 importers are USA, France, West Germany, Netherlands, and the UK.
Belgium’s top 5 exporters are the same as its importers. All observations relating to
Belgium’s trade with these countries are excluded.
Eliminating the main trade partners from the sample as described above leaves us
with 207,415 observations and 12,467 country pairs. We estimate the same model as in
regression 4 table 5.1 (with country-pair and year FE). The result of regression 1 table
5.3 is consistent with what we see in table 5.1 regression 4. We still estimate a total
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Table 5.3: Endogeneity and Heterogeneity


































ln gdp per capita(i) 0.600*** 0.641*** 0.604*** 0.870*** 0.766*** 1.254*** 1.251*** 0.678***
(0.0456) (0.0463) (0.0458) (0.1106) (0.1480) (0.1512) (0.4452) (0.0431)
ln gdp per capita(j) 0.801*** 0.822*** 0.813*** 0.988*** 1.176*** 0.788*** 0.720* 0.813***
(0.0406) (0.0408) (0.0414) (0.0813) (0.1309) (0.1021) (0.3731) (0.0380)
ln pop (i) 0.753*** 0.813*** 0.737*** 1.272*** 0.902*** 1.970*** 1.398** 0.856***
(0.0934) (0.0942) (0.0945) (0.2037) (0.3168) (0.2400) (0.6763) (0.0872)
ln pop (j) 1.380*** 1.327*** 1.415*** 0.889*** 0.993*** 0.823*** -0.882 1.282***
(0.0882) (0.0882) (0.0898) (0.1759) (0.2639) (0.2471) (0.6673) (0.0826)
portcont(i) 0.133*** 0.118*** 0.143*** 0.139*** 0.125* 0.177** 0.180 0.127***
(0.0227) (0.0231) (0.0230) (0.0503) (0.0670) (0.0713) (0.1940) (0.0233)
portcont(j) 0.125*** 0.136*** 0.140*** 0.031 0.002 0.115 0.153 0.167***
(0.0243) (0.0249) (0.0247) (0.0547) (0.0708) (0.0787) (0.2092) (0.0248)
portcont(i)*portcont(j) -0.090*** -0.074** -0.099*** -0.044 -0.015 -0.113 0.067 -0.093***
(0.0300) (0.0306) (0.0306) (0.0610) (0.0814) (0.0858) (0.2493) (0.0281)
trend * portcont(i) 0.024*** 0.026*** 0.023*** 0.040*** 0.046*** 0.035*** 0.056*** 0.020***
(0.0031) (0.0031) (0.0031) (0.0057) (0.0108) (0.0060) (0.0175) (0.0029)
trend * portcont(j) 0.013*** 0.014*** 0.011*** 0.026*** 0.017*** 0.035*** -0.015 0.012***







Countries 127 127 127 127 127 127 21 127
Country Pairs 12467 12411 12373 3128 1672 1644 188 13385
Observations 207415 204748 204117 45194 24646 23028 2480 231917
overallR
2 0.3645 0.3737 0.3504 0.4750 0.5154 0.5311 0.2913 0.4352
Dummies ij,t ij,t ij,t ij,t ij,t ij,t ij,t ij,t
Clustering ij ij ij ij ij ij ij ij
Balanced No No No No No No No No
Standard errors in parentheses
∗
p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
effect for the container of 18% on trade.
In regressions 2 and 3, we repeat the same exercise as above. However, instead of
averaging bilateral trade flows over the entire period, we calculate the shares of bilateral
trade in total trade for each country in 1962 and 1990 respectively. In estimating
regression 2, we remove the top 5 exporters and importers of each country in the sample
in 1962. In estimating 3, we do the same but for 1990. The results are roughly similar
to what we see in regression 1.
These results support our prediction that large bilateral trade flows should not affect
the decision to containerise, at least not to a big extent. A country will containerise
only if it had realised the need for it and it had secured the capital to do so. The private
sector is as crucial to the process as the public sector is. The private sector needs to
invest in very expensive containers and container ships. This means that the poorer a
country is, the slower it will containerise. We have seen earlier that low income countries
were last to containerise. Also, country size and remoteness govern whether it is feasible
for shipping lines to call at. This is why a country like the Comoros Islands remained
largely uncontainerised in the late 80s. In short, it is very likely that the decision to
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containerise is determined by several factors other than bilateral trade flows.
The second endogeneity treatment we attempt concerns solely landlocked countries.
It can be argued that containerisation is exogenous to landlocked countries. Containeri-
sation was imposed on landlocked countries and they had little say in the process. Many
landlocked countries were forced to adapt to the new technology by constructing inland
container depots and railway stations to get their goods in containers to the nearest con-
tainer port over the border. The use of containers on the railway will be modelled later.
We see this process of adaptation most clearly in countries like Austria and Switzerland.
How did containerisation affect the trade of landlocked countries?
To answer the above questions, we perform a series of empirical exercises. In the
first exercise, we restrict our sample to observations in which either the originator or the
destination is landlocked (or both)3. This leaves us with 45194 observations and 3128
country pairs. Since landlocked countries do not have access to the sea, they are nat-
urally uncontainerised. However, to trade with remote countries, landlocked countries
have to use the ports of their non-landlocked neighbours. In regressions 4-7 of table
5.3, we allow for landlocked countries to containerise once their nearest port country
containerises. We do this by having the containerisation variables of the landlocked
countries reflect the state of containerisation in the country with the nearest port to
them. For instance, for Austria, the nearest country with a coastline would be Italy and
for Burundi, it would be Tanzania, etc. In the event that a landlocked country borders
more than one non-landlocked countries, we look at the distance from the capital of the
landlocked country to the main container port in each of the adjacent countries and take
the shorter distance4.
In regression 4, we restrict the sample to observations in which either the originator
or the destination is landlocked. By doing this, we investigate the effect of the use
of containers on the trade of landlocked countries, regardless of whether the landlocked
country is the originator or the destination. Recall that we allow landlocked countries to
use the nearest container port in the most adjacent country for trade with overseas. We
estimate equation 5.1 with country-pair and year effects. We still estimate positive and
3Landlocked countries in our data sample are: Afghanistan, Austria, Bolivia, Burkina Faso, Burundi,
Central African Republic, Chad, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Laos, Malawi, Mali, Mongolia, Nepal, Niger,
Paraguay, Rwanda, Switzerland, Uganda, Zambia, and Zimbabwe - a total of 21 countries
4We consult Google Earth for distance calculations.
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significant effect of the exporter’s containerisation on trade but only a small positive and
insignificant effect of the destination’s containerisation. In magnitude, trade increases
by 15% when the landlocked or non-landlocked exporter starts using containers. The
coefficient of the interacted container variable is negative but insignificant. In total,
trade increases by around 15% when both partners containerise. This is less than the
total base effect of containerisation found in table 5.1. The container trend effect is
bigger however. Trade grows at an annual rate of 4% when the originator containerises
and 3% when the destination containerises.
To further investigate the effect of containerisation on the trade of landlocked coun-
tries, we restrict our sample to landlocked destinations to isolate landlocked countries’
imports. This means that all country j’s are now landlocked countries. In column 5,
the result suggests that landlocked countries’ imports are affected by the originators’
use of containers to some extent. The coefficient of the originators’ container variable
is positive and significant at the 10% significance level. Trade increases by 13% af-
ter the originator’s containerisation. Recall that the originator could be a landlocked
or non-landlocked country in this exercise but the destination can only be landlocked.
There is no evidence that the landlocked destination’s use of the nearest container port
has any effect on their imports. This suggests that the originator’s containerisation is
more crucial in increasing imports to landlocked countries which is perhaps intuitive.
The marginal effect of the second country containerising is negative but small and in-
significant. The trend effects of containerisation on imports to landlocked countries
are however positive and relatively big. Imports grow at an annual rate of 5% if the
originator containerises and 2% if the destination containerises.
To isolate landlocked originator’s exports, we now restrict our sample to landlocked
originators only. There is evidence that exports of landlocked countries benefited from
the containerisation of their near non-landlocked neighbours. In column 6, exports of
landlocked countries jump by 19% upon the containerisation of their nearest neighbours.
The coefficient of the destination container variable is positive but insignificant and is
wiped out by the coefficient of the interacted container variable. The use of the container
by the landlocked countries by using the nearest container port across the border is what
matters for their exports. The trend variables are both positive and significant at the
1% significance level. Trade grows at an annual rate of 4% due to the use of the nearest
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port by the landlocked originators and a similar 4% due to the containerisation of the
destination countries.
To look at the effect of containerisation on landlocked countries’ trade among each
other, we restrict the sample to landlocked originators and destinations in column 7.
We are left with 2480 observations and 188 country pairs. Results suggest that con-
tainerisation may have had some effect on trade between landlocked countries although
the effect is not well-identified. Both coefficients of the container variables are positive
but insignificant. The coefficients of the trend variables suggest that trade grows at an
annual rate of 6% when landlocked originators use the container ports of their near-
est neighbours. No such trend is found when the landlocked destinations start using
containers.
To summarise, in the section, we consider the potential problem of endogeneity in
estimating the effects of the container as modelled in equation 5.1. Since we lack an
instrument, we consider sub-samples in which endogeneity is less a concern. The first
exercise in this respect consider the largest trade partners and drop the observations re-
lated to these trade partners. The rationale behind this is that countries may select into
containerisation if their largest trade partner adopt the technology. We find no evidence
for this in our estimations in this section. In the second set of estimations, we look at
the effect of the use of the container on landlocked countries, where endogeneity is less
a concern. We find evidence for an effect of containerisation on the trade of landlocked
countries even if they had no say in containerisation themselves. We find a bigger effect
of containerisation on their exports than their imports to the rest of the world. The
effect on the trade between landlocked countries is positive but not well-identified. The
results here suggest that containerisation may have had spillovers that benefitted land-
locked countries. This is an important result because while containerisation is exogenous
to these countries their trade seems to have benefited from containerisation.
5.5 Heterogeneity: Island Nations
After having looked at the effects of the container on landlocked countries, we now turn
to island countries. These are nations that depend purely on shipping to conduct their
trade. A country like France shares land borders with many countries and thus conducts
most of its trade by rail and by road. The UK, an island nation, on the other hand, is
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dependent entirely on the sea for the its trade. This is especially true before the prolif-
eration of air cargo and the opening of the Euro Tunnel5. One would expect different
effects of containerisation on island countries. In fact, one might expect bigger effects
on their trade since more of their trade moves through ports. To test this, we construct
two island dummies, one for the originator and one for the destination. We then add
a number of interaction terms between the container variables and the island dummies.
In column 8 of table 5.3, we find a total base effect of 23% of containerisation. This is
similar in magnitude to what we find in the regression 4 in table 5.1. Looking at the coef-
ficients of the island-container interaction terms suggest the following6. If the originator
is an island country and starts using containers, then its exports would increase by an
additional 13%, making the total effect of containerisation on the exports of the island
originator 27% (adding up the coefficients of the container(i) and island(i)*container(i)
variables). If the destinations are containerised but not island nations, then the vari-
ables container(j) and container(i)*container(j) switch on. The total base effect of the
island originator’s use of the container would then be around 36%. This is interesting
because it suggests that the increase in exports of island nations due to containerisa-
tion is double the average increase in the exports of the non-island containerisers. On
the other hand, if only the destination island containerises, then there is a small im-
pact on their imports. The magnitude of the increase in their imports is around 4%
from non-containerised originators (the variables container (j) and island(j)*container(j)
switch on). Finally if both countries are islands and start containerising, then all vari-
ables switch on in the regression (container(i), container(j), container(i)*container(j),
island(i)*container(i), island(j)*container(j)). Adding up all coefficients results in an
increase of 21% in intra-island trade due to containerisation. This is close to the total
base effect found in our table 5.1, regression 4.
In summary, perhaps in line with expectations, we find that an island country can
increase its exports on average twice as much as a non-island country would do by
containerising.
5Refer to figure 4.9 in chapter 4.
6Dummies for island status of countries i and j are included in the regression but these drop out due
to multicollinearity.
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5.6 Containerisation and Intermodal Transport
Countries that share a common border conduct their trade mostly by road or rail.
Experts in the transportation and shipping sectors are of the opinion that containerisa-
tion’s real value is in its intermodality, i.e. its capacity to be used in all transportation
modes indiscriminately7. Intermodal transport is the term used for allowing goods to
be shifted among the three main transport modes with relative ease. Containerisation
allowed goods to be transported quickly to and from the port by rail or truck. The
container can be transported as a trailer on wheels by trucks and lorries or on wagons
by trains. This meant that in order to benefit the most from containerisation, countries
had to link their ports with the rest of the country through a comprehensive transport
system.
In many countries, containerisation was putting pressure on the existing road net-
works as trucks have become bigger to transport 20 foot and 40 foot containers. This
is why some countries had to invest in their transport infrastructure to cope with the
increased traffic on their roads and railways. In the US, this was known as the Federal-
Aid Highway Act of 1956. Also railways had to invest to improve their rails to compete
with the trucking sector and to build inland container depots and terminals to handle
and transfer containers.
Due to the above, one expects containerisation to have spill-overs on the larger
economy and on trade. Our data set and model setting allow us to test for spill-over
effects on the transport system in countries that start containerisation. One way to
look at this is by looking at how containerisation affected the trade between 2 adjacent
countries (countries with common border). If port containerisation had led to improved
rail and road connections internally, then trade between two countries that share a
border should be affected by containerisation even if their trade does not pass through
ports. Trade between 2 adjacent countries mostly goes by rail or road. To investigate
this, we construct a common border dummy and interact this dummy with the port
container variables. We introduce the interacted variable into equation 5.1 and estimate
the equation as before. In column 1 table 5.4, the coefficients of the container variables
and their trends are similar in magnitude to the estimate in regression 4, table 5.1. As for
7Refer to the introduction of chapter 4.
114
the interacted container and border variable, the coefficient is positive but insignificant.
In column 2 of table 5.4, we interact the container variable with the border dummy
and a variable that indicates whether the two countries are OECD countries. The reason
we do this is because railway containerisation was mainly introduced in OECD countries
in the early stages of containerisation as we discuss in chapter 4. Also, most intra-
European trade takes place inland and thus it is most likely to be positively affected by
the container. Our reasoning is confirmed by the results. In column 2, containerisation
had an additional effect on the trade of OECD countries that share a border in the
magnitude of 47%. This quite large result confirms the spill-overs of the new technology
on the trade of adjacent countries even if their trade does not go through ports.
To explore this further, we use the data collected about the container proliferation
in railways we discussed in the previous chapter. To study the effects of the introduc-
tion of containerisation on the railway, we first introduce railway containerisation as
separate variables in equation 5.1. We will call these variables ’infra(i)’ and ’infra(j)’.
The railway or infrastructure indicator variables capture the introduction of the con-
tainer on the railway in each country. A country’s railway container dummy switches
on when that country’s railways start handling containers. The variables are similar
in nature to the port container variables. We also add in an interacted infrastructure
variable. The results are presented in column 3 table 5.4. Introducing the infrastructure
variables wipes out the port container effects. The introduction of the container on the
railway increases trade by around 59% if introduced by the originator and by around
39% if introduced by the destination. When both countries have introduced container
on the railway, then total effect is around 74% increase in trade. We no longer esti-
mate significant coefficients for the port container variables. This could be because the
infrastructure variables are partially collinear with the original container variables and
capture the original effects the port container variable as well as any additional effects
from carrying containers by rail. To put this into perspective, the base effects of the
container in table 5.1 were around 22% when the entire sample of countries is consid-
ered. This suggests substantial additional effects of the container on trade through its
introduction on the railway.
Just as our model allows us to test whether introducing containers in ports was found
to have additional effects on countries that share a border, similarly, it also allows us to
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test whether introducing containers on the railway affected countries that share borders
more than those that do not. To do so, we simply introduce an interacted infrastructure
variable with the border dummy and estimate the same model. Indeed, in column 4
table 5.4, we find that countries that share a border benefit more from containerisation
on the railway. This is because trade by rail is only possible inland and makes most
sense for countries that share a border together. The model estimates that countries
that share a border benefit by an additional 22% increase in their bilateral trade flows
on top of the effects estimated in the previous regression.
As a last exercise on this topic, we merge the port container and railway container
dummies in our estimation equation. We merge port and railway container variables so
that a country is considered containerised whenever its ports or railways start handling
containers whichever comes first. In other words, we allow for intermodality in con-
tainerisation albeit on ship and rail only. This has the advantage of allowing landlocked
countries as well as non-port containerised countries to use their existing railway system
to transport containers to adjacent countries and subsequently overseas. We argue that
this is a better way of allowing for intermodality between ships and rail because what we
see in practice is that a mixture of the two modes of transport is used. Also, countries
that first containerised by rail could transport containers to the nearest port over the





1, country i has either containerised ports or railways at time t
0, otherwise
We call this merged container variable ’full container’ variable. We replace the
port container variable with the full container variables in our estimation equation 5.1.
In table 5.4 column 5, the estimation suggests stronger effects of containerisation on
trade when we account for railway containerisation compared with port containerisation
only. When the container is introduced by both countries, then the total base effect
of containerisation at around 30%. This is higher than the base effect found in table
5.1 (regression 4). The coefficients of the container trend variables remain roughly the
same.
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In conclusion to this section, we have tried to answer the question whether the spill-
over effects of containerisation on the broad infrastructure of the introducing countries
translated into additional effects on trade. We try estimating different specifications in
which we try to measure and incorporate the spillovers of containerisation. The evi-
dence from these estimations suggests that containerisation that started with ports had
additional spill-over effects on trade that were transmitted through improvements and
investments in the inland transport infrastructure of port-containerised and landlocked
countries.
Table 5.4: Spill-Over Effects of the Container











ln gdp per capita(i) 0.681*** 0.682*** 0.683*** 0.683*** 0.682***
(0.0430) (0.0430) (0.0424) (0.0425) (0.0431)
ln gdp per capita(j) 0.808*** 0.809*** 0.806*** 0.806*** 0.798***
(0.0379) (0.0379) (0.0373) (0.0373) (0.0379)
ln pop (i) 0.823*** 0.832*** 0.960*** 0.964*** 0.867***
(0.0874) (0.0876) (0.0888) (0.0889) (0.0979)
ln pop (j) 1.325*** 1.333*** 1.366*** 1.370*** 1.416***
(0.0817) (0.0818) (0.0817) (0.0818) (0.0879)
portcont(i) 0.154*** 0.155*** 0.025 0.025
(0.0211) (0.0211) (0.0219) (0.0219)
portcont(j) 0.127*** 0.128*** 0.031 0.031
(0.0227) (0.0227) (0.0239) (0.0239)
portcont(i)*portcont(j) -0.093*** -0.092*** 0.004 0.004





trend * portcont(i) 0.020*** 0.020*** 0.013*** 0.013***
(0.0029) (0.0029) (0.0029) (0.0029)
trend * portcont(j) 0.013*** 0.012*** 0.008*** 0.008***



















Countries 127 127 127 127 127
Country Pairs 13385 13385 13385 13385 13385
Observations 231917 231917 231917 231917 231917
overallR
2 0.4292 0.4337 0.4335 0.4331 0.4286
Dummies ij,t ij,t ij,t ij,t ij,t
Clustering ij ij ij ij ij
Balanced No No No No No
Standard errors in parentheses
∗
p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
5.7 Gravity and Multilateral Resistances
After the derivation of a structural gravity equation from CES preferences and based on
a general equilibrium framework by Anderson and van Wincoop (2003), empirical studies
of international trade flows had to take account of multilateral resistances. Equation
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3.2 tells us that bilateral trade flows depend on bilateral trade barriers between i and j
relative to the product of their multilateral resistance terms, after controlling for size.
For a given trade barrier between i and j, higher barriers between j and its other trading
partners will reduce the relative price of goods from i and thus raise imports from i. In
other words, trade between countries i and j depends on the trade barrier between them
relative to average trade barriers that both regions face with all their trade partners.
The expressions of the multilateral resistance terms are given in equations 3.3 and 3.4.
It should be clear that multilateral resistance terms are functions of trade costs tij .
Since trade costs are correlated with the multilateral prices, then estimations of the
effects of trade costs that ignore multilateral prices suffer from omitted variable bias.
Since it is not easy to calculate or estimate multilateral resistances, economists have
tended to include country FE in cross-sectional studies, country-time effects in panel
settings to deal with this problem. We follow suit and include country-time FE in this
section.
5.7.1 Multilateral Resistances in the Estimation Equation
To account for multilateral resistance in line with theory, we need to introduce country-
year dummies (it and jt) in equation 5.1. However, introducing country-year dummies
turns out to be problematic to the previous empirical strategy and our constructed
container variable. Recall that we measured containerisation as a country variable that is
time-variant in the previous sections. So controlling for multilateral resistances through
the use of country-year dummies will wipe out the container effect. Since the country-
time effects are collinear with the opening of container port facilities and/or adoption
by rail, we can only estimate the effects of containerisation when origin and destination
countries both containerize. So this means that we are only able to capture the effect of
the container when both parties in a bilateral trade relationship containerise. In other
words, our container variable becomes a country-pair time-variant variable (ijt). Now
since one-sided containerisation might have had an effect on trade, the total effect of
containerisation measured through the bilateral variable might be an underestimate of
the true effects of containerisation.
On the practical side of things, introducing country-time dummies means that we
need to introduce 157*2*29 or 9106 dummies. This is where you hit a limit on the
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computing capacity of the statistical software available, Stata in our case. To get around
this, we choose data points spaced at 5-yearly intervals starting from 1962 to 1987 and
add 1990 as the final data point. The adoption of containerisation started in 1966
and ended in 1983. So our chosen period includes at least one data-point of ’pre-
containerisation’, the main containerisation period for all countries, and at least a further
2 observations of ’post-containerisation’ trade. This reduces the dummies that we need
to introduce to 157*2*7 or 2198 dummies only.
Choosing 5-year interval time points turns out to be convenient for another reason.
As discussed in the previous chapter (refer to section 4.3), evidence suggests that it
takes a few years for trade to adjust fully to containerisation. So with 5-year intervals,
we allow time for adjustment and hence we are in a better position to capture the effects
of containerisation. By introducing the bilateral container measure, our reduced form
gravity specification becomes:






Dijt + uijt (5.2)
Our container variable is now bilateral time-variant (Contijt). Policyijt is a vector
of policy variables that are ijt-variant (country-pair time) and these are FTAs, GATT
membership, and common currency as mentioned before. Vij is a vector of gravity
controls that are bilateral but time invariant such as distance. Dijt is a vector of all it,
jt, ij dummies. uijt is the error term in this model.
Returning to country-time dummies, introducing these dummies allows us to control
not only for multilateral resistances but also variables such as GDP, population, and
other observable and non-observable time-varying factors that might be correlated with
the countries’ decision to invest in container ports. Similar to previous estimations,
including country-pair FE control for distance, language as well as difficult to measure
geographic factors, like government desires to act as container port hubs. Wooldridge
(2010)8 asserts that FE estimations is a useful tool for policy analysis.
We also choose to estimate the above equation in first-differenced model as a ro-
bustness check and to allow the ij dummies to vary over time. According to Wooldridge
(2010) (page 320), first differencing a structural equation is a simple yet powerful method
of programme evaluation. Wooldridge also notes that the first-differencing estimator is
8Wooldridge (2010) chapter 10.
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more efficient under the assumption that the error terms are serially correlated9. Our
estimation equation then becomes:
∆lnxijt = β0 + β1∆Contijt + β2∆Policyijt + β3
−−→
Dijt + uijt (5.3)
We test for serial correlation in the above model using the command xtserial (see
Drukker (2003)). The test strongly rejects the null hypothesis of no serial correlation.
The result of the test suggests that using first-differencing would correct for serial cor-
relation and hence produce more efficient estimates. The result of the test is included
in appendix B.
Another advantage of the above specifications is that they allow for a ”horse race”
between the technology and the policy variables. This allows us to compare between
the effects of technology and policy variables.
5.7.2 FE and Sources of Endogeneity
An important concern that arises when trying to identify the effects of containerisation
on trade flows is their possible correlation with the error term, such that the variable
is endogenous and therefore OLS yields biased and inconsistent coefficient estimates.
As discussed by Baier and Bergstrand (2007) in the context of the effect of FTAs on
trade, of the potential sources of endogeneity bias (omitted variables, simultaneity and
measurement error) perhaps most important is the potential omission of other relevant
variables. We anticipate that there will be both a country-time and bilateral component
to this bias.
Containerisation started as a private endeavor by the shipping lines. In the early
stages, shipping lines had to bear most of the costs since many ports such as New York
and London were reluctant to spend significant funds on ’a new technology’ with uncer-
tain returns at the time. Many shipping lines had to operate from small and formerly
unknown ports and install their own cranes. The process was extremely expensive. Af-
ter the container gained ground, ports warmed up to containerisation and a race started
among ports to attract the most shipping lines by building new terminals and providing
the infrastructure to handle containers. In many countries, port authorities fall under
the administration of the government. Because of the high costs, careful planning and
9Wooldridge (2010) chapter 10.
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analysis had to be undertaken by governments to study the feasibility of containeri-
sation. In the UK, the government commissioned McKinsey & Co to conduct a cost
and benefit analysis before spending significant public funds on containerisation. The
McKinsey report focused on the cost savings and potential economies of scale brought
about by the container and how these would benefit UK trade in general (McKinsey
and Company (1967)).
This suggests that the decision to invest in container facilities is likely to be affected
by the government beliefs about the trade potential of a country relative to current
levels and may change over time with changes to the ruling party’s attitude towards free
trade and port inefficiencies. These are also factors that are likely to affect difficult to
measure aspects of the broader domestic policy environment which are likely to affect
trade flows. We control for such effects though the inclusion of country-time dummies
for both country i and country j in the estimation of equations 5.2 and 5.3.
While the decision to invest in container port facilities is potentially affected by omit-
ted country-time factors that also affect trade, there may also be a bilateral component
to this investment. The location for container port facilities by a country are likely to be
affected by geographic factors, they require deep water channels for example, as well as
domestic and foreign demand considerations. For example, the first container port facil-
ities in Italy were located in Genoa, in part because Northern Italy is a major centre of
industrial production but also in order to provide easier access to the Western Mediter-
ranean and the Atlantic sea routes and in order that this port would be used to serve
Austria and Switzerland with containerised goods. More generally containerisation has
displayed a hub-and-spoke pattern: large container ports at Rotterdam, Hong Kong and
Singapore are used as hubs from which to serve smaller ports. The location of container
port facilities in one country may therefore affect the location chosen for container port
facilities by later adopters. This may lead to a positive correlation between the location
of container port facilities and the error term in the gravity model and therefore a need
to control for all observable and unobservable determinants of trade flows between two
countries to prevent an upward bias on the containerisation variable. We control for this
in the regressions by including country-pair FE similar to the annual data estimations
in previous sections.
The effects of containerisation are therefore identified in our empirical framework
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using the within country-pair variation in trade following the start of containerised trade
by both countries, conditional on common changes to trade with other countries in that
time period for the importer and exporter. We also note that FE specifications have
also been used to avoid omitted variable biases associated with multilateral resistance
terms identified from the structural approach to gravity (refer to the literature review,
Bergstrand and Egger (2011), and Feenstra (2004)). The inclusion of country-time as
well as country-pair FE in the gravity model removes the need to include all time varying
country specific factors such as GDP and GDP per capita, as well as time invariant
country-pair specific factors such as distance, border dummies, common language etc.
A disadvantage of this approach is that the effects of containerisation are determined
only when the two countries containerise in different time periods (where they occur in
the same time period the effect is captured by the country-time effects). If both countries
adopting the technology in the same time periods has a different effect to trade volumes
compared to when they differ this will affect our estimated effect of containerisation.
The use of fixed-effects also suggests that countries that never containerise could be
excluded from the sample. We include them in order to improve the efficiency with
which the country-time effects are estimated. Also, since our specification resembles a
difference-in-difference estimation equation, then non-containerised countries will serve
as a counterfactual in identifying the effects of containerisation.
5.7.3 Empirical Results
Table 5.5 contains the results for estimating equations 5.2 and 5.3 for total trade and a
subset of total trade. To reduce any issues surrounding differences in the composition of
containerisable versus non-containerisable products across countries, we concentrate our
analysis on SITC 1-digit industries 6 and 8 (combined), where such issues are less likely
to feature. Refer to chapter 4 (section 4.8) for a discussion on the containerisability
of products. Industries 6 and 8 are two ’containerisable’ industries according to our
containerisability classification at the 1-digit disaggregate level. Our data is not classified
along the lines of economic activities (as in ISIC classification). However, industries 6
and 8 are both pure manufactures and ’highly’ containerisable10.
Investigating the effects of containerisation on a subset of aggregate bilateral trade
10SITC 1-digit Industry 6 - Manufactured goods classified chiefly by material; 8 - Miscellaneous
manufactured articles.
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is also advantageous because we can test whether those effects differ by product as one
may expect. In the next chapter, we will allow this effect to differ by product at the
SITC disaggregate product level. We will consider product level econometric models in
which the dependent variable has an additional product dimension lnxijkt.
Hence, we estimate equation 5.2 (FE model) for total trade and industries 6 and 8
including country-time effects in columns 1 and 4 respectively and add bilateral dummies
in columns 2 and 5, while we estimate equation 5.3 (first differenced) in columns 3 and
6.
When considering the two SITC industries, our dependent variable is still lnxijt but
it is now the aggregated bilateral trade flows in industries 6 and 8 combined together.
For now, we will refer to these two industries as ’manufacturing’ for convenience.
Our results suggest positive and significant effects from containerisation that is
stronger for manufacturing compared to total trade and is stronger when its effects
are identified by exploiting the between country-pair variation in international trade.
The evidence in columns 1 and 4 suggest strong effects from the bilateral adoption of
containerisation on manufactured goods trade equal to 60%. For total trade, which in-
cludes trade in major, minor and liquid bulk items such as iron ore, steel, grain and oil
that cannot be containerised, the estimated effect is only 23%. In the two regressions,
we included bilateral controls which are distance, common language, colonial relation-
ship, border, along with the policy variables, FTAs, GATT membership and common
currency.
The results from the remaining columns of table 5.5 indicate that other relevant bi-
lateral factors may be omitted that are correlated with the likelihood that two countries
adopt the container as a technology. In columns 2 and 5 we introduce country-pair FE
alongside the country-time dummies. These additional FE control for all time invariant
country-pair determinants of bilateral trade that were not already captured by the dis-
tance, shared borders, common language, and colonial history variables in regressions 1
and 4. Therefore, in columns 2 and 5, the effects of containerisation are identified from
the variation within a bilateral pair across time and removing any increases or decreases
to trade common to all trade flows for each origin or destination country. We find that
the effects of containerisation are not statistically significant for total trade, but remain
significant for manufactured goods. The magnitude of the effect of the introduction of
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containerisation at both the origin and destination ports for manufacturing trade is now
at 10%.
In regressions 3 and 6, we consider the robustness of our results to differencing the
data across 5-year periods. In first-differencing the data we control for the possibility
that the ij FE are not time invariant but rather change over time. We find slightly
stronger effects from containerisation in these regressions. In regression 3, the effect of
containerisation on total trade is positive but still insignificant while in regression 6 the
estimated effect on manufactured goods trade is 11%.
Our results in the above table indicate a consistent effect of containerisation on man-
ufactured trade of around 10% or 11%. How does this compare to the policy variables
that we include in the regression? We include three sets of policy variables as mentioned
and described above.
In line with the literature, our results indicate some sensitivity to the inclusion of
bilateral and country-time effects for these variables, most noticeably for the GATT
variable. We find that the estimated effects of trade policy are generally larger than
those for containerisation, between 3 and 5 times as large, and larger for total goods
trade compared to manufacturing trade. The FTA coefficient of 0.41 in regression 2 is
similar to the estimate found by Head et al. (2010) and only slightly smaller than the
Baier and Bergstrand (2007) estimate of 0.46 when using country-pair and country-time
effects and total trade. In percentages, the effect of FTAs on total trade is 50% and
on manufactured trade 39%. No effect is found for GATT membership on total trade
or manufacturing trade. This is contrary to the effect found in Head et al. (2010).
The effects of having a common currency are even larger than FTA effects: 50% for
manufactured goods and 69% for total goods trade. This is much lower than the effect
found in Rose (2000) but higher than the effect for common currency found in Head
et al. (2010).
5.7.4 Robustness Checks
In the previous section, we checked for the robustness of some of the results by consid-
ering an alternative model (first differenced model). We argue that the first differenced
model is more convenient from an estimation point of view since it takes care of the
ij-variables (distance, language, etc) but it is also the less restrictive model in the sense
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Table 5.5: Effects of Bilateral Containerisation, Introducing it and jt dummies, 5-year
interval periods, Two Specifications
Dep.Var: ln trade(ij) Total Trade Manufacturing
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)




FE Model 1st Diff
(by ij)
port Cont(ij) 0.204*** -0.044 0.035 0.470*** 0.103** 0.110**
(0.0500) (0.0463) (0.0425) (0.0528) (0.0497) (0.0466)
FTA -0.155*** 0.408*** 0.161* 0.404*** 0.327*** 0.220**
(0.0572) (0.0686) (0.0940) (0.0555) (0.0668) (0.0892)
Both GATT 0.111*** -0.026 0.048 0.402*** 0.020 0.024
(0.0346) (0.0454) (0.0527) (0.0387) (0.0516) (0.0599)
Com Cur 1.127*** 0.526*** 0.303*** 1.331*** 0.406*** 0.210*
(0.0660) (0.0944) (0.1116) (0.0707) (0.1033) (0.1250)








Countries 157 157 157 157 157 157
Observations 68508 68508 49615 50413 50413 35415
R
2 0.234 0.540 0.168 0.3184 0.642 0.238
Dummies it,jt it,jt,ij it,jt it,jt it,jt,ij it,jt
Standard errors in parentheses
∗
p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
that it allows for ij FE to vary over time. In this section, we consider more robustness
checks.
The effects of containerisation are identified in the above regression when a pair
of countries containerise in different time periods. For some country-pairs the num-
ber of years between partial and full containerisation is short, whereas for others it
can be spread many years apart. As an example, our containerisation dummy would be
switched on for US trade with Myanmar only in 1983, even though the US has developed
experience with containerisation since the 1950s. To test whether partial containerisa-
tion has an effect on trade, conditional on the effects of bilateral containerisation, we
add to the regression an interaction between the containerisation dummy and a count
of the number of years between partial and bilateral containerisation for that pair of
countries.
The results from this regression, regression 1 in table 5.6, indicate that that this gap
does not matter. The coefficient on the years of partial containerisation is negligible and
statistically insignificant, while the direct effect is now slightly bigger but less significant.
In regression 2, we add in a square of the interaction term between the container and
the number of years of partial containerisation to allow for a non-linear relationship. In
regression 3, we add in the square root of the same interaction term to allow a different
type of non-linearity. Both regressions 2 and 3 confirm the same thing as regression 1 -
that partial containerisation does not matter in this specification. In both regressions,
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the coefficient of the container variable is now poorly identified.
In regression 4 we use 1962, 1965, 1970, 1975, 1980, 1985 and 1990 as time points
in the data set. As figure 4.5 in the previous chapter makes clear, the containerisation
of countries is not evenly distributed across years, but rather tends to be clustered in
specific time periods. Given what we assume about the speed with which containeri-
sation is adopted in each country this may suggest that our results may be sensitive
to the choice of years that we include in the regression. In regression 4 the estimated
effect of containerisation on manufactured goods trade is 11% which is only slightly
higher than the effect found in regression 5 table 5.5. However, the result is lower in
the first-differenced model. Compared to table 5.5 column 6, in column 5 table 5.6, the
coefficient of the container variable is positive but insignificant.
In columns 6 and 7, we choose the same time points as in regressions 4 and 5 but
choose bilateral aggregate trade outcomes. Compared to table 5.5, the estimated effects
of the container on total trade are not robust to the choice of time points. In column 6,
the effect picked up on total trade is negative and significant at the 1% significance level.
In the first-differenced regression (column 7), the coefficient of the container variable is
negative but insignificant.
Table 5.6: Effects of Bilateral Containerisation - Robustness Checks
Dep. Var: ln trade(ij) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)







port Cont(ij) 0.115* 0.086 0.086 0.108** 0.067 -0.127*** -0.065
(0.0603) (0.0651) (0.0687) (0.0470) (0.0429) (0.0434) (0.0403)
port cont(ij)*Yrs of part cont -0.001 0.012
(0.0045) (0.0125)
port cont(ij)*Sq Yrs of part cont -0.001
(0.0009)
port cont(ij)*Sqrt Yrs of part cont 0.006
(0.0180)
FTA 0.325*** 0.326*** 0.330*** 0.256*** 0.136 0.388*** 0.246**
(0.0672) (0.0672) (0.0672) (0.0706) (0.0907) (0.0729) (0.0954)
Both GATT 0.020 0.022 0.018 0.077 0.031 -0.029 0.035
(0.0517) (0.0517) (0.0516) (0.0494) (0.0573) (0.0437) (0.0507)
Com Cur 0.407*** 0.407*** 0.407*** 0.260*** -0.066 0.390*** 0.074
(0.1033) (0.1033) (0.1033) (0.0881) (0.1134) (0.0802) (0.1035)
Countries 157 157 157 157 157 157 157
Observations 50413 50413 50413 50340 34972 69398 50270
R
2 0.642 0.642 0.642 0.641 0.254 0.535 0.172
Dummies it,jt,ij it,jt,ij it,jt,ij it,jt,ij it,jt it,jt,ij it,jt
Standard errors in parentheses
∗
p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
5.7.5 Introducing Railway Containerisation
We now return to the information we have on railway containerisation that we introduced
earlier and incorporate them into our model. We merge railway and port containerisation
as we did in regression 5 table 5.4. In other words, we allow for intermodality in
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transport between ships and railway. Recognising that containerisation encompasses
transportation by sea as well as rail, we use the data to define a second containerisation
variable which we call full containerisation which switches to 1 if i and j have both









1, i and j have both containerised ports or railways at time t
0, otherwise
In table 5.7, we report results for the effect of containerisation on both total trade
and manufactures. The top part reports the effects of full containerisation as defined
above while the bottom part reports the effects of port containerisation and hence only
restates the results of table 5.5. Similar to section 5.7.3, In the first 3 columns, we
estimate 3 different (FE) specifications for the effects of containerisation on total trade.
In columns 1 we estimate equation 5.2 with it and jt dummies and a host of country-
pair time invariant controls. In column 2, we estimate the same equation but we add ij
dummies to control for observable and non-observable country-pair variables. In column
3, we estimate a first-differenced model or equation 5.3 (with it and jt dummies). In
columns 4-6, we repeat the same exercise on a sample restricted to manufactures only.
As for the results, when we allow for railway containerisation, we find that full con-
tainerisation reduces total trade by around 11% when we control for it and jt dummies.
The coefficient is significant at the 5% significance level. In column 2, when we add in ij
dummies, the coefficient of the full container variable doesn’t change much and remains
negative at about 12% but less significant at the 10% significance level. This compares
to a positive effect of around 23% for port containerisation in the first column and no
effect in the second column. In column 3, when we estimate a first-differenced model,
the effect of full containerisation is positive but insignificant (0.065). This is slightly
higher than the effect found for port containerisation although both coefficients are in-
significant. There are no differences between the estimates of policy variable coefficients
between the top and bottom parts of the table, between full and port containerisation
regressions.
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When we restrict our sample to manufactures only, the results differ substantially.
Unlike the estimations for total trade, full containerisation returns stronger results on
manufacturing trade than port containerisation alone. This is suggestive of the impor-
tance of rail containerisation on the trade in these products. The coefficient estimates
of the full container variable are positive and significant in all three estimations. In
column 4, the effects of full and port containerisation on manufactures are estimated
to be around 60 and 68% respectively. When controlling for ij dummies as well as for
country-year (it and jt) dummies in column 5, the effect of containerisation is signifi-
cantly lower at 14% for full containerisation somewhat similar to the 11% estimated for
port containerisation, the coefficient of the full container variable being significant at
the 10% significance level. In the first differenced estimation in column 6, the estimated
effect is around 22% for full containerisation compared to 12% for port containerisation.
The higher coefficient estimates for the full container variable than the port container
variable suggests that intermodal transport has additional effects on this trade. As for
the other policy variables, entering a free trade agreement seems to have a positive and
significant effect on manufacture trade in all three estimations. The effect is estimated to
be around 48% when controlling for country-time dummies, 39% when we add country-
pair dummies, and around 27% in the first difference estimation. These estimates are
similar to what Baier and Bergstrand (2007) when estimating the same models for total
trade. The effect of GATT membership on manufacture trade is less evident than the
effect of FTAs. In column 4, the effect of GATT membership is similar to that of FTAs
in that specification, around 48%. In columns 5 and 6, we find no evidence for any
effect of GATT membership on manufacture trade. The coefficients are both very small
and insignificant. Common currency seems to matter for the trade of manufactured
goods. The effect is very large in column 4 in the magnitude of 278%, becomes smaller
at around 50% in column 5, and positive but insignificant in column 6. The estimations
for the policy variables are almost identical in the top and bottom tables. Comparing
the policy and technology variables in the manufacturing trade regressions, the effects
of the policy variables are 2 to 3 times the size of containerisation on manufacturing
trade in the FE model but the effect of FTA is very close to the effect of the container
in the first-differenced model.
To conclude this section, we consider the effects of full containerisation (ports and
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Table 5.7: Effects of Full Containerisation (Railway and Ports), Total Trade and Man-
ufactures, Two Specifications
Dep.Var: ln trade(ijk) Total Trade Manufacturing
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
FE Model FE Model 1st Diff
(by ij)















Full Cont(ij) -0.120** -0.126* 0.065 0.516*** 0.136* 0.193***
(0.0554) (0.0492) (0.0429) (0.0600) (0.0553) (0.0476)
FTA -0.153*** 0.402*** 0.166 0.395*** 0.330*** 0.234**
(0.0572) (0.0686) (0.0941) (0.0555) (0.0668) (0.0893)
Both GATT 0.120*** -0.027 0.049 0.393*** 0.018 0.027
(0.0346) (0.0453) (0.0527) (0.0388) (0.0516) (0.0599)
Com Cur 1.128*** 0.526*** 0.303** 1.329*** 0.408*** 0.210
(0.0660) (0.0944) (0.112) (0.0707) (0.1033) (0.1250)








Countries 157 157 157 157 157 157
Observations 68508 68508 49615 50413 50413 35415
R
2 0.7303 0.540 0.168 0.2142 0.642 0.238


















Port Cont(ij) 0.204*** -0.044 0.035 0.470*** 0.103** 0.110**
(0.0500) (0.0463) (0.0425) (0.0528) (0.0497) (0.0466)
FTA -0.155*** 0.408*** 0.161 0.404*** 0.327*** 0.220**
(0.0572) (0.0686) (0.0940) (0.0555) (0.0668) (0.0892)
Both GATT 0.111*** -0.026 0.048 0.402*** 0.020 0.024
(0.0346) (0.0454) (0.0527) (0.0387) (0.0516) (0.0599)
Com Cur 1.127*** 0.526*** 0.303** 1.331*** 0.406*** 0.210*
(0.0660) (0.0944) (0.112) (0.0707) (0.1033) (0.1250)








Countries 157 157 157 157 157 157
Observations 68508 68508 49615 50413 50413 35415
R
2 0.2398 0.540 0.168 0.3184 0.642 0.2382
FE it,jt it,jt,ij it,jt it,jt it,jt,ij it,jt
Standard errors in parentheses
∗
p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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rail) on both total trade and manufacturing trade. We estimate a FE and first-differenced
model to identify the effects of containerisation. We find mixed results for the effect of
containerisation on aggregate trade flows. The FE model estimates a negative effect
of around 12% of full containerisation with country-time and country-pair effects. We
estimate a positive but statistically insignificant coefficient for the full container vari-
able in the first-differenced model. On the other hand, we find economically positive
and statistically significant effects of containerisation on manufactures trade. The effect
on manufactured trade is estimated between 14% and 22%. The effects of FTAs are
estimated to be slightly higher to 3 times the effects of containerisation on the same
trade.
5.7.6 Hetrogeneity in the SITC 1-digit Industries
The estimations for manufacturing trade suggest that the effects of containerisation are
not uniform across all products but rather that there is heterogeneity in the effects on
the different industries. While we find mixed results for the effects of containerisation
on total trade, we find evidence for a positive and significant effect on the aggregated
manufactured goods. In this section, we look at the effects that containerisation had
on the bilateral trade flows in the individual 1-digit industries. The dependent variable
is the bilateral trade flow in the 1-digit SITC industries separately. We consider the
effects of full containerisation in this analysis. Similar to the county aggregate trade
flows regressions, we estimate both a FE as well as a first-differenced model.
The results in table 8 paint a mixed picture. Although we get a negative effect of
containerisation on total trade in the FE regression, we only get a negative and sig-
nificant effect in the same regression on category 5 goods or ”Chemicals and related
products”. It can be argued that most goods in this category are not moved in contain-
ers. Nevertheless, containerisation has a negative effect of around 13% on the trade in
products of category 5. The coefficient of the containerisation variable is significant at
the 5% significance level. The coefficient of the container variable becomes negligible
and insignificant in the first difference estimation of the category 5 regression.
Of all industries, containerisation had a strong and positive effect in both specifi-
cations on industry 8 or ”Miscellaneous Manufactured Articles”. The products in this
category are perhaps most suitable for containerisation. Some of the products under
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this category include handbags, apparel and clothing, footwear, toys and some consumer
electronics. In the FE regression, containerisation leads to an increase of around 40% in
the trade of category 8 goods. The first difference regression estimates an effect of 32%
on the trade in category 8 goods. Also, we capture an positive and significant effect
of containerisation on the trade in category 7 goods or ”Machinery and Transport”.
This category includes industrial machinery as well as other consumer electronics such
as TV sets and computers. In the FE regression, we estimate an effect of around 30%
on the trade in this category. The first difference regression estimates an effect of the
container which almost half in magnitude, around 14% and the coefficient is significant
at the 10% significance level. As for the other main manufacturing category, industry 6
which is ”Manufactured goods classified chiefly by material”, we only find a positive and
significant effect of around 16% for the container on these products when we estimate a
first difference regression. The FE regression picks up an effect which is half that of the
first difference regression but the coefficient of the container variable is insignificant.
The other 1-digit product categories where we see a positive and significant effect in
at least one of the two specifications are categories 0 and 3, or ”Food and Live Animals”
and ”Mineral Fuels, lubricants”. In the FE regression in category 3, the coefficient of the
container variable is positive but insignificant (0.208). In the first difference regression
however, the coefficient is positive, significant, and quite large and suggests an effect of
around 50% on the trade in the category. This is quite surprising because this suggests
that the use of the container affected products that are non-containerisable in nature
such as oil and fuels. In category 0 regressions, the evidence for the effect of the container
is less clear cut in magnitude and significance. The effect captured in the FE regression is
positive but insignificant whereas the effect of the container on the trade in the products
of that category in the first difference is around 14% and the coefficient is significant at
the 10% significance level.
As for the remaining product categories, which are category 1 (”Beverage and To-
bacco”), category 2 (Crude Materials except fuels), category 4 (Animal and vegetable
oils), and category 9 (Commodities and transactions not elsewhere classified), we find
no evidence for any effect of containerisation in any of the regressions. The coefficients
of the container variables in each of their regressions are very small and insignificant.
In summary, we find that the effects of containerisation are heterogeneous when the
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Table 5.8: Effects of Full Containerisation on Trade at the 1-digit level (SITC)
SITC 0 SITC 1
Total Trade Food and Live Animals Beverage and Tobacco
Dep. Var: ln trade(ij) FE Model 1st Diff FE Model 1st Diff FE Model 1st Diff
Full Cont(ij) -0.126** 0.065 0.076 0.130* 0.0358 0.0238
(0.0492) (0.0429) (0.0645) (0.0570) (0.0974) (0.0836)
FTA 0.402*** 0.166* 0.104 0.061 0.474*** 0.239*
(0.0686) (0.0941) (0.0741) (0.101) (0.0822) (0.1062)
Both GATT -0.027 0.049 0.138* -0.021 0.144 -0.0141
(0.0453) (0.0527) (0.0618) (0.0741) (0.0978) (0.1122)
Com Cur 0.526*** 0.303*** 0.307** 0.105 0.534*** 0.377*
(0.0944) (0.1116) (0.111) (0.540) (0.1332) (0.1572)
Countries 157 157 157 157 157 157
Observations 68508 49615 45439 31398 21890 14271
R
2 0.0123 0.1677 0.511 0.186 0.594 0.2833
FE it,jt,ij it,jt it,jt,ij it,jt it,jt,ij it,jt
SITC 2 SITC 3 SITC 4
Crude Materials except fuels Mineral Fuels, lubricants Animal and vegetable oils
Full Cont(ij) -0.035 .074 0.208 0.406*** -0.044 0.023
(0.0682) (0.0593) (0.1378) (0.1268) (0.1486) (0.1315)
FTA 0.179** 0.004 0.304** 0.345** 0.412*** 0.577***
(0.0744) (0.1007) (0.1196) (0.1631) (0.1140) (0.1576)
Both GATT -0.106 -0.006 0.105 0.464*** -0.309** -0.385**
(0.0653) (0.0774) (0.1335) (0.1668) (0.1463) (0.1798)
Com Cur 0.298** 0.287** 0.574** 0.088 0.962*** 0.299
(0.1199) (0.1435) (0.2299) (0.2855) (0.2072) (0.2507)
Countries 157 157 157 157 157 157
Observations 39601 27180 19123 12053 15430 9732
R
2 0.0179 0.2009 0.0013 0.2790 0.1090 0.2671
FE it,jt,ij it,jt it,jt,ij it,jt it,jt,ij it,jt
SITC 5 SITC 6 SITC 7
Chemicals and related products Manufactured Goods by Material Machinery and Transport
Full Cont(ij) -0.134** -0.023 0.070 0.147*** 0.264*** 0.127*
(0.0680) (0.0602) (0.0607) (0.0527) (0.0714) (0.0653)
FTA 0.265*** 0.071 0.399*** 0.267*** -0.028 0.184*
(0.0680) (0.0922) (0.0693) (0.0927) (0.0725) (0.1006)
Both GATT -0.136** -0.214*** -0.015 -0.001 0.169*** 0.023
(0.0614) (0.0724) (0.0569) (0.0661) (0.0655) (0.0813)
Com Cur 0.438*** 0.273** 0.465*** 0.210 0.486*** 0.208
(0.1146) (0.1382) (0.1115) (0.1339) (0.1197) (0.1530)
Countries 157 157 157 157 157 157
Observations 35790 24790 45374 31664 38849 26783
R
2 0.0055 0.2293 0.0191 0.2446 0.694 0.2630
FE it,jt,ij it,jt it,jt,ij it,jt it,jt,ij it,jt
SITC 8 SITC 9
Miscellaneous Manufactured Articles Commodities and transactions NEC
Full Cont(ij) 0.332*** 0.277*** 0.126 0.062
(0.0566) (0.0488) (0.1266) (0.1193)
FTA 0.066 0.053 0.184 0.239
(0.0617) (0.0818) (0.1127) (0.1688)
Both GATT -0.052 -0.017 0.051 0.247
(0.0534) (0.0625) (0.1155) (0.1498)
Com Cur 0.266*** 0.059 0.573*** 0.042
(0.1002) (0.1229) (0.1624) (0.2118)
Countries 157 157 157 157
Observations 40279 27740 21259 12404
R
2 0.0292 0.2963 0.0247 0.3894
FE it,jt,ij it,jt it,jt,ij it,jt
Standard errors in parentheses
∗
p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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sample is restricted to trade flows in each of the ten 1-digit SITC industries separately.
We find that containerisation had the strongest effects on industries 8 (Miscellaneous
Manufactured Articles), and industry 7 (Machinery and transport equipment). We
estimate an effect of the container on the trade in industry 8 of between 32% and 40%
and between 14 and 30% on trade in industry 7. We find some or no evidence for
container effects on the other industries.
5.8 A Discussion on Missing Trade Values
In practice, many potential bilateral trade flows are not active. The data in front of us
records either positive value or missing observations. The data may record a missing
observation that is truly missing or it may reflect shipments that fall below a threshold
above zero. Also, there may be observations that are in fact zeros.
Missing/zero observations might be a problem if they have economic meaning. For
example, Helpman et al. (2008) argue that zeros are due to fixed costs of export facing
monopolistic competitive firms. OLS estimations that ignore missing/zero observation
may be biased because of selection bias.
In our case, missing observations may potentially affect our results for the container
if containerisation is a determinant of non-zero trade values which is likely. It is however
not clear whether any such bias will be upwards or downwards and there is no evidence
for the direction of the bias.
The NBER-UN data set covers international trade flows for the period 1962-2000.
The period 1962-1983 covers most countries in the world. The panel data set is unbal-
anced for this period and many observations are missing. For the period 1984-1990, the
data set only reports trade for 63 countries11. This means that only bilateral trade flows
where at least one of the 63 countries is a party are available. In other words, only trade
flows of the 63 countries with the rest of the world and among each other are included.
Here too, the panel data set is unbalanced.
The data set reports trade as small as 1000 USD for the period 1962-1983 and the
minimum trade value reported is 100,000 USD between 1984-1990 (There are very few
observations with values less than 100,000 USD).
Given 157 countries in our sample and 7 time points, we have 157*156*7 or 171,444
11The list of these countries is provided in table A.5 in the appendix.
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potential trade relations. We plot the distribution of trade flow values in the data set. In
figure 4.1, we find that approximately 50% of potential trade observations are missing,
around 20% are less than $100,000, around 15% are between $100,000 and $1 million,
around 10% are between $1 million and $10 million, and around 5% are higher than
$10m in value.
Figure 5.1: Distribution of Trade Observations by values at the country level
When we check the numbers of missing observations per country, we find a clear
correlation between the level of development of a country and missing trade. In the
appendix B, we list all 157 countries in our data set and their respective missing trade
observations (both exports and imports). In the 29 years between 1962 and 1990, the
UK has the least number of missing observations, followed by Japan, and then Italy, and
so on. St. Helena has the largest number of missing observation. The most developed
countries have the least missing observations. This is confirmed in figure 4.2 where
we plot the distribution of trade flows by value for North-North trade. Recall that we
defined North countries as OECD countries minus Turkey in the previous chapter12. We
find that we have almost no missing observations or any observations with values less
than $100,000 in North-North trade. Only around 2% of the observations is between
$100,000 and $1 million in value. Most of the observations are higher than $1 million in
12While Turkey is a founding member of the OECD, Turkey is a late containeriser. Twenty two coun-
tries are classified as North in our sample. These are: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark,
Finland, Fm German FR, France, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, New Zealand,
Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, UK, and USA
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value. Namely, 10% of all North-North trade observations are between $1 million and
$10 million, close to 30% is between $10 million and $100 million, over 35% is between
$100 million and $1 billion, and just under 25% is higher than $1 billion in value.
Figure 5.2: Distribution of Trade Observations by values at the country level - North
North Trade
We also plot the distribution of trade flow values in North South trade. The first
thing we notice is that substantially less observations as percentage of total observations
are missing compared to the entire sample. Only around 17% of all North South trade
observations are missing. Of the positive values, 10% of all observations is less than
$100,000 in value, around 15% is between $100,000 and $1 million, just below 25% is
between $1 million and $10 million, a similar percentage is between $10 million and
$100 million, around 10% is between $100 million and $1 billion, and only around 2%
is above $1 billion in value.
There is no consensus in the literature on how to deal with missing observations
and zeros. Most studies have tended to ignore zeros especially when estimating gravity
equations. CES/Armington preferences and demand functions that the gravity equation
is based on as well the model of Eaton and Kortum (2002) do not allow for zeros/missing
observations. In these models, some volume will be purchased no matter how high the
price13. This makes those estimations conditional on positive trade flows.
13More recently, Novy (2010) derives a gravity equation from a translog expenditure function which
allows for zeros in demand.
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Figure 5.3: Distribution of Trade Observations by values at the country level - North
South Trade
Silva and Tenreyro (2006) suggest estimating trade flows with a Poisson Pseudo-
Maximum Likelihood (PPML) estimator because it allows for zeros although the main
reason for proposing PPML is to deal with heteroskedastic errors. The solution of
Santos-Silva has not convinced all researchers though. Martin and Pham (2008) argue
that Tobit estimators outperform PPML when zeros are present and heteroskedasticity
can be controlled for by using size-adjusted trade as the dependent variable.
The issue of zeros and missing trade requires a proper deeper analysis and that is an
avenue for future research. Besides, in our data, we do not know for sure what is zero
and what is missing as highlighted by the authors of the data set (Feenstra et al. (2005)).
Therefore, applying ’off the shelf’ solutions would provide a false impression that the
problem has been dealt with. Also the difference-in-difference approach that we employ
here, which our regressions resemble, does not handle missing observations. Having said
that, our work is not therefore a description of the full effects of containerisation on
world trade but rather considers the effects on non-zero trade flows.
One way we could choose to deal with this is by restricting our data set to samples
in which the missing observations is less of an issue. For instance, based on the above,
we might want to study the effects of containerisation on North-North trade or North-
South trade separately. There may be other reasons why we want to concentrate on
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North-North trade. Recall that our containerisation measure is partial in the sense that
it only captures ports and rail. This may contain errors as a result. Those errors are
likely to be minimised for North countries from what learn from the narrative. This is
because North countries were first to containerise and containerisation happened more
or less concurrently in all modes of transport in these countries.
5.9 Empirical results
We estimate equations 5.2 and 5.3 to identify the effects of full containerisation in the
subsamples that we discussed above. We start however, by balancing our data set.
In table 5.8 columns 1 and 2, we consider a balanced sample only. Compared to the
entire sample (table 5.7), we capture no effect for containerisation on total trade in the
FE model (column 1). In the first-differenced model on the other hand, we estimate
a strong positive and significant coefficient for the container variable. The effect is
estimated around 24% and the coefficient is significant at the 1% significance level. This
is suggestive of a strong effect of containerisation on the intensive margin of trade14.
Containerisation and its effects on the intensive and extensive margins of trade is not
dealt with in this thesis but will be the subject of future research.
In the remaining results in table 5.8, we restrict our data set to samples where
missing observations is less of a problem. In columns 3 and 4, we restrict our sample
to North North trade. We find no effect of containerisation on North-North trade from
the two estimations. The container coefficient estimate is negative but insignificant in
column 3 and negligible in column 4. Similarly, we find no effect for full containerisation
on North-South trade in columns 5 and 6. The container coefficients are now positive
but insignificant in the estimations. And finally, for the sake of completion, we run the
same regressions on a sample restricted to South South trade. Here too, we don’t pick
up any effects for containerisation on South South trade in columns 7 and 8.
As for the other controls, compared to the entire sample regressions in table 5.7,
we estimate larger effects of FTAs on trade in the balanced sample. The effect of FTA
on trade is around 55% in the FE model, and 24% in the first-differenced model. The
14Felbermayr and Kohler (2006): ”World trade evolves at two margins. Where a bilateral trading
relationship already exists it may increase through time (intensive margin). But trade may also increase
if a trading bilateral relationship is newly established between countries that have not traded with each
other in the past (extensive margin).
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coefficients are negative but insignificant for GATT membership which is somehow a
similar finding to table 5.7. Also, the effects of common currency are larger in the
balanced sample. As for North North trade regressions, we still pick up a strong and
significant effect for FTAs on bilateral trade flows. The effect is similar in the FE model
and the first-differenced model (27%). As for GATT memberships, we estimate larger
effects on trade in North North trade compared to the entire sample. This effect is
strong and significant in the FE model at around 37% and the coefficient is significant
at the 10% significance level. This effect is poorly identified in the first-differenced
model. Also, we pick up stronger effects for common currency on North-North trade
and the coefficients are both significant.
As for North-South trade, we find no evidence of any effect for FTAs on this trade.
We find some evidence that GATT membership negatively affects this trade. This effect
is around negative 20% in the FE model and the coefficient is significant at the 10%
significance level. Common currency has a positive effect on North-South trade. This
effect is quite large in the FE model and the estimated coefficient suggests an effect of
around 81% on this trade and it is significant at the 1% significance level. The coefficient
of the common currency variable is positive but insignificant in the first-differenced
model.
Finally, in the South South regressions, we find no evidence for an effect of FTA and
GATT membership on this trade. There is evidence for an effect of common currency
on South-South trade, The coefficients of the common currency are positive, strong, and
significant at the 10% significance level in both estimations. The estimates of the effects
are around 46% and 64% respectively.
Table 5.9: Effect of Full Containerisation of Total Trade - Dealing with Missing Trade
Dep.Var: ln trade(ijk) Balanced Sample North-North Trade North-South Trade South-South Trade
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
FE Model 1st Diff FE Model 1st Diff FE Model 1st Diff FE Model 1st Diff
Full Cont(ij) 0.000 0.215*** -0.237 -0.018 0.288 0.0419 -0.146 -0.003
(0.0661) (0.0526) (0.138) (0.0935) (0.233) (0.185) (0.0915) (0.0826)
FTA 0.438*** 0.232** 0.246*** 0.249*** -0.000 0.046 0.480 0.343
(0.0609) (0.0836) (0.0373) (0.0412) (0.170) (0.231) (0.262) (0.300)
Both GATT -0.064 -0.035 0.313* 0.174 -0.227* -0.198 -0.080 0.062
(0.0506) (0.0577) (0.138) (0.133) (0.109) (0.120) (0.0723) (0.0855)
Com Cur 0.807*** 0.396** 0.773*** 0.439* 0.595*** 0.226 0.377* 0.494*
(0.100) (0.1210) (0.156) (0.172) (0.112) (0.137) (0.176) (0.208)
Countries 157 157 22 22 157 157 135 135
Observations 34713 29754 3215 2753 33838 27462 31455 19400
R
2 0.691 0.253 0.935 0.367 0.633 0.2649 0.501 0.176
FE it,jt,ij it,jt it,jt,ij it,jt it,jt,ij it,jt it,jt,ij it,jt
Standard errors in parentheses
∗
p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
In table 5.9, we estimate the same regressions for manufacturing trade as in table
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5.8. In columns 1 and 2, we consider a balanced panel. The container variable here
measures full containerisation as well. The coefficient of the full container variable is
positive but insignificant in column 1 for the FE model estimation. In column 2, for
the first-differenced estimation, we find a strong positive and significant effect for full
containerisation on manufactures trade. Containerisation leads to an increase of around
28% in manufactures trade. This result suggests that containerisation has a strong
positive effect on the intensive margin of trade when considering bilateral manufactures
trade.
When restricting the sample to North-North trade only in columns 3 and 4, we find
no evidence for an effect of containerisation on manufacturing trade. In column 3, the
FE model estimates a negative but insignificant coefficient of the container variable.
Similarly, in column 4, we estimate a negative and statistically insignificant coefficient
of the container variable albeit much smaller in absolute value than column 3.
In columns 5 and 6, we consider North-South trade. We estimate large positive
but statistically insignificant coefficients for the container variable in both the FE and
first-differenced models.
In the last two columns, we restrict our sample to South-South trade and estimate the
same models. In the FE model, we estimate a positive coefficient for the container vari-
able but the effect is not well-identified. The first-differenced model however estimates a
positive and strong effect of ’full’ containerisation on South-South manufacturing trade
of around 22%, the coefficient being significant at the 10% significance level.
As for the policy variables in question, we find evidence that signing a free trade
agreement has a positive and significant effect on manufactures trade in the balanced
panel estimation in columns 1 and 2. This effect is around 27% and the coefficient of
the FTA variable is significant at the 1% significance level in the FE model. In the
first-differenced model, the effect is around 18% and the significance level is at the 10%
level. Similarly, we find a positive and significant effect for FTA in the North-North
trade regressions in columns 3 and 4. The effect is around 41% and 28% respectively
and the coefficients are significant at the 1% significance level. In columns 5 and 6 which
correspond to North-South trade, we find no evidence for such an effect. The coefficients
are positive but insignificant. In the last two columns, we find mixed results of FTAs
on manufactures trade. In the FE model, the effect is very strong around 136% and the
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coefficient is significant at the 1% significance level. In the first-differenced estimation,
this effect is insignificant.
As for GATT membership, we find no evidence of an effect on manufactures trade in
all estimations except one. The effect is positive and significant on North-South trade
in the FE model. The estimate is around 30% and the coefficient is significant at the
10% significance level.
Finally, common currency seems to matter in North-North manufactures trade. The
estimates thereof are both very strong and significant. The effects are estimated to be
around 189% in the FE model and 86% in the first-differenced model. When we estimate
a balanced panel in columns 1 and 2, we find common currency to have a strong and
significant effect on manufactures trade in the FE model but not in the first-differenced
model. The effect in column 1 is around 87%. Similarly, in the North-South trade
estimations, we find a positive and significant effect for adopting a common currency on
manufactures trade in column 5 but not column 6. The coefficient estimate in column
5 is around 52%. In columns 7 and 8, we find no evidence for an effect in South-South
manufacturing trade.
Table 5.10: Effect of Full Containerisation of Manufacturing Trade- Dealing with Missing
Trade
Dep.Var: ln trade(ijk) Balanced Sample North-North Trade North-South Trade South-South Trade
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
FE Model 1st Diff FE Model 1st Diff FE Model 1st Diff FE Model 1st Diff
Full Cont(ij) 0.112 0.247*** -0.206 -0.014 0.496 0.168 0.177 0.195*
(0.0787) (0.0605) (0.167) (0.124) (0.285) (0.233) (0.108) (0.0955)
FTA 0.241*** 0.179* 0.344*** 0.256*** 0.218 0.326 0.860** 0.419
(0.0606) (0.0792) (0.0453) (0.0551) (0.184) (0.249) (0.274) (0.310)
Both GATT -0.056 -0.041 0.022 0.195 0.260* 0.183 -0.073 0.000
(0.0593) (0.0661) (0.181) (0.1900) (0.130) (0.148) (0.0856) (0.0993)
Com Cur 0.625*** 0.102 1.059*** 0.621** 0.421*** 0.159 0.237 0.183
(0.111) (0.130) (0.190) (0.229) (0.122) (0.152) (0.225) (0.270)
Countries 157 157 22 22 157 157 135 135
Observations 22883 19614 3178 2715 27440 21172 19795 11528
R
2 0.785 0.368 0.924 0.3874 0.706 0.325 0.614 0.273
FE it,jt,ij it,jt it,jt,ij it,jt it,jt,ij it,jt it,jt,ij it,jt
Standard errors in parentheses
∗
p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
In conclusion, restricting the investigation to subsamples where missing observations
are less a concern yield mixed results. Balancing the panel suggests that (full) container-
isation has had strong and positive effects on aggregate trade and manufacturing trade of
around 24% and 28% respectively if one considers the first-differenced model. Compare
this to the negative container coefficient estimated in the FE model and the positive but
insignificant coefficient in the first-differenced model in table 5.7 for total trade.
We also conclude that containerisation did not have any significant effects on North-
North, North-South, or South-South aggregate trade separately. There is some evidence
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that containerisation has a positive effect of around 22% on South-South trade when
estimating a first-differenced model.
The results may be strongest for North-South and South-South but those are parts
of the dataset where we have least confidence both in terms of the trade data (miss-
ing/zeros) and the container variable. This may suggest that a causal effect from con-
tainerisation in trade flows is difficult to establish using the aggregate trade flows and
specifications in this chapter.
5.10 Chapter Conclusion
In this chapter, we consider different specifications to identify the effects of containeri-
sation on bilateral aggregate trade outcomes. The purpose of this chapter is to provide
an initial exploration into how containerisation should be modelled in this context. We
consider annual data, 5-year intervals, port containerisation, port and rail containerisa-
tion, and several robustness checks. We also address some econometric problems that
are likely to feature in the estimations such as omitted variable bias and endogeneity.
In order to identify the effects of containerisation from other determinants of trade,
we start our investigation from the gravity framework. We initially use annual data.
Containerisation is measured as a country-year variable in these estimations. Estimating
a FE model in which we control for country-pair FE yields an effect for port container-
isation of around 22% on aggregate trade flows when both the origin and destination
countries adopt the technology in ports in addition to an annual growth rate of around
3% (trend). This result is robust to including policy variables and to the exclusion of
top trading partners for each country. The result is not homogenous across country
groups. The first gravity estimations suggest that containerisation affected trade of
low-income countries the most followed by OECD-countries - 41% and 30% respectively.
Containerisation has led an island country to increase its exports by twice as much as a
non-island economy. Landlocked countries seem to have benefitted from their neighbour
port’s adoption of containerisation.
We also estimate an additional effect for containerisation by rail on the aggregate
trade flows. When allowing intermodal transport by merging the port and rail container
- we call this full containerisation, the effect of ’full’ containerisation on total trade is
estimated to be around 30% when both the origin and destination countries adopt the
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container and hence higher than the estimated effect of port containerisation in the
benchmark gravity estimations.
The derivation of a structural gravity equation from microeconomic foundations
showed that estimations of the ’traditional’ gravity equation suffer from omitted variable
bias. This is because these estimations have long ignored ’multilateral resistances’. In
line with the literature, we control for multilateral resistances using FE - importer and
exporter-time FE in our setting. To be able to include the country-time dummies, we
need to measure containerisation as a bilateral adoption of the technology. We also
choose a pooled panel at 5-year intervals. We propose two specifications to estimate
the effects of containerisation on trade flows: a FE model based on the gravity equation
and a first-differenced model. We argue that the first-differenced model is the least
restrictive one.
Controlling for multilateral resistances wipes out the port container effect on aggre-
gate trade flows. We find however that bilateral port containerisation has a positive
and significant effect on manufacturing trade or around 11%. We define manufacturing
in our data set to be industries 6 and 8 at the 1-digit SITC product level. By merging
port and railway container data to allow for intermodal transport, we find that full
containerisation had a negative or no effect on total trade. We find however that full
containerisation had a strong positive effect on the trade in manufactures of between
14% and 22%. We also find a strong positive effect of containerisation on both total and
manufactures trade of 24% and 28% when considering a balanced panel and estimating
the first-differenced model.
The container measure that we have constructed is partial in the sense that it only
captures ports and rail. It does not capture the third mode of transport which is
roads. Error may also be present in the data from the source (we have only one source
for our data and we cannot cross-check this data for each country). The narrative
suggests that those errors are likely to be minimised for North countries. This is because
North countries were first to adopt the technology and our measure is likely to capture
containerisation in all modes of transport. Also, we find that missing/zero trade flows
are least present in trade flows of North countries.
We therefore concentrate our analysis on North-North trade and investigate the
effects of containerisation on North-South and South-South trade as well. We find
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however no effect for containerisation on North-North when we consider total trade and
manufacturing trade. We find stronger results when considering subsamples of North-
North and North-South trade but these are parts of the dataset where we have least
confidence both in terms of the trade data and the container variable.
The analysis in this chapter may suggest that a causal effect from containerisation
on trade flows is difficult to establish using the approach in this chapter. This might
be because there are differences in the containerisability of products and our trade data
may be dominated by products that are not containerisable. Also, the different estimates
of the effects of containerisation on total trade and manufacturing trade suggest that
containerisation affected different products differently. Anderson (2011) suggests that
aggregation bias may be present in models that predict bilateral trade flows because of
sectorially varying trade costs and sectorially varying elasticities of trade with respect
to costs. We therefore deal with containerisability of products in the next chapter.
Another possibility for the results in this chapter is that the effects of containerisation
take longer than 5-years to materialise. We investigate this in chapter 7.
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Chapter 6
Estimating the Effects of
Containerisation on International
Trade at the Product Level
6.1 Introduction
We assumed in the previous chapter that all goods were containerisable. If this is not
the case, then this may help to explain the weaker evidence towards the end of the
previous chapter. However the solution is not just simply to create a containerisable
and non-containerisable definition. Take cars for instance. While cars cannot be con-
tainerised, car parts and their intermediate inputs can. This suggests that while cars
are not moved in containers, trade in cars may be affected by the container. We see
this clearly in table 4.5 (chapter 4) where parts of cars and motor vehicles become
the top traded containerisable commodity in 1990 after containerisation was adopted
worldwide. The car example demonstrates that the issue is not as simple as that: non-
containerisable products may be affected by containerisation. This means that trade in
non-containerisable products may not be a good counterfactual to identify the effects
of containerisation on containerisable products. Similarly some products may become
containerisable later on, such as some food products. So our strategy in this chapter
is to again use the bilateral variation in the adoption of the container rather than the
cross-product variation.
In chapter 4, we introduced a product classification that dates back to 1968 which
contains information about the containerisability of products. This classification iden-
tifies products at the 4-digit SITC product level that were suitable for the container
in 1968 based on their physical properties. Products that were not suitable for the
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container in 1968 are classified as either of limited suitability or not suitable for the
container. This is the only scientific classification available to us. This classification
lends both advantages and disadvantages to our analysis.
The advantage of this classification is that it is conducted in the early years of
containerisation. This means that we know what could be moved in containers in the
early stages and we can be sure that these products were suitable for containers at the
time and remained so thereafter. A disadvantage of using this classification is that it
is static. The group of products classified as ’of limited suitability’ or ’not suitable’
for containers may include products that are sometimes containerisable or were strongly
affected by containerisation because their intermediate inputs were. Some products may
have become containerisable (adjusted to fit in containers) as containerisation caught
on such as fresh produce and frozen foods. Some products were not and won’t be trans-
ported in containers such as oil products. Other products are not containerisable but
the supply chains that were enabled by containerisation meant that the trade of these
products was strongly affected by containerisation. This was especially the case when
just-in-time manufacturing gained popularity in the 1980s. This means that the group
of products classified as non-containerisable contains elements that are endogenous to
containerisation. Ideally, we want a classification that is updated as products are ad-
justed to become containerisable. But unfortunately, this classification does not exist
as far as we are aware. Even if we had such a classification, we still wouldn’t be able to
account for those products that are non-containerisable but whose trade is affected by
containerisation. An alternative would be looking at customs data on individual ship-
ments to determine what was being transported in containers. This data is unavailable
unfortunately for our period.
As a result, causal statements are clearer for the group of products that were con-
tainerisable in 1968, and less so for the group classified as non-containerisable. The
results of the latter group are of interest and suggestive but the direction of causality is
less clear.
Moving forward, we call ’containerisable’ products those products that are classi-
fied as containerisable in the containerisability classification of 1968. We call ’non-
containerisable’ trade those products that are classified as partially suitable or not suit-
able for the container in 1968 in the same classification. We understand that the latter ti-
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tle is inaccurate as the group may contain products that may have become transportable
in containers at the end of the period. However, we use these terms for convenience.
In this chapter, we use the containerisability classification of 1968 to restrict the
sample of trade flows to the 4-digit containerisable products. We estimate the effects of
containerisation on containerisable trade using a treatment estimation equation at the
product level. We also use the containerisability classification at the 1-digit disaggregate
product level constructed in chapter 4 for robustness. This chapter is divided as follows.
In section 2, we discuss the empirical strategy and propose the estimation equation. In
section 3, we estimate the effects of containerisation on containerisable trade at the 4-
digit and 1-digit SITC product disaggregate levels. In section 4, we run some robustness
regressions. In section 5, we explore heterogeneity in the results by restricting samples
to North-North, North-South, and South-South containerisable trades. In section 6, we
investigate the effects of containerisation on non-containerisable trade. We conclude in
section 7.
6.2 Product Level Econometric Specification of the Effects
of Containerisation on Containerisable Trade
In the previous chapter, we investigated the effects of containerisation on aggregate
trade flows at the country level. In this section, we add an additional dimension to our
estimation which is the product dimension. Our dependent variable becomes the log of
trade flows at the SITC product level between countries i and j at time t. The treatment
estimation equation becomes:
lnxijkt = β1 + β2Containerijt + β3Policyijt + β4
−−−→
Dijkt + uijkt (6.1)
The variable Container in this specification measures the adoption of containeri-
sation by both countries i and j at time t. This variable is product invariant. As in
the previous chapter, this variable takes the value of 0 or 1. It switches to one when
both countries on a trade route are containerised in year t. The policy variables control
for trade and economic shocks that are country-pair time variant and these are FTAs,
GATT members, and common currency in line with the previous chapter. This would
solve for any potential omitted variable bias if containerisation is correlated with any
of the other policy variables. For example, one might think that countries that share a
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free trade agreement are more likely to containerise if either country containerises. The
second advantage of this specification is that it allows for a ”horse race” between the
technology variable and the policy variables. We also control for a host of dummies (it,
jt, and ij) as in the previous chapter. We will also include product dummies in addition.
These are summed by the vector Dijkt.
The treatment group in this specification is all bilateral trade flows between two
containerising countries. Our treatment variable is the bilateral container variable at
time t. The control group is all bilateral trade flows in which either one country or none
of the two countries are containerised. In other words, our counterfactual becomes all
product trade flows between non-containerising country pairs1.
At the 4-digit level between 1962 and 1990, we have 15,578,068 observations or
positive trade relationships between 157 countries. Just like the previous chapter, we
choose points in time that are 5 years apart to allow trade to adjust to containerisation.
This reduces the sample to 2,237,820 observations. This is also necessary since with
such a large sample, we are nearing the computational power limit of the statistical
software package. The size of the sample does not allow for the inclusion of all exporter-
and importer-time and country pair as well as product dummies. We deal with this by
estimating a first-differenced version of the above equation. Also the first-differenced
version of the equation allows for the possibility that the bilateral FE vary over 5-year
periods. According to Wooldridge (2010)2, first differencing a structural equation is a
simple yet powerful method of programme evaluation.
Beside necessity, other potential problems are solved by first-differencing. First-
differencing the panel yields some potential advantages over FE. Wooldridge (2010)
notes that when the number of time periods exceeds two, the fixed-effects estimator
is more efficient under the assumption of serially uncorrelated error terms. The first-
differencing estimator is more efficient under the assumption that the error terms are
1One can think of a different specification in which the treatment group is containerisable products
and the control group is non-containerisable products. This specification would ideally work if we had a
product classification in which we are able to separate between containerisable and non-containerisable
trade for all years. The containerisability classification allows us to separate between what we know
is containerisable in 1968 and thereafter and what is classified as ’non-containerisable’ in 1968 but
for which we cannot be confident they stay so after 1968 as we argue in this chapter. We however
propose a specification in appendix C in which we use the classification of 1968 to capture the effects
of containerisation on ’containerisable’ trade as opposed to ’non-containerisable’. We cannot draw any
causal statements from the results however.
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serially correlated. It is quite plausible that the unobserved factors in trade flows, uijt
are correlated over time. For instance, factors affecting the likelihood to containerise
may be present in several time periods and hence serially correlated. One can think
of the political will to invest in new container ports in a trade-promoting government
or other political factors that might encourage a country to containerise following other
countries or even competition between countries to become the regional hub. If the error
terms are serially correlated then the FE estimates are inefficient and the inefficiency
increases as T gets large. This suggests that differencing the data will increase estimation
efficiency for our large panel.
In applying first differencing, we difference equation (6.1) to obtain the estimating
equation. By first-differencing, the equation becomes:
∆lnxijk,t = γ1 + γ2∆Containerij,t + γ3∆Policyij,t + γ4
−−→
Dijk + uijk,t (6.2)
The estimates of the coefficients in the above equation should be interpreted in the
original equation (6.1). The estimate of the coefficient from the above equation is the
differences-in-differences estimator, i.e. γˆ2 = ∆ytreat−∆ycontrol. It is worth mentioning
that the effect of containerisation is assumed to affect the growth of trade for a single
5-years period.
6.3 Product Level Estimations of the Effects of Container-
isation on Containerisable Trade
As discussed in the introduction, we use a product containerisability classification which
looks at the product characteristics to classify them as containerisable or not in 1968.
Products classified as containerisable in this classification are suitable for transport
in containers at the beginning of containerisation and remain so thereafter. We are
therefore able to make causal statements about the effects of containerisation on con-
tainerisable trade.
Some products may have been adjusted later on to be moved in containers as con-
tainerisation caught on and some other products may be traded more intensively because
their parts or inputs are containerisable. This means that we can have greater confidence
that we identify the causal effects for those products that are classified as containerisable
in 1968. Products classified as non-containerisable in 1968 may not remain so and their
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containerisability might be affected by containerisation itself. This means that their
inclusion in the analysis might introduce an element of endogeneity. Any study of the
effects of containerisation on these products is thus suggestive and may be somewhat
biased. It is also difficult to determine the direction of any bias however.
For these reason, we will restrict our empirical estimation on containerisable prod-
ucts in this initial analysis. In this section, we estimate equation 6.2 to estimate the
effects of containerisation on containerisable commodities. We estimate the effects of
containerisation on containerisable trade at both the 4- and 1-digit SITC product levels
as a robustness check.
In table 6.1, we estimate equation 6.2 to identify the effects of full containerisation
(port and railway) in the top part and port containerisation only in the bottom part.
We present the results for the 4-digit product level regressions in columns 1 to 3 and the
1-digit product level regressions in columns 4 to 6. We introduce FE gradually. We start
by including it and jt dummies. We then introduce product dummies, and then product-
year (kt) dummies. Product-year dummies should control for technological changes in
product production and transportation.
The results in table 6.1 suggest that estimating the effects of containerisation on
containerisable trade is robust to the product aggregation level and to the inclusion of
product and product-year FE.
The coefficients of the full containerisation variables are very close to each other
in magnitude in the 3 estimations (columns 1 to 3). The effect of containerisation on
containerisable product trade is around 90%. This result is robust to the inclusion of
product and product-year FE. Similarly, port containerisation alone leads to an average
increase of approximately 68% in containerisable product trade and this estimate is also
robust to the inclusion of product and product-year FE.
The effect of full containerisation is estimated to be around 93% on containerisable
trade in the 1-digit industry regressions. The estimated coefficients are virtually equal
to each other in columns 4-6. This means that the estimated effect is robust to the
inclusion of product and product-year FE. The estimated effect of port containerisation
in the bottom half of the table is around 76% on containerisable trade in columns 4-6.
With regards to the other policy variables, the effect of FTAs is therefore roughly
one third to half the effect of containerisation. We estimate roughly similar effects for
bilateral GATT memberships to FTAs.
In conclusion, Containerisation has strong and significant effects on containerisable
trade in the range of 70 to 90% depending on the level of product aggregation and
whether we allow for containerisation on rail (full containerisation). Signing a free trade
agreement has roughly the same effect on containerisable trade as a bilateral signing up
to GATT. Also, the results suggest that the effect of containerisation is equal to the
effects of FTAs and GATT combined. In the next section, we will test the robustness
of these results to the selection of data points in time, time intervals, and sub-samples.
Table 6.1: Effects of Containerisation on Containerisable trade, Product level regres-
sions, 5-year Intervals and 7 periods
4-digit SITC product level 1-digit SITC product level
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)













y Full cont(ij) 0.645∗∗∗ 0.651∗∗∗ 0.633∗∗∗ 0.654∗∗∗ 0.659∗∗∗ 0.655∗∗∗
(0.00658) (0.00655) (0.00652) (0.0197) (0.0196) (0.0196)
FTA 0.336∗∗∗ 0.339∗∗∗ 0.332∗∗∗ 0.287∗∗∗ 0.287∗∗∗ 0.279∗∗∗
(0.00940) (0.00934) (0.00927) (0.0405) (0.0404) (0.0404)
Both GATT 0.355∗∗∗ 0.350∗∗∗ 0.344∗∗∗ 0.227∗∗∗ 0.232∗∗∗ 0.228∗∗∗
(0.00992) (0.00987) (0.00980) (0.0268) (0.0267) (0.0267)
Com Cur 0.143∗∗∗ 0.138∗∗∗ 0.135∗∗∗ 0.144∗ 0.140∗ 0.134∗
(0.0169) (0.0168) (0.0167) (0.0574) (0.0572) (0.0572)
N 1731210 1731210 1731210 175425 175425 175425
R
2 0.077 0.089 0.106 0.122 0.127 0.130

















n Port cont(ij) 0.525∗∗∗ 0.526∗∗∗ 0.511∗∗∗ 0.564∗∗∗ 0.569∗∗∗ 0.564∗∗∗
(0.00601) (0.00598) (0.00595) (0.0189) (0.0189) (0.0188)
FTA 0.325∗∗∗ 0.327∗∗∗ 0.320∗∗∗ 0.261∗∗∗ 0.261∗∗∗ 0.253∗∗∗
(0.00940) (0.00935) (0.00928) (0.0405) (0.0404) (0.0404)
Both GATT 0.390∗∗∗ 0.386∗∗∗ 0.378∗∗∗ 0.235∗∗∗ 0.241∗∗∗ 0.236∗∗∗
(0.00991) (0.00986) (0.00979) (0.0268) (0.0267) (0.0267)
Com Cur 0.142∗∗∗ 0.138∗∗∗ 0.135∗∗∗ 0.142∗ 0.139∗ 0.132∗
(0.0169) (0.0168) (0.0167) (0.0574) (0.0573) (0.0572)
N 1731210 1731210 1731210 175425 175425 175425
R
2 0.076 0.088 0.105 0.121 0.126 0.128
FE it,jt it,jt,k it,jt,kt it,jt it,jt,k it,jt,kt
Standard errors in parentheses
∗
p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
6.4 Some Robustness Regressions for the 1-digit and 4-
digit Product Level Estimations
After checking the robustness of the first estimations to the choice of product disaggre-
gate level, we now turn to other robustness checks. Namely, we look at the length of the
time intervals, the choice of data points (years), the sample break, and the exclusion of
the Comecon countries, and the containerisability of refrigerated products. We also in-
clude a test for endogeneity that we introduced in the previous chapter in which we drop
the top 5 trading partners for each country but at the industry level. We will follow the
practice of estimating all models for both full containerisation and port containerisation
separately.
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In table 6.2, we run our robustness checks on trade flows at the 1-digit and 4-digit
product levels and exhibit the results side by side. In the first two columns, we choose
data points in time that are 3 years apart instead of 5 years that we chose earlier. Recall
that our earlier choice of 5-year intervals is based on evidence from the UK and Japan
in chapter 4. The years of choice become: 62, 65, 68, 71, 74, 77, 80, 83, 86, and 90.
So now, we have 10 data points instead of 7. The results suggest that our estimates
are robust to the choice of the length of adjustment. As expected, the estimates of the
container effects are lower when the period of adjustment allowed is lower. Nonetheless,
the effects of full containerisation on trade flows at the 1- and 4-digit level are strong
and significant. The estimates of the effect of full containerisation are around 47% and
53% for the 1- and 4-digit product level estimations respectively; the estimated effects of
port containerisation are 42% and 47% respectively. This exercise is suggestive that the
effect of containerisation is not contemporaneous and may linger on many years later
which is supported by the narrative. In chapter 7, we explore whether the effects can
be felt 5 and 10 years after containerisation.
In columns 3 and 4, we choose different data points that are 5 years apart. Recall
that previously, we chose the following data points (years): 62, 67, 72, 77, 82, 87, and 90.
In this exercise, we choose the years 62, 65, 70, 75, 80, 85, and 90. The results suggest
that our estimates are robust to the choice of years. The estimates for the effects of full
containerisation on containerisable trade are around 88% and 91% for the 1- and 4-digit
level estimations respectively. This is not much different than the estimates we find in
table 6.1 (columns 3 and 6).
In columns 5 and 6, we test for any breaks in the sample. The reason why we
do this is that the trade data sample is restricted to a group of 72 countries only
between 1984-1990. Any break, therefore, is expected to take place in 1984. We choose
data points that are at 5-years apart and the first year after the break is 1987. Since
we estimate a first-differenced model, then any effects from the break in the sample
would be picked up in the differenced data in the interval 1982-1987. We drop the
differenced data at 1987 to check for robustness of our estimation to this break. We still
pick up strong and significant effect for full containerisation on containerisable trade at
both product disaggregate levels. The estimated effect of around 68% is slightly lower
than the estimated effect in table 6.1. The estimated effect for port containerisation is
151
approximately 50%. Our estimates are thus robust to any possible breaks in the sample.
Furthermore, we remove the ex-Comecon countries plus India from the sample in
columns 7 and 8. Comecon stands for The Council for Mutual Economic Assistance.
Although many of these countries did containerise, they were fairly closed economies and
traded a lot among each other. The ex-Comecon countries are: Bulgaria, Czechoslo-
vakia, Hungary, Poland, Romania, USSR, Albania, East Germany, Mongolia, Cuba,
and Vietnam. Removing these countries does not have any noteworthy effects on the
estimates. If anything, the coefficient estimates of the full and port containerisation
variables are ever so slightly higher than the estimates in the entire sample regressions.
We also test the robustness of the results to the containerisability of refrigerated
products. These are products that we know have become containerisable after the
introduction of refrigerated containers. We list these products in the appendix (table
C1). We allow these products to be containerisable in our sample at the 4-digit product
level. Running the same regression on the new sample of containerisable products at
the 4-digit product level results in similiar estimates of the effects of port and full
containerisation to the estimates in column 3 of table 6.1. At the 1-digit industry level,
we allow industry 0 (Food and live animals) to be containerisable while it was considered
as non-contanerisable in table 6.1. Allowing industry 0 to be containerisable produces
estimates for port and full containerisation that are in line with the estimates in column
6 of table 6.1. Our estimates are therefore robust to the containerisability of refrigerated
products.
Finally, dropping the top 5 trading partners by industry for each country i does
not change the results in table 6.1 whether for full and port containerisation or at the
4-digit and 1-digit industries . The top 5 trading partners were eliminated by taking
the average value by industry between any two countries i and j across all years and
eliminating the top 5 trading partners for each country i by industry.
Since we are not testing the robustness of the other policy variables estimates in
this section, we will not comment on those estimates. However, it is noteworthy that in
almost all robustness checks, the container effects is larger than the effects of the policy
variables and the conclusions reached in the previous section with this regard are valid
here.
In conclusion to this section, our estimates of the effects of containerisation on con-
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tainerisable trade are robust to the length of the adjustment period, the choice of the
5-year interval data points (years), the sample break, the exclusion of the Comecon
countries plus India, the containerisability of refrigerated products, and the elimination
of the top 5 trading partners by industry.
6.5 Heterogeneity: Estimations for North-North / South-
South / North-South Trade
Economic commentators such as Levinson (2006) are of the opinion that containerisa-
tion helped integrate East Asia with the world economy. In chapter 4, we show from
product level data how the composition of trade between North and South has changed
after the containerisation adoption was completed. If containerisation has helped the
fragmentation of the production process and hence led to change in the composition of
trade, do we find evidence that containerisation has affected North-South trade more
than other trades as the narrative suggests? After running some robustness checks on
our product level estimations, we now turn to this rather interesting question3.
To answer this question, we restrict our data set to samples of the respective groups
we are interested in and estimate equation 6.2. Here too, we estimate the effects of full
and port containerisation at both the 1- and 4-digit product levels.
Table 6.3 confirms that containerisation affected North-South containerisable trade
the most, then South-South trade, and North-North trade the least. This result is robust
to the product disaggregate level. In magnitude, depending on the product disaggregate
level, the effect is between 158% and 269% for North-South trade, between 99% and
110% for South-South trade, and between 28% and 40% for North-North trade. The
coefficient estimates are generally lower in the port containerisation estimations with the
exception of South-South regressions, where the coefficient estimates are either very close
or slightly higher than the full containerisation coefficients. This reflects the prominence
of railway in European trade and the introduction intermodal cargo transportation in
North countries. In South countries, containerisation was restricted to ports in most
cases if we ignore roads.
That containerisation affected North-South containerisable trade the most is a re-
3Recall that North countries are: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, Fm Ger-
man FR, France, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal,
Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, UK, and USA. South countries are all other countries
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Table 6.2: Effect of Containerisation, Robustness checks, Containerisable Trade only
3-year intervals Different data points dropping 1987 excl Comecon & India incl refrigerated products dropping top trading partners
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)















Full cont(ij) 0.423*** 0.387*** 0.646*** 0.633*** 0.519*** 0.509*** 0.651*** 0.693*** 0.634*** 0.655*** 0.596*** 0.641***
(0.0047) (0.0152) (0.0068) (0.0192) (0.0068) (0.0211) (0.0068) (0.0210) (0.0063) (0.0181) (0.0069) (0.0199)
FTA 0.240*** 0.189*** 0.220*** 0.212*** 0.362*** 0.278*** 0.350*** 0.301*** 0.341*** 0.252*** 0.318*** 0.282***
(0.0084) (0.0375) (0.0093) (0.0407) (0.0100) (0.0469) (0.0093) (0.0407) (0.0090) (0.0380) (0.0098) (0.0417)
Both GATT 0.290*** 0.199*** 0.262*** 0.201*** 0.317*** 0.183*** 0.310*** 0.210*** 0.344*** 0.242*** 0.346*** 0.217***
(0.0079) (0.0229) (0.0095) (0.0260) (0.0102) (0.0285) (0.0104) (0.0288) (0.0096) (0.0247) (0.0102) (0.0269)
Com Cur 0.0922*** 0.058 0.0292 0.057 0.133*** 0.138* 0.146*** 0.0544 0.135*** 0.0993 0.164*** 0.127*
(0.0138) (0.0479) (0.227) (0.0521) (0.0170) (0.0582) (0.0170) (0.0598) (0.0162) (0.0528) (0.0179) (0.0600)
N 2916513 281659 1662604 174376 1567536 150156 1564278 154040 1820826 209420 1602621 170183
R2 0.099 0.115 0.116 0.140 0.094 0.123 0.111 0.135 0.104 0.120 0.105 0.130





















port cont(ij) 0.387*** 0.349*** 0.523*** 0.563*** 0.408*** 0.420*** 0.527*** 0.591*** 0.518*** 0.575*** 0.469*** 0.551***
(0.00451) (0.0151) (0.0062) (0.0185) (0.0062) (0.0202) (0.0063) (0.0202) (0.0058) (0.0175) (0.0062) (0.0191)
FTA 0.226*** 0.174*** 0.199*** 0.174*** 0.350*** 0.247*** 0.326*** 0.258*** 0.330*** 0.226*** 0.307*** 0.255***
(0.0084) (0.0375) (0.0093) (0.0407) (0.0101) (0.0469) (0.0093) (0.0407) (0.0090) (0.0380) (0.0098) (0.0417)
Both GATT 0.335*** 0.212*** 0.340*** 0.223*** 0.345*** 0.188*** 0.329*** 0.208*** 0.378*** 0.249*** 0.379*** 0.225***
(0.00791) (0.0229) (0.0094) (0.0261) (0.0102) (0.0286) (0.0104) (0.0288) (0.0095) (0.0247) (0.0102) (0.0269)
Com Cur 0.0925*** 0.0603 0.031* 0.0594 0.133*** 0.136* 0.144*** 0.0507 0.134*** 0.0981 0.162*** 0.124*
(0.0138) (0.0479) (0.0151) (0.0521) (0.0170) (0.0582) (0.0170) (0.0599) (0.0162) (0.0528) (0.0180) (0.0600)
N 2916513 281659 1662604 174376 1567536 150156 1564278 154040 1820826 209420 1602621 170183
R2 0.099 0.096 0.115 0.139 0.093 0.122 0.110 0.134 0.103 0.119 0.104 0.129
FE it,jt,kt it,jt,kt it,jt,kt it,jt,kt it,jt,kt it,jt,kt it,jt,kt it,jt,kt it,jt,kt it,jt,kt it,jt,kt it,jt,kt
Standard errors in parentheses
∗
p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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markable result. This could be a consequence of the change of the composition of trade
between North and South after containerisation. Before containerisation, North-South
containerisable trade was dominated by the trade in basic commodities such as coffee,
cotton, and copper. After containerisation, there was a clear shift towards new trade
in which South countries have become suppliers of manufactures and containerisable
finished products to North countries. This result suggests that containerisation had a
strong effect on containerisable trade between North and South countries by encour-
aging the fragmentation of the production process allowing South countries to develop
into suppliers to North countries.
Also, that South-South containerisable trade was affected could reflect the strength-
ening economic position of many of the South countries in Asia and the Middle East.
But this could also be a result of the fragmentation of production process itself. Parts
and intermediate inputs are transported many times between countries where some value
is added in each step. Another channel in which trade could have been stimulated in
South South trade is that building new ports allowed many countries to trade which
couldn’t previously trade because of poor infrastructure or perhaps the new hub and
spoke systems allowed these countries to send their goods to the nearest biggest port
where shipping lines care to call.
While containerisable trade was affected positively by containerisation in North-
North trade, the effect is smaller than in North-South or even South-South trade. This
could be a direct result of the new economic order in which South countries supply
North countries which means that relatively North-North countries trade less with each
other than they do with South countries.
We also find interesting results for the other policy variables. Of all country groups,
FTAs have the biggest effect on North-North containerisable trade followed by South-
South and then North-South. There are more North-North FTAs than South-South and
North-South FTAs in our sample period (1962-1990)4. Most of the FTAs in our sample
are related to the European Community. The effect of the FTAs on containerisable
trade between North countries is very similar to the effect of full containerisation among
these countries. However, what is perhaps a more interesting result is that GATT
4The only FTAs between North and South countries in the years 1962-1990 were EC-Algeria, EC-
Syria, and Israel-USA.
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membership seems to affect North-South and South-South containerisable trade but has
no significant effect on North-North trade. This could be because membership in the EC
preceded GATT membership for many European countries and hence these countries
were already in a free trade agreement.
To conclude, containerisation affected North-South containerisable trade the most,
followed by South-South, and then North-North containerisable trade the least. The
effects of containerisation on North-South containerisable trade are quite large and range
between around 158 and 269%. This reflects a change in the composition of trade
between North and South. While traditionally this trade was dominated by moving basic
commodities from South to North, the narrative suggests that the container allowed
South countries to resume a new role in the world economy. The fragmentation of
the production process and the longer supply chains means that South countries have
become suppliers of finished containerisable goods.
Table 6.3: Effect of Containerisation, Heterogeneity in Results
































Full Cont(ij) 0.949*** 0.334*** 0.686*** 1.306*** 0.245*** 0.745***
(0.0106) (0.0124) (0.0171) (0.0447) (0.0677) (0.0373)
FTA 0.080* 0.409*** 0.212** 0.242* 0.253*** 0.408**
(0.0390) (0.0097) (0.0678) (0.122) (0.0348) (0.148)
Both GATT 0.510*** 0.053 0.244*** 0.215*** 0.028 0.215***
(0.0154) (0.0311) (0.0207) (0.0521) (0.106) (0.0449)
Common Curr 0.178*** 0.170*** -0.093 0.221** 0.422** 0.0837
(0.0208) (0.0423) (0.0585) (0.0744) (0.148) (0.119)
No. Countries 157 22 135 157 22 135
No. Observations 1028251 481174 221785 107993 17641 49791
overall R2 0.112 0.117 0.142 0.158 0.143 0.152


















Port Cont(ij) 0.753*** 0.295*** 0.657*** 0.705*** 0.126* 0.773***
(0.0095) (0.0120) (0.0174) (0.0338) (0.0550) (0.038)
FTA 0.058 0.401*** 0.203** 0.242* 0.245*** 0.408**
(0.0390) (0.0097) (0.0679) (0.122) (0.0350) (0.148)
Both GATT 0.592*** 0.087** 0.244*** 0.279*** 0.041 0.218***
(0.0154) (0.0310) (0.0207) (0.0521) (0.106) (0.0449)
Common Curr 0.174*** 0.171*** -0.103 0.222** 0.425** 0.078
(0.0209) (0.0423) (0.0585) (0.0746) (0.148) (0.119)
No. Countries 157 22 135 157 22 135
No. Observations 1028251 481174 221785 107993 17641 49791
overall R2 0.120 0.116 0.141 0.155 0.143 0.152
FE it,jt,kt it,jt,kt it,jt,kt it,jt,kt it,jt,kt it,jt,kt
Standard errors in parentheses
∗
p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
6.6 Estimating the effects of containerisation on container-
isable and non-Containerisable trade
So far we have estimated the effects of containerisation on containerisable trade. To
estimate the effects of containerisation on both containerisable and non-containerisable
trade would be introducing endogenous components since some products may become
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containerisable as containerisation caught on as we discussed before. Estimating equa-
tion 6.2 for these products can only be of interest and suggestive but the direction of
causation is less clear.
In table 6.4, we estimate the effects of containerisation on non-containerisable and
containerisable trade. We estimate the effects of containerisation on non-containerisable
trade and all products at the 4-digit product disaggregate level in columns 1 and 2 and
at the 1-digit product level in columns 3 and 4.
Looking at the coefficients reveals two things. Containerisation seems to have af-
fected trade in non-containerisable goods. In magnitude, the effects of full containerisa-
tion on non-containerisable trade are between 107 and 112% depending on the product
disaggregate level. As for port containerisation, the estimated coefficient is slightly lower
than the full containerisation coefficient in column 1 (4-digit) and slightly higher in col-
umn 3. This could be explained by the fact that some non-containerisable products such
as oil are usually not transported by rail inland. Hence, railway containerisation would
not have an additional effect on the trade in these products.
In columns 2 and 4, the effects of full containerisation on all products (container-
isable and non-containerisable) are estimated between 97 and 100% respectively. The
coefficients of the port containerisation variable are slightly lower in both columns.
The result that containerisation affected all products, containerisable and non-containerisable
can only be suggestive as we argued and maybe biased. It is also difficult to determine
the direction of any such bias. We cannot be sure of the direction of causality. This is
mainly because the trade in products classified as ’non-containerisable’ may have jus-
tified their adjustment to move them in containers later on. Also, if containerisation
allowed for the fragmentation of the production process and the trade in intermediate
inputs, then the trade in finished goods may have been stimulated by containerisation
even if the finished product itself is not moved in containers.
To conclude, containerisation seems to have affected both containerisable and non-
containerisable trade. We are however unable to make the claim that the effect on what is
classified as non-containerisable in our product classification is causal as many products
may have been adjusted to fit in containers or have been affected by containerisation
because the trade in their parts/inputs is stimulated by containerisation itself.
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Table 6.4: Effect of Containerisation on containerisable and non-containerisable trade
4-digit 1-digit
(1) (2) (3) (4)














full cont(ij) 0.753*** 0.680∗∗∗ 0.729*** 0.692∗∗∗
(0.0120) (0.00576) (0.0373) (0.0175)
FTA 0.357*** 0.347∗∗∗ 0.257** 0.287∗∗∗
(0.0177) (0.00831) (0.0790) (0.0365)
Both GATT 0.358*** 0.360∗∗∗ 0.410*** 0.278∗∗∗
(0.0198) (0.00891) (0.0531) (0.0242)
Com Cur 0.127*** 0.142∗∗∗ 0.0139 0.0998
(0.0332) (0.0151) (0.109) (0.0513)
N 506610 2237820 61681 237106
R
2 0.081 0.069 0.128 0.108

















n port cont(ij) 0.663*** 0.567∗∗∗ 0.752*** 0.636∗∗∗
(0.0115) (0.00534) (0.0368) (0.0170)
FTA 0.349*** 0.337∗∗∗ 0.241** 0.264∗∗∗
(0.0177) (0.00832) (0.0789) (0.0365)
Both GATT 0.410*** 0.400∗∗∗ 0.428*** 0.289∗∗∗
(0.0197) (0.00890) (0.0530) (0.0242)
Com Cur 0.126*** 0.141∗∗∗ 0.0167 0.0987
(0.0332) (0.0151) (0.109) (0.0513)
N 506610 2237820 61681 237106
R
2 0.080 0.068 0.129 0.107
FE it,jt,kt it,jt,kt it,jt,kt it,jt,kt
Standard errors in parentheses
∗
p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
6.7 Chapter Conclusion
Not all products are moved in containers. This may help explain the weak results reached
in the previous chapter when we consider aggregate trade flows. This is why we consider
containerisable products in this chapter to identify the effects of containerisation. We
use the product containerisability classification introduced in chapter 4 to identify those
products that are moved in containers. We argue that this classification is convenient
since it goes back to 1968, the beginning of containerisation. We can therefore be confi-
dent that products that are deemed containerisable in 1968 can be moved in containers
at the start of the process and remain so after. We cannot be sure about products that
are classified as non-containerisable however. This is because this group may contain
products that may become containerisable or products whose trade may be affected by
containerisation owing to their parts/intermediate products which are containerisable.
Hence these products introduce endogenous elements in our regressions. As a result,
causal statements are cleaner for products that are classified as containerisable in 1968.
We identify the effects of containerisation in a treatment type equation in which the
dependent variable is the 1-digit or 4-digit SITC product trade flows. The identification
of the container effects comes from the treatment group which is the containerisable
products trade between two containerising countries and the control group which is
the same trade between non-containerising countries. We first-difference the estimation
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equation and include importer- and exporter-time as well as product FE to deal with
endogeneity bias. This specification has many advantages such as allowing the bilateral
FE to vary over 5-year periods. It also delivers an efficient estimator when we have serial
correlation in the data. We estimate the equation with port and full container variables
separately.
The empirical results return economically and statistically significant results for the
effect of containerisation on containerisable trade. The effect is estimated to be around
90% for full containerisation and 70% for port containerisation. The results are robust to
the product disaggregation level. The relatively large effect for the container is around
twice the individual effect of FTAs and GATT membership on containerisable trade
and up to six times the effect of common currency. We also perform several robustness
checks for these results and find them to be robust to the choice of years in the pooled
panel, the length of the time intervals, controlling for a possible break, and the exclusion
of the Comecon countries.
In answering whether containerisation affected North-South trade as the narrative
suggests, we restrict our estimation to subsamples of North-North, North-South, and
South-South trade and estimate equation 6.2 for each sub-sample separately. What we
find is that containerisation had the largest effects on North-South trade. This result
and evidence from chapter 4 in which new patterns of trade are clear suggest that
containerisation aided in promoting North-South trade and the new patterns of trade.
The effects of containerisation in ports and rail on North-South containerisable trade
is estimated around 160% when considering 4-digit SITC product disaggregate level.
The effect is lower for South-South and North-North containerisable trade. This effect
is estimated around 100% and 28% respectively. Hence, containerisation is estimated
to have affected North-South (containerisable) trade the most followed by South-South
and then North-North containerisable trade the least.
In this chapter, we investigate the contemporaneous effects of containerisation. One
obvious question may arise. Were the effects of the container only contemporaneous or
could they still be felt many years later? In the next chapter, we investigate whether







”Only with time, as container shipping developed into an entirely new system
of moving goods by land and sea, did it begin to affect trade patterns and
industrial location.”1
Containerisation is a technological change that was adopted by different countries at
different times and in varying degrees. In most countries, the adoption was implemented
gradually. In the UK, containerisation started in a few ports and on the rail first before
new container ports were built from scratch such as Felixstowe and Tilbury. Even
when ports became equipped with container handling equipment, it took time before
trade adjusted to the new technology. Naturally, not all shipping lines had container
ships or containers in business at the time of adoption. It took around 5 years in the
UK and Japan before around 50% of all containerisable trade was actually moved by
containers. One may expect different countries to adjust at different rates. Also many
of the efficiencies and savings brought about by the container were not felt immediately.
It is true that once goods were transported in the box, then problems like pilferage and
damage are solved immediately and port efficiencies increase. But some savings such
as labour costs and time savings at port only came later on as the industry switched
from being labour intensive to being capital intensive. Similarly, many of the advantages
of containerisation such as intermodal transportation, the development of the hub and
spoke systems, expansions of ports, etc. take time to be accomplished. All of the above
1Levinson (2006) page 13.
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suggest that while the effects of containerisation are immediately felt, these effects are
likely to be felt years later. This motivates this chapter.
It is thus reasonable to assume that containerisation that is adopted bilaterally in
1970 might still have an effect on trade 10 years later in 1980. To capture the cumulative
effect on trade of containerisation, we introduce lagged and lead treatment variables in
the estimation specification.
Besides capturing lagged effects, including lagged regressors in the estimation equa-
tion solves for the potential lack of strict exogeneity. According to Wooldridge (2010)2,
when lagged regressors are correlated with the error terms, we can solve the lack of strict
exogeneity by including lags. Also, Wooldridge suggests that it is possible to test for
the ’strict exogeneity’ in our context by adding a future level along with lagged terms
of the treatment variable to the equation.
In the previous chapter, we set down our empirical strategy to estimate the effects
of containerisation on containerisable trade flows at the product level. In doing so, we
used information about the nature of products and their suitability for transportation
in containers. We used two levels of product level aggregation, the 1- and 4-digit SITC
product level classifications. The specification employed is an average treatment spec-
ification to identify the effects of containerisation. The specification employed is given
by equation 6.2.
When introducing first lagged and first lead independent variables in the specifica-
tion, the estimation equation becomes:
∆lnxijkt = β1 + β2∆Containerijt + β3∆Containerij,t−5 + β4∆Containerij,t+5




The container treatment variable is Containerijt which is country pair specific. Sim-
ilar to the previous chapter, we consider containerisable trade in this chapter. We argued
in the previous chapter that our product containerisability classification goes back to
1968 and products that are classified as ’non-containerisable’ might include endoge-
nous elements since products may become containerisable or may be affected through
2Wooldridge (2010) page 322
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their parts. As before, the treatment group is containerisable trade flows between two
containerising countries. The control group is containerisable trade flows between non-
containerising country pairs. Non-containerising country pairs are the country pairs or
trade routes in which either one country or none is containerised. We also introduced 3
policy treatment variables which are FTAs, GATT memberships, and common currency.
This has the benefit of solving for possible omitted variable bias if the container vari-
able is correlated with any of the policy variables as well as allow a horse run between
the technology and policy variables. The lagged terms Containerij,t−5 and Policyij,t−5
capture any lingering effects for the treatment variable in question in the future. The
lead terms Containerij,t+5 and Policyij,t+5 capture whether there is any pre-treatment
effect and serve as a test for exogeneity as we discussed earlier.
This chapter is divided as follows. In section 2, we first estimate equation 7.1 with
lagged and lead variables at the 4-digit and 1-digit product aggregate levels for con-
tainerisable trade. In section 3, we try to interpret the lead container variable by
testing whether it includes a trend component. In section 4, we use the narrative to test
for strict exogeneity in North North containerisable trade since we do not expect any
feedback effects from containerisation in that sample. In section 5, we estimate the same
equation with the lagged and lead terms for North-South and South-South containeris-
able trades to investigate heterogeneity in the cumulative effects of containerisation in
line with the previous chapter. In section 6, we plot a diagram to show the development
of (containerisable) trade following treatment and we conclude in section 7.
7.2 Cumulative effects of Containerisation: Introducing
Lags and Leads of Treatment Variables
In this section we estimate equation 7.1 to identify the effects of containerisation. We
introduce lagged and lead treatment variables gradually to allow for cumulative/lagged
effects. We estimate the treatment effects at both the 1- and 4-digit product levels.
We only consider full containerisation to allow for the cumulative effects of both port
and rail containerisation. Since we are introducing lagged treatment effects, we will be
calculating what we term as Total Treatment Effect (TTE) in each of the tables to add
up the compounded treatment effects of containerisation and the policy variables. We
include the cumulative effect of containerisation in the estimation tables and term those
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Total Container Effect (TCE). As in the previous chapter, we will restrict our sample to
containerisable trade only. The reasons for this were dealt with in the previous chapter
in length. Briefly, the classification that we use to identify the effects of containerisation
dates back to 1968. These are the products for which we can be confident that any
causal statements can be made.
In tables 7.1 and 7.2, we choose to include up to 2 lagged terms since we have 7
points in time and the bulk of the countries containerise after 1975, which leaves us
with only 2 time periods after the last countries containerise in our sample. In table
1, we present the 1-digit industry regressions while in table 2, we present the 4-digit
product level regressions. In column 1, we do not include any lagged variables but 1st
lead variables. In column 2, we include 1st lagged variables and in column 2, we include
1st and 2nd lagged variables as well as 1st lead variables. A 1st lagged variable means
lagging a variable 1 period (t-1) which is equivalent to 5 years in our setting. A 2nd
lagged variable means lagging a variable 2 periods (t-2) or 10 years. A 1st lead variable
means moving a variable 1 period (t+1).
There are a few things that we can conclude from our estimations. First of all, con-
tainerisation doesn’t have just a one-off effect but lagged effects as well. The estimations
in the two tables suggest that containerisation has large contemporaneous and lagged
effects on containerisable trade and the lagged effects die out slowly. In table 1, total
(cumulative) treatment effect (TTE) of the container variable is around 99% in column
1, 200% in column 2, and 165% in column 3. This means that containerisation had
cumulative effects on containerisable trade of around 165% to 200% 10 to 15 years after
the bilateral adoption of containerisation.
Similarly, in table 2, the 4-digit level regressions suggest that the effects of container-
isation are still present in the data 10-15 years after introduction. The contemporaneous
and lagged effects are larger than what we have seen in the 1-digit industry regressions.
The cumulative or the TCE effect ranges from 93% in columns 1 with no lagged vari-
ables, to 249% in column 2 with 1 lagged variable, to 450% in column 3 when we include
2 lagged container variables.
Beside the lags, the estimations also suggest positive and significant coefficients for
the lead container term in these estimations. The lead effect is much smaller than the
contemporaneous effect however.
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The fact that we are picking up a lead effect for the full containerisation treatment
variable could mean one of three things. We could be picking up a pre-existing trend or
a pre-container effect. If these two possibilities are ruled out, then there is a possibility
that the containerisation measures suffer from weak endogeneity judging by the small
magnitude of the lead container variable coefficient.
A pre-container effect could be the result of several things. One of the things that
comes to mind is the spill-overs from a one-sided containerisation or in other words the
containerisation of one of two countries on a particular trade route. We know that at
the start of containerisation, only a handful of countries - mainly North countries - had
container facilities for the handling of containerisation. This meant that most of the
world trade routes were not containerised as defined by our container variable in the
estimation equation which requires bilateral containerisation on a trade route. But one
cannot ignore that even with one-sided containerisation, trade could still benefit from
the new technology. We know that in the early years of containerisation, many shipping
lines deployed container ships with cranes onboard to allow for loading and unloading
of containers in unequipped ports. Even later on when cranes onboard were abolished,
containerisation was a compelling force that ships would be stripped off their containers
using ropes and pulleys sometimes on the high sea (Comoros Islands in the 1980s: Figure
4.16 chapter 4). We test whether the lead variable coefficient is indeed capturing all of
these things later. More about this later.
Sources of endogeneity could be omitted variable bias, simultaneity bias and/or
measurement error. Omitted variable bias is dealt with by first-differencing the data
and including country-time and product-time FE. Simultaneity bias is unlikely since
the dependent variable is 4-digit product trade flow between countries i and j whereas
the technology variable is ij specific. Heavily traded routes perhaps are more likely
to containerise, for example, albeit this problem would only be a limited one given
the magnitude of the lead coefficients relative to the level coefficients and since the
dependent variable and the regressor are of different dimensions. Measurement error
cannot be ruled out since our container measure does not capture containerisation on
the road but only in ports and rail. In section 7.4, we will use the narrative to minimise
any measurement error in the container variable.
With respect to the other policy variables, we find a consistent contemporaneous
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effect of FTAs on containerisable trade of around 34% in the 1-digit regressions and
40% in the 4-digit regressions. TCE of FTAs is between 59% (table 7.1) and 75%
(table 7.2) when 2 lagged container terms are included. These estimates are close to
the estimated TTE of FTAs by Baier and Bergstrand (2007) when employing the same
model on aggregate trade data. The model estimates a lead FTA or pre-FTA effect
in columns 3 which was not estimated by Baier and Bergstrand (2007). The TTE of
FTAs is only around one-sixth or one-seventh of the TTE estimated for the container.
The treatment effects of GATT membership is approximately one-tenth the estimated
total effect of the container. The TTE of common currency is between one-tenth and
one-sixth that of containerisation.
To summarise, we find that containerisation, once adopted by the two partners on
a give route, has effects on containerisable product trade that persist 10-15 years later.
The TCE accounting for the 1st and 2nd lagged effects, is between 165% and 450%
depending on the product disaggregation level. The TTE of the container is multiple
times the treatment effects of the policy variables. The TTE of containerisation is 6 to 10
times the TTE of the individual policy variables. We also pick up a lead containerisation
coefficient but the estimate thereof is relatively small compared to the contemporaneous
variable coefficients. We investigate this lead variable coefficient further in the next two
sections.
7.3 Understanding the Container First Lead Variable
In the previous section, we introduced lagged and lead effects of the container treatment
variable to check whether containerisation had a one-off effect or the effects of the new
technology lingered on after introduction. In the process, we also introduced a 1st lead
treatment variable.Wooldridge (2010) states that including a lead variable is a good
way of checking for strict exogeneity in the type of specification that we employ here.
Estimating a significant coefficient for the lead container variable could therefore signal
a pre-treatment effect, a pre-existing trend in trade, or weak endogeneity.
In the above estimations, we estimate positive and significant coefficients for the lead
container term. Although, these coefficients are small compared to the contemporaneous
container treatment variable coefficient, we try to understand what this lead effect is.
Namely, in this section, we explore the possibility of a pre-existing trend.
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Table 7.1: Introducing lags and leads of Full Containerisation: First Differenced Model
(by ijk); 1-digit Industries: Containerisable Trade
(1) (2) (3)
diﬄnvalue diﬄnvalue diﬄnvalue






diﬄead1 0.180∗∗∗ 0.250∗∗∗ 0.212∗∗∗
(0.0214) (0.0234) (0.0249)






diﬄead1rta 0.0990∗ 0.0304 0.132∗∗
(0.0422) (0.0432) (0.0510)






diﬄead1bothgatt -0.0893∗ -0.102∗∗ -0.106∗∗
(0.0367) (0.0364) (0.0366)






diﬄead1comcur 0.0318 0.128 0.133
(0.0990) (0.154) (0.192)
N 175425 159277 146689
R
2 0.130 0.136 0.140
TCE 99% 193% 165%
Standard errors in parentheses
∗
p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Table 7.2: Introducing lags and leads of full containerisation: First Differenced Model
(by ijk); 4-digit SITC product level: Containerisable trade
(1) (2) (3)
diﬄnvalue diﬄnvalue diﬄnvalue






diﬄead1 0.212∗∗∗ 0.240∗∗∗ 0.270∗∗∗
(0.00738) (0.00844) (0.00892)






diﬄead1rta -0.0247∗ 0.000163 0.0606∗∗∗
(0.00985) (0.0108) (0.0150)






diﬄead1bothgatt 0.108∗∗∗ 0.104∗∗∗ 0.0957∗∗∗
(0.0128) (0.0130) (0.0131)






diﬄead1comcur 0.134∗∗∗ 0.136∗∗∗ 0.137∗∗
(0.0272) (0.0381) (0.0482)
N 1731210 1329371 1122540
R
2 0.107 0.115 0.123
TCE 93% 249% 450%
Standard errors in parentheses
∗
p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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In order to check whether this pre-treatment container effect is an existing trend,
we could introduce a second lead treatment variable, i.e. containerij,t+2 to see whether
we pick up a similar effect for the 2nd lead as the 1st lead. The rationale behind it is
simple. If we have a trend in the data, then the 1st and 2nd lead variables should be
both positive, significant, and close to each other in magnitude.
In tables 7.3 and 7.4, we introduce the 2nd lead containerisation term in the estima-
tion equation at the 1- and 4-digit product levels respectively. In all estimations in the
two tables, the coefficients of both the first and second lead variables are positive and
approximately of the same magnitude3. This result confirms that the lead effect picked
up in the estimations in tables 1 and 2 may indeed be a pre-existing trend in trade.
With respect to the container effects after introducing the 2nd trend treatment
variable, we don’t notice major changes in the estimated TCE’s compared to the first
two estimation tables. This is also the case for the other policy variables treatment
effects.
Table 7.3: Checking for Trend through 2nd lag; 1-digit SITC product level
(1) (2) (3)
diﬄnvalue diﬄnvalue diﬄnvalue






diﬄead1 0.252∗∗∗ 0.362∗∗∗ 0.350∗∗∗
(0.0255) (0.0279) (0.0307)
diﬄead2 0.229∗∗∗ 0.291∗∗∗ 0.271∗∗∗
(0.0290) (0.0316) (0.0334)






diﬄead1rta 0.0957∗ 0.0465 0.127∗
(0.0413) (0.0426) (0.0502)






diﬄead1bothgatt -0.0844∗ -0.0841∗ -0.0913∗
(0.0375) (0.0374) (0.0376)






diﬄead1comcur 0.0757 0.135 0.107
(0.0966) (0.152) (0.188)
N 166524 153936 141348
R
2 0.136 0.140 0.144
TCE 87% 196% 193%
Standard errors in parentheses
∗
p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
3Testing the null that the two coefficients are statistically equal leads to accepting the null in column
1 table 7.3. We also accept the null at the 10% significance level in column 1 table 7.4. We reject the
null in all other columns
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Table 7.4: Checking for Trend through 2nd lag; 4-digit SITC product level
(1) (2) (3)
diﬄnvalue diﬄnvalue diﬄnvalue






diﬄead1 0.235∗∗∗ 0.300∗∗∗ 0.366∗∗∗
(0.00923) (0.0102) (0.0111)
diﬄead2 0.218∗∗∗ 0.265∗∗∗ 0.307∗∗∗
(0.0104) (0.0115) (0.0121)






diﬄead1rta -0.0327∗∗ 0.000422 0.0516∗∗∗
(0.00996) (0.0108) (0.0150)






diﬄead1bothgatt 0.110∗∗∗ 0.113∗∗∗ 0.106∗∗∗
(0.0138) (0.0138) (0.0138)






diﬄead1comcur 0.154∗∗∗ 0.139∗∗∗ 0.116∗
(0.0273) (0.0382) (0.0484)
N 1467883 1261047 1054216
R
2 0.111 0.118 0.127
TCE 81% 249% 487%
Standard errors in parentheses
∗
p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
7.4 Testing for Endogeneity in North-North Trade
In the previous sections, we estimate a relatively small but positive and statistically
significant first-lead effect from containerisation. As mentioned above, the lead effect
could be the product of a pre-existing trend, a pre-containerisation effect, or weak en-
dogeneity. We tested for a pre-existing trend in the previous section. If the coefficient
of the lead containerisation variable is not capturing pre-containerisation effects, then
it could mean that we could have weak endogeneity. We use the data and the narrative
to check whether our specification suffers from weak exogeneity.
We argued above that sources of endogeneity are omitted variable bias, simultaneity
bias and/or measurement error. We have dealt with possible omitted variable by first-
differencing the data and including importer- and exporter-time as well as product-time
FE. Simultaneity bias is unlikely since the dependent variable is 4-digit product trade
flow between countries i and j whereas the technology variable is ij specific. Also, it
is perhaps more true that countries that trade a lot are likely to self-select into FTAs.
Lastly, potential endogeneity may be caused by measurement errors in the container
variable.
The analysis in this section is driven by the narrative. The narrative and the con-
tainer data tells us that North countries were first to containerise. In these countries,
containerisation started in port and was introduced on rail almost concurrently (chap-
ter 4). Also our container measure is likely to capture the intermodal effects of using
containers on the roads as well. This means that measurement error in the container
variables are minimal for the sample of North countries.
Our containerisation measure depends on the bilateral adoption of containerisation
on any specific trade route. Some countries containerise before others. We know already
that many ships had onboard cranes especially in the early years to enable containers
to be handled in unequipped ports. Also, the bigger ports in some countries served as
centres for hub and spoke systems in which containers made their way to the hub and
then transferred onto lighters and barges to smaller ports in more peripheral countries.
These effects are likely to be captured by the lead container variable.
Our data allows for an experiment that is driven by the narrative to test whether the
lead effect we estimate is indeed a pre-container effect. We know that a pre-container
effect emanating from a unilateral adoption of the technology in North-North trade
should not be there since these countries adopted the technology in the early years of
containerisation.
Therefore, the narrative suggests that we should not capture a significant lead vari-
able coefficient for North-North trade. In this section, we examine this claim in the
sample of North-North containerisable trade at the 4-digit product levels. This exercise
serves as a test for endogeneity. If we have a causal relationship between containerisa-
tion and the trade flows, then we do not expect to observe a lead effect in North-North
trade. We restrict our sample to North-North containerisable trade flows and run the
same regression as in table 7.2.
The results in table 7.5 confirm largely that we don’t pick up a lead container effect
for North-North trade. In columns 2 and 3 where we include lagged effects, the lead
container variable is very small and insignificant.
This experiment suggests that our estimations of the cumulative effects of container-
isation on North-North containerisable trade don’t suffer from endogeneity. We can
therefore be more confident about making a causal statement about the effects of con-
tainerisation on this trade. The regressions also suggest that the results in tables 7.1
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and 7.2 are contaminated by unilateral adoption of containerisation and measurement
error. The results of the regressions in the two tables are therefore only suggestive and
we cannot be as confident about making causal statements for overall containerisable
trade.
With regards to magnitude of effects of containerisation on North-North trade, com-
pared to the sample average treatment effects in table 7.2, the estimates suggest that
North-North containerisable trade was less affected by containerisation on average than
the entire sample even after accounting for lagged effects. This result is consistent with
what we found in the previous chapter for the contemporaneous effects on North-North
trade. We estimate a TCE on North-North containerisable trade of 50% in column 1,
152% in column 2, and 381% in column 3. This is compared with 450% for the TTE of
containerisation 10 to 15 years later for the entire sample.
As for the effects of the other policy variables on North-North containerisable trade,
we find that the contemporaneous and lagged effects of FTAs on North North in table
7.5 is very close to the estimates of the full sample in table 7.2. This is not the case
for GATT membership. The results suggest that GATT membership has a positive and
strong TTE on North-North containerisable trade which is similar in magnitude to table
7.2 in column 2 (1st lag) but much higher in column 3 (1st and 2nd lag). This is not
the case for column 1 (no lags) where the estimated coefficient of the contemporaneous
policy variable is very small and insignificant. In columns 2 and 3, we estimate a TTE
for GATT membership of around 51% and 159% respectively. Having said that, we
should not give much weight to this result since most North countries became GATT
members before 1962 and the only three countries that joined the GATT in our sample
period are Iceland (1968), Switzerland (1966) and Spain (1963). Finally, with regards
to common currencies, the number of common currencies between North countries in
our sample is very limited. These are: UK-Ireland (until 1978), New Zealand-UK (until
1966), and New Zealand-Ireland (until 1966). TTE of common currency on North North
containerisable trade is between 20% (no lags) and 70% (with 2 lags).
The cumulative effect of containerisation is therefore multiple times the effect of the
individual policy variables, around 2-4 times larger in magnitude.
To summarise, by restricting the sample to North North trade, we do not estimate
a significant coefficient for the 1st lead container variable. This serves as a test of strict
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exogeneity. We do not expect a pre-container effect from the narrative and the data
descriptives. This is similarly confirmed by the result. As a result, we are confident
that we estimate a causal effect for containerisation on North-North containerisable
trade. With regards to the magnitude of this effect, the estimated TCE on North
North trade is less than the estimated effect of the container in the entire sample. The
estimated cumulative container effect remains multiple times the cumulative effects of
FTAs, GATT membership, and common currency in the sample of North North trade
- around 2-4 times as large. We turn to North-South and South-South containerisable
trade in the next section.
Table 7.5: Introducing lags and leads of full containerisation: First differenced model
(by ijk); 4-digit SITC product level; North North containerisable trade
(1) (2) (3)
diﬄnvalue diﬄnvalue diﬄnvalue






diﬄead1 0.349∗∗∗ 0.110 0.0989
(0.0263) (0.0801) (0.0757)






diﬄead1rta -0.0509∗∗∗ -0.0259∗ 0.127∗∗∗
(0.00993) (0.0106) (0.0163)






diﬄead1bothgatt 0.369 0.312 0.227
(0.215) (0.212) (0.199)






diﬄead1comcur 0.205∗∗∗ 0.243∗∗∗ 0.204∗∗
(0.0542) (0.0550) (0.0625)
N 481174 346690 263253
R
2 0.117 0.128 0.154
TCE 50% 152% 381%
Standard errors in parentheses
∗
p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
7.5 Lagged Container effects in North-South and South-
South Trade
After investigating the lead and lagged effects of containerisation on North-North con-
tainerisable trade, we move to investigate the same effects on North-South and South-
South trade. Similar to the previous estimations in this chapter, introducing the lead
and lagged independent variables allows us to investigate whether the effects of the con-
tainer are felt some years after bilateral adoption and serve as a test for endogeneity.
171
In table 7.6, we replicate the regressions in table 7.2 for North-South containerisable
trade while in table 7.7, we look at South-South containerisable trade. We consider the
4-digit product disaggregate level.
The results in table 7.6 suggest that North-South containerisable trade was affected
by containerisation more than the average effect in the entire sample and North-North
trade. We estimate large and significant coefficients for the contemporaneous container-
isation variable in all three regressions. Containerisation effects are also persistent 5 and
10 years to 15 years later based on these regressions. TCE effects are very large indeed.
Trade increases 1.5- to 12-fold between North and South due to containerisation. This
result supports the finding in chapter 6 that North South containerisable trade bene-
fited the most from containerisation. In chapter 6, we argue that this result supports the
claim that containerisation allowed and fostered offshoring and the fragmentation of the
production process which resulted in changes in the composition of trade between North
and South. South countries have become major exporters of containerisables especially
manufactures and hi-tech parts and components.
Similar to what we find in the regressions that pertain to the entire sample, the
coefficients of the lead treatment variable in the estimations for North-South trade are
significant and positive. The results from the North-North and the North-South regres-
sions suggest that the latter results may be contaminated with unilateral containerisation
or the use of containers on trucks. Having said that, the coefficients of the lead vari-
ables are very small compared to the contemporaneous effects indicating that any effects
from unilateral containerisation are not large. While one may say that the results found
here provide evidence that containerisation had large effects on North-South trade, one
cannot be as confident here about making causal statements as we did for North-North
trade.
With regards to the other policy variables, there is evidence that FTAs actually lead
to less trade in the North-South sample. The caveat here is that the number of FTAs
in this sample is three 4. The coefficients of the 1st lagged FTA variable in columns 2
and 3 are negative and significant and so is the coefficient of 2nd lagged FTA variable
in column 3.
4The only FTAs between North and South countries in the years 1962-1990 are EC-Algeria, EC-Syria,
and Israel-USA
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GATT membership matters a lot in North-South containerisable trade. Bilateral
GATT membership has a strong contemporaneous effect on trade and this effect persists
10-15 years later. The coefficients of the contemporaneous and lagged GATT variables
are positive and significant in all three regressions. TTE for GATT membership ranges
between 67% and 147%.
Similarly, there is evidence that common currency stimulates North-South container-
isable trade. We estimate positive and significant coefficients for the contemporaneous
and lagged container variables. TTE for common currency ranges between 20% with no
lags and 78% with 2 lags (10-15 years later).
Table 7.6: Introducing lags and leads of full containerisation: First Differenced Model
(by ijk); 4-digit SITC product level; North South containerisable trade
(1) (2) (3)
diﬄnvalue diﬄnvalue diﬄnvalue






diﬄead1 0.136∗∗∗ 0.132∗∗∗ 0.120∗∗∗
(0.0102) (0.0115) (0.0121)






diﬄead1rta 0.0612 0.0851 0.206∗∗∗
(0.0430) (0.0440) (0.0451)






diﬄead1bothgatt 0.115∗∗∗ 0.125∗∗∗ 0.126∗∗∗
(0.0181) (0.0184) (0.0185)






diﬄead1comcur 0.158∗∗∗ 0.0810 0.0775
(0.0341) (0.0524) (0.0662)
N 1028251 810888 704113
R
2 0.122 0.132 0.139
TCE 159% 545% 1200%
Standard errors in parentheses
∗
p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
In table 7.7, we restrict the sample to South-South trade. Containerisation had a
sizeable effect on South South containerisable trade albeit much less than the effects on
North South. The cumulative effect of the container ranges between 105% with no lags
and 271% with 2 lags, i.e. 10 to 15 years after containerisation. The cumulative effect of
containerisation of 271% on containerisable trade of South South trade is smaller than
the cumulative effect estimate in the total sample in table 7.2 (450%), North-North
regressions in table 7.5, and North-South regressions in table 7.6.
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Turning to the lead container variable, the coefficients are positive and significant as
well unlike the North-North estimations. Here too, this suggests that the estimations
may be contaminated by unilateral containerisation. The lead coefficients are much
smaller than the contemporaneous variable coefficients however.
With regards to the effect of signing an FTA on the trade of South South trade, we
notice two main things. The first is that unlike the effects of FTAs on North South trade,
there is some evidence that FTAs in our estimations have a positive effect on South South
containerisable trade by looking at the contemporaneous and lagged coefficients. The
second is that the effects of FTAs in these estimations suffer from severe endogeneity. In
fact, if anything, the magnitude of the coefficients of the lead FTA variables suggest that
causality runs in the opposite direction. This is quite interesting because this suggests
that the likelihood of signing an FTA is very much determined by the volume of trade.
This rather strong feedback from FTAs is not found in this magnitude in tables 1 and
2 or in North North and North South regressions.
There is evidence that bilateral GATT membership has an effect on South South
trade. TTE of GATT memberships on South-South containerisable trade range from
29% in column 1 with no lags to 32% with 1 lag to 15% with 2 lags. However, here too,
we estimate a large pre-GATT effect relative to the contemporaneous effect.
We estimate negative coefficients for some of the contemporaneous and lagged com-
mon currency terms. We need to be careful however about how to interpret these
coefficients. Most currency unions in the sample of South South trade in our time pe-
riod were linked to colonialism. For example, many former British colonies shared a
common currency which is the colonial British pound until they gained independence.
Also, some countries split from a single state. For instance, Pakistan and Bangladesh
split in 1971. So in our sample, there are no common currency unions forming but rather
disintegrating. In table 7.7, The coefficients of the level common currency variable and
its 1st lag are negative and statistically significant at the 5% and 1% levels respectively
in column 2. In column 3, we estimate a negative and statistically significant coefficient
for the 1st lagged term. To interpret this, trade is reduced by the disintegration of
common currency unions, which is something expected.
In conclusion, we estimate positive lead variable coefficients for containerisation
which makes us less confident about making causal statements about the effects of
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Table 7.7: Introducing lags and leads of full containerisation: First Differenced Model
(by ijk); 4-digit Industries; South South containerisable trade
(1) (2) (3)
diﬄnvalue diﬄnvalue diﬄnvalue






diﬄead1 0.248∗∗∗ 0.301∗∗∗ 0.309∗∗∗
(0.0180) (0.0196) (0.0206)






diﬄead1rta 0.0664 1.207∗∗∗ 1.232∗∗∗
(0.103) (0.302) (0.303)






diﬄead1bothgatt 0.118∗∗∗ 0.133∗∗∗ 0.134∗∗∗
(0.0255) (0.0266) (0.0275)






diﬄead1comcur -0.313∗ 0.206 0.771
(0.149) (0.422) (0.538)
N 221785 171793 155174
R
2 0.143 0.152 0.158
TCE 105% 229% 271%
Standard errors in parentheses
∗
p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
containerisation on North-South and South-South container trade. The size of these
coefficients is very small however compared to the contemporaneous variable coefficients
which is suggestive of the direction of causality from containerisation to trade volumes.
The estimations of North-North trade suggest that the lead coefficients in the North-
South and South-South regressions are capturing unilateral containerisation and the
intermodal use of containers on roads.
If we want to comment on the regressions in this section, the results suggest that
containerisation affected North-South containerisable trade the most- more than North-
North and South-South containerisable trade. TCE estimated on North-South con-
tainerisable trade are very large and are estimated around 12-fold 10 to 15 years after
the bilateral adoption of the technology. This supports the claim that containerisation
aided if not allowed the fragmentation of the production process and the expansion of
North South trade in which South countries became major suppliers of manufactures
and containerisables to North countries. The TTE of containerisation on North-South
containerisable trade are at least 10 times the TTE of GATT membership and common
currency. Similarly, containerisation is estimated to have affected South-South con-
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tainerisable trade albeit to a much lesser extend. TCE is estimated around 270% 10-15
years after adoption.
7.6 Plotting Treated Series
After we have estimated the total treatment effects for containerisation on containeris-
able trade, we plot the treated trade series by treatment year. This gives an indication
on how trade developed following treatment - a bilateral adoption of the new technology.
In constructing the series, we aggregate trade observations that are treated by treatment
year. We then normalise the value of trade at the time of treatment to 100 to construct
indices and trace the indices.
In figure 6.1, we notice that the series that were treated in 1967 and 1972 follow
similar paths in which their slopes become steeper 2 or 3 periods after treatment. From
the diagram, it seems that the series treated in 1977, 1982, and 1987 were affected less
than the first series in the time periods after containerisation available to us.
Figure 7.1: Indices of Treated Trade Series
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7.7 Chapter Conclusion
Are the effects of containerisation only contemporaneous or where they felt many years
later?
Our treatment specification from the previous chapter provides us with the oppor-
tunity to introduce lagged and lead terms of the control variables. There are many
advantages to doing so. We are able solve for omitted variable bias if the error term is
correlated with lagged independent variables. We are able to test the claim that con-
tainerisation had long-lasting effects on trade. Finally, we follow Wooldridge (2010) and
use the lead terms to test for strict exogeneity in the effects of containerisation.
The estimates suggest that containerisation does not only have contemporaneous ef-
fects on containerisable trade in the entire sample. Indeed, the effects of containerisation
can be felt 10 to 15 years later. We estimate a total container effect of 165% to 450%
over a period of 10-15 years depending on the level of product disaggregate level. This
effect is 6 to 10 times the TTE of the policy variables FTAs, GATT membership, and
common currency. We also estimate a positive and significant coefficient for the lead
container variable, the magnitude being much smaller than level container variable. We
argue that this lead effect can be either a pre-existing trend, a pre-container effect, or a
sign of weak endogeneity.
We test for a pre-existing trend by introducing a second lead container variable and
we find that the coefficients thereof are very close to the 1st lead variable coefficients
which suggests a pre-existing trend.
We argue that if the first lead variable is picking up a pre-container effect, then it is
likely to be the result of unilateral adoption of the container technology or perhaps the
development of the hub-and-spoke system. The source of any endogeneity is likely to
be measurement error because our container measure does not capture the use of con-
tainers over the road. The narrative suggests that both the pre-container effect as well
as any measurement error are most likely to be non-existent for North countries. We
investigate this by restricting the sample to North-North countries. We find indeed that
the coefficient of the lead container variable is statistically insignificant in the sample
of North-North countries just as one might expect from the narrative. As suggested by
Wooldridge (2010), this is evidence of strict exogeneity and we can be confident about
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making causal statements concerning North-North trade. We estimate that container-
isation had a cumulative effect of around 380% on North-North containerisable trade
over a period of 10-15 years.
Unlike North countries, a pre-container effect as well as measurement error may be
present in the sample of South countries. This is confirmed when we estimate positive
and statistically significant container lead coefficients in North-South and South-South
containerisable trade regressions. The coefficients thereof are however small relative to
the level variables. Therefore, the results for the sample of North-South and South-South
trade are suggestive of a causal effect but we cannot be as confident about making causal
statements. Nevertheless, the regressions suggest that North-South containerisable trade
is affected the most by containerisation, followed by North-North and then South-South
containerisable trade. In all cases, the cumulative treatment effects of containerisation
are multiples of the effects of the individual policy variables - between 2 and 10 times as
large. The large effects estimated for North-South trade can be explained by the change
in the composition of trade in which a clear move towards containerisable products can




This thesis is the first attempt to explore the effects of the container on world trade
in economics. Although there is ample anecdotal evidence on the effects of containeri-
sation on world trade (mainly in the business literature), quantitative and econometric
evidence on the effects of containerisation remains lacking. Besides being the first at-
tempt to quantify the effects of containerisation on international trade, this thesis makes
other contributions to the literature. We collect data from a specialist business publi-
cation on the adoption of the containers between 1966 and 1983 across the world. We
construct a qualitative measure of containerisation that reflects the cross-sectional and
time-series variation in the adoption of the new technology. This is the first measure
of containerisation in the economics literature as far as we know. Also, the nature of
the study and empirical specifications allows for a ”horse race” between technological
change and policy in international trade. The comparison between the two remains a
disputed issue as highlighted by Krugman (1995).
Data on containerisation is extremely scarce. We use data available in Containeri-
sation International Yearbook, a specialist business publication. The container measure
that we construct makes use of information on the adoption of containerisation in ports
and rail. We know that there is a third mode of transport that containerisation affected
which is road. Our data does not include roads. This places limitations on our container
measures and therefore measurement error may be introduced in the data which might
produce some bias in the results. We deal with this in parts of the analysis by focusing
on subsamples where measurement error is minimised. We make use of the narrative
in driving our analysis in this respect. Beside data on containerisation, we make use of
a scientific containerisability classification from 1968 that classifies products as fit for
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shipping in containers or not. Using this classification and the commodity trade data
set of Feenstra et al. (2005), we explore some interesting trends and patterns on the
trade data. We find that before containerisation, containerisable trade was dominated
by basic commodities such as coffee and cotton. After containerisation was largely com-
pleted, the top 20 traded containerisable products are all manufactures, the majority of
which are high-tech manufactures and electronics. When isolating North-South trade,
similar patterns are found. For instance, South countries exported mainly basic com-
modities to North countries such as coffee, copper, tea, cocoa, and copra in 1962. In
1990, the top containerisable traded products exported by South countries are footwear
and electronic micro-circuits. There is therefore a clear shift in the composition of trade
towards advanced and hi-tech manufactures after containerisation was largely adopted
worldwide. The business literature is of the opinion that this shift of the South countries
towards becoming major suppliers of manufactures to North countries was enabled by
the fragmentation of the production process, which in-turn was enabled by the container.
In estimating the effects of containerisation on world trade, we start our investiga-
tion from the gravity model in line with the literature. We initially consider bilateral
aggregate trade outcomes in chapter 5. We attempt different FE specification to pin
down how containerisation should be modelled in this context. We consider annual
data, 5-year intervals, port containerisation, port and rail containerisation, a reduced
gravity equation as well as a first-differenced model. We also address some econometric
problems that are likely to feature in the estimations such as omitted variable bias and
endogeneity. When considering annual data and a traditional gravity equation with
country-pair and year effects, we estimate an effect for port containerisation of around
22% on aggregate trade flows when both the origin and destination countries adopt the
technology in ports in addition to an annual growth rate of around 3% (trend). We also
estimate an additional effect for containerisation by rail on the aggregate trade flows.
The derivation of a structural gravity equation from microeconomic foundations
showed that estimations of the ’traditional’ gravity equation suffer from omitted variable
bias because it ignored multilateral resistances. We control for multilateral resistances
by estimating a ’reduced’ form gravity equation with importer and exporter-time FE.
Containerisation is now measured as a bilateral adoption of the technology and we
choose 5-year intervals to allow the regressions to run and time for adjustment. We also
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estimate a first-differenced model as proposed by Wooldridge (2010). We argue that
the first-differenced model is the least restrictive one. Estimating the reduced gravity
equation as well as the first-differenced model return no results for containerisation on
aggregate trade flows. We find however that full containerisation (port and rail) had a
strong positive effect on the trade in manufactures between 14% and 22%. The results
from the aggregate trade flow regressions may be explained by the fact that not all
products are moved in containers. Also, containerisation may have affected products
differently and aggregation may introduce aggregation bias as suggested by Anderson
(2011). We therefore explore commodity trade flows in chapter 6.
It is perhaps intuitive that not all products are moved in containers. This may
help explain the weak results reached when we consider aggregate trade flows. We use
the product containerisability classification introduced in chapter 4 to identify prod-
ucts that are moved in containers in 1968. We can be confident that products that
are classified as containerisable in 1968 can be moved in containers at the start of the
process and remain so after. We cannot be sure about products that are classified as
non-containerisable however. This is because this group may contain products that may
become containerisable or products whose trade may be affected by containerisation ow-
ing to their parts/intermediate products which are containerisable. As a result, causal
statements are cleaner for products that are classified as containerisable in 1968. Using
the product level trade flows, we identify the effects of containerisation in a treatment
type equation in which the dependent variable is the 1-digit or 4-digit SITC product
trade flows. The identification of the container effects comes from the treatment group
which is the containerisable products trade between two containerising countries. We
first-difference the estimation equation and include importer- and exporter-time as well
as product FE to deal with omitted variables which may bias the estimation. The esti-
mation equation provides us with a way to compare between the effects of the technology
variables and the policy variables: FTAs, GATT membership, and common currencies.
Estimating the treatment first-differenced equation returns strong results for the con-
tainer treatment variable. The treatment effect is estimated to be around 90% for full
containerisation (port and rail) and 70% for port containerisation. The results are ro-
bust to the product disaggregation level. The relatively large effect for the container is
around twice the individual effect of FTAs and GATT membership on containerisable
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trade and up to six times the effect of common currency. We also deal with potential
bias from measurement error by considering North-North trade. The narrative suggests
that measurement error is likely to be minimal in the sample of North countries. There-
fore, a causal relationship is clearer for North-North containerisable trade. We estimate
an effect of full containerisation on this trade of around 28%. The effects are found to
be much higher for North-South and South-South trade, 160% and 100% respectively.
The result is suggestive but a causal statement is less clear in the case of the latter
sub-samples mainly because of potential measurement error.
Finally, in chapter 7, we dealt with an obvious extension which is the dynamic
effects of containerisation. We do so by introducing lagged and lead terms of the control
variables. There are many advantages to doing so. We are able solve for omitted
variable bias if the error term is correlated with lagged independent variables and test
the claim that containerisation had long-lasting effects on trade. Also we can introduce
a lead treatment variable which serves as a test for strict exogeneity in the effects of
containerisation as suggested by Wooldridge (2010).
The estimates suggest that containerisation does not only have contemporaneous
effects on containerisable trade in the entire sample. Indeed, the effects of containeri-
sation can be felt 10 to 15 years later. We estimate a cumulative container treatment
effect of 165% to 450% over a period of 10-15 years depending on the level of product
disaggregate level. This effect is 6 to 10 times the cumulative effects of the policy vari-
ables FTAs, GATT membership, and common currency. We also estimate a positive
and significant coefficient for the lead container variable, the magnitude being much
smaller than level container variable. The lead effect can be a pre-existing trend, a
pre-container effect, or could indicate weak endogeneity. We find evidence that a pre-
existing trend may be present in the data. The narrative provides us a way to test
whether this lead effects constitutes a pre-container effect. A pre-container effect is
likely to be the result of unilateral adoption of the container technology or perhaps the
development of the hub-and-spoke system. Also any source of endogeneity is likely to be
coming from measurement error because our container measure does not capture the use
of containers over the road. The narrative suggests that both the pre-container effect as
well as any measurement error are most likely to be minimal for North countries. We
investigate this by restricting the sample to North-North countries. We find indeed that
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the coefficient of the lead container variable is statistically insignificant in the sample
of North-North countries just as one might expect from the narrative. As suggested by
Wooldridge (2010), this is evidence of strict exogeneity and we can be confident about
making causal statements concerning North-North trade. This also suggests that the
lead effect estimated in the entire sample regressions may be a combination of a trend,
a pre-container effect and measurement error. We estimate that containerisation had a
cumulative effect of around 380% on North-North containerisable trade over a period of
10-15 years.
Looking at cumulative treatment effects in North-South and South-South countries
suggest that North-South containerisable trade is affected the most by containerisation,
followed by North-North and then South-South containerisable trade. In all cases, the
cumulative treatment effects of containerisation are multiples of the effects of the individ-
ual policy variables - between 2 and 10 times as large depending on the policy variable.
The large effects estimated for North-South trade can be explained by the change in the
composition of trade in which a clear move towards containerisable products can be seen
as highlighted in chapter 4. However, we estimate positive and statistically significant
container lead coefficients in North-South and South-South containerisable trade regres-
sions. The coefficients are however small relative to the level variables. Therefore, the
results for the sample of North-South and South-South trade are suggestive of a causal
effect but we cannot be as confident about making causal statements as in North-North
trade.
It is a known fact that the composition of trade between North and South countries
has changed radically since the 1960s and 1970s. As we already mentioned, trade be-
tween the two groups of countries was mainly basic commodities in 1962 but becomes
dominated by manufactures and hi-tech products in 1990. The business literature claims
that this was made possible by containerisation. In chapters 6 and 7, we found evidence
that suggests that containerisation affected North-South trade the most. This suggests
that containerisation may have led to the creation of trade. Future research should
therefore examine in depth this question by exploring the effects of containerisation on
the extensive and intensive margins of trade.
Future research should also look at the welfare effects of containerisation because
the narrative suggests substantial welfare consequences. We only brushed on this in
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chapter 2 in this thesis. We know that containerisation led to the destruction of the
profession of dockers. Entire communities were affected by this such as East London.
Also, manufacturing jobs were affected because containerisation removed the need for
plants to locate near the port. Any research into the welfare effects of containerisation
is very helpful to understand how policy should deal with technological changes that are
likely to have consequences for certain sections of the community.
Other research that looks very promising is the issue of containerisation and just-
in-time manufacturing. It is well-known that the just-in-time manufacturing model
depends heavily on the reliability of container shipping. This is highly suggestive of the
relationship of containerisation and just-in-time manufacturing which in-turn had major
effects on the world economy and consumer welfare in the US and Europe.
One of the messages that one can take from this thesis is surely that the issue of
containerisation and trade is more complicated than just sticking a dummy into a gravity
model and requires an understanding of the historical narrative. We see this clearly in
this thesis. More work is obviously needed to help understand the effects of a major
technological change such as containerisation. This is the first research into the effects
of containerisation. It is certainly not the last word on containerisation and world trade.
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Data and Constructing the
Container Variable
Table A.1: Countries in the entire sample (157 countries)
Afghanistan Dominican Republic Jordan Qatar
Albania Ecuador Kenya Romania
Algeria Egypt Kiribati Rwanda
Angola El Salvador Korea Democratic People’s Republic Samoa
Argentina Equatorial Guinea Korea Republic Saudi Arabia
Asia NES (Bhutan, Brunei) Ethiopia Kuwait Senegal
Australia Falkland Islands Laos Seychelles
Austria Fiji Lebanon Sierra Leone
Bahamas Finland Liberia Singapore
Bahrain East Germany Libya Somalia
Bangladesh West Germany Madagascar South Africa
Barbados Fm USSR Malawi Spain
Belgium-Luxembourg Fm Yugoslavia Malaysia Sri Lanka
Belize French Overseas Departments Mali St.Helena
Benin French Guiana Malta St. Kitts , Nevis -Anguilla
Bermuda France, Monaco Mauritania Saint Pierre and Miquelon
Bolivia Gabon Mauritius Sudan
Brazil Gambia Mexico Suriname
Bulgaria Ghana Mongolia Sweden
Burkina Faso Gibraltar Morocco Switzerland-Liechtenstein
Burundi Greece Mozambique Syria
Cambodia Greenland Myanmar Taiwan
Cameroon Guadeloupe Nepal Tanzania
Canada Guatemala Netherlands Antilles, Aruba Thailand
Central African Republic Guinea Netherlands Togo
Chad Guinea Bissau New Caledonia Trinidad Tobago
Chile Guyana New Zealand Tunisia
China Haiti Nicaragua Turkey
Hong Kong Honduras Niger Uganda
Macao Hungary Nigeria UK
Colombia Iceland Norway United Arab Emirates
Congo India Oman Uruguay
Costa Rica Indonesia Pakistan USA
Cote Divoire Iran Panama Venezuela
Cuba Iraq Papua N. Guinea Viet Nam
Cyprus Ireland Paraguay Zambia
Czechoslovakia Israel Peru Zimbabwe




Table A.2: Countries that containerise between 1966 and 1983 (118 countries)
Algeria Djibouti Ireland Nigeria Thailand
Angola Dominican Republic Israel Norway Togo
Argentina Ecuador Italy Oman Trinidad Tobago
Australia Egypt Jamaica Pakistan Tunisia
Bahamas El Salvador Japan Panama Turkey
Bahrain Ethiopia Jordan Papua N.Guinea UK
Bangladesh Fiji Kenya Peru USA
Barbados Finland Kiribati Philippines United Arab Emirates
Belgium-Luxembourg East Germany Korea Republic Poland Uruguay
Belize West Germany Kuwait Portugal Venezuela
Benin Fm USSR Lebanon Qatar
Bermuda Fm Yugoslavia Liberia Romania
Brazil France, Monaco Libya Samoa
Asia NES (Bhutan, Brunei) Gambia Madagascar Saudi Arabia
Bulgaria Ghana Malaysia Seychelles
Cameroon Gibraltar Malta Sierra Leone
Canada Greece Mauritania Singapore
Chile Guadeloupe Mauritius South Africa
China Guatemala Mexico Spain
Hong Kong Guinea Morocco Sri Lanka
Colombia Haiti Mozambique St. Helena
Congo Honduras Myanmar St. Kitts & Nevis -Anguilla
Costa Rica Iceland Netherlands Antilles & Aruba Sudan
Cote Divoire India Netherlands Sweden
Cyprus Indonesia New Caledonia Syria
Democratic Republic Congo Iran New Zealand Taiwan
Denmark Iraq Nicaragua Tanzania














Korea Democratic People’s Republic
Senegal
Somalia


























Table A.5: Countries with Reported Trade Data for 1984-1990 (63 countries)
Algeria Fm Czechoslovakia Kuwait
Angola Fm Fed Germany Libya
Argentina Fm USSR Saudi Arabia
Australia Fm Yugoslavia Malaysia
Singapore Austria France
Mexico Morocco Belgium-Luxembourg
Greece Netherlands South Africa








Israel Philippines United Kingdom
Denmark Italy Poland
United Arab Emirates Dominican Republic Japan
Portugal USA Ecuador
Qatar Venezuela Finland
Korea Republic Romania Vietnam
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Table A.6: Countries for which containerisation and GDP data are available (127 coun-
tries)
Afghanistan Guinea Seychelles
Algeria GuineaBissau Sierra Leone
Argentina Guyana Singapore
Australia Haiti Somalia
Austria Honduras South Africa
Bahamas Iceland Spain
Bangladesh India Sri Lanka




Bermuda Israel Switzerland Liechtenstein
Bolivia Italy Syria
Brazil Jamaica Taiwan
Burkina Faso Japan Tanzania
Burundi Jordan Thailand
Cambodia Kenya Togo
Cameroon Korea Republic Trinidad Tobago
Canada Kuwait Tunisia
Central African Republic Liberia Turkey
Chad Madagascar United Kingdom
Chile Malawi United States of America
China Malaysia Uganda
China Hong Kong Mali Uruguay
Colombia Malta Venezuela
Congo Mauritania Zambia
Costa Rica Mauritius Zimbabwe
Cote D’ Ivoire Mexico
Cyprus Morocco
Czechoslovakia Mozambique










Former German Federal Republic Panama














Table A.7: Containerisability of products at the SITC Rev 2: Class A Suitable for
Containers
Code Good Description
035 Fish, dried, salted or in brine smoked fish
037 Fish, crustaceans and molluscs, prepared or preserved
042 Rice
046 Meal and flour of wheat and flour of meslin
047 Other cereal meals and flours
048 Cereal preparations & preparations of flour of fruits or vegetables
056 Vegetables, roots & tubers, prepared/preserved, n.e.s.
058 Fruit, preserved, and fruit preparations
061 Sugar and honey
062 Sugar confectionery and other sugar preparations
071 Coffee and coffee substitutes
072 Cocoa
073 Chocolate & other food preptions containing cocoa
074 Tea and mate
075 Spices
081 Feed.stuff for animals (not including unmilled cereals)
091 Margarine and shortening
098 Edible products and preparations n.e.s.
111 Non alcoholic beverages, n.e.s.
112 Alcoholic beverages
121 Tobacco, unmanufactured; tobacco refuse
122 Tobacco manufactured
211 Hides and skins (except furskins), raw
212 Furskins, raw (including astrakhan, caracul, etc.)
222 Oil seeds and oleaginous fruit (excluding flours and meals)
223 Oils seeds and oleaginous fruit, whole or broken (including flours and meals)
23 Crude rubber (including synthetic and reclaimed)
244 Cork, natural, raw & waste (including in blocks/sheets)
25 Pulp and waste paper
26 Textile fibres (except wool tops) and their wastes
277 Natural abrasives, n.e.s (including industrial diamonds)
291 Crude animal materials, n.e.s.
411 Animal oils and fats
423 Fixed vegetable oils, soft, crude, refined/purified
424 Other fixed vegetable oils, fluid or solid, crude
431 Animal & vegetable oils and fats, processed & waxes
53 Dyeing, tanning and colouring materials
54 Medicinal and pharmaceutical products
55 Essential oils & perfume materials; toilet polishing and cleansing preparations
58 Artificial resins, plastic materials, cellulose esters and ethers
59 Chemical materials and products, n.e.s.
61 Leather, leather manufactures, n.e.s. and dressed furskisg
62 Rubber manufactures, n.e.s.
63 Cork and wood manufactures (excluding furniture)
64 Paper, paperboard, articles of paper, paper-pulp/board




667 Pearls, precious& semi-prec.stones, unwork./worked
673 Iron and steel bars, rods, angles, shapes & sections
674 Universals, plates and sheets, of iron or steel
675 Hoop & strip, of iron/steel, hot-rolled/cold-rolled
677 Iron/steel wire, wheth/not coated, but not insulated
678 Tubes, pipes and fittings, of iron or steel
679 Iron & steel castings, forgings & stampings; rough







689 Miscell.non-ferrous base metals employ.in metallgy
692 Metal containers for storage and transport
693 Wire products and fencing grills
694 Nails, screws, nuts, bolts etc.of iron, steel, copper
695 Tools for use in hand or in machines
696 Cutlery
697 Household equipment of base metal, n.e.s.
699 Manufactures of base metal, n.e.s.
71 Power generating machinery and equipment
723 Civil engineering and contractors plant and parts
724 Textile & leather machinery and parts
725 Paper and pulp mill mach., mach for manuf.of paper
726 Printing and bookbinding mach.and parts
727 Food processing machines and parts
728 Mach.& equipment specialized for particular ind.
73 Metalworking machinery
745 Other non-electrical mach.tools, apparatus & parts
749 Non-electric parts and accessories of machines
75 Office machines & automatic data processing equipment
76 Telecommunications & sound recording apparatus
77 Electrical machinery, apparatus & appliances n.e.s.
8 Miscellaneous manufactured articles
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Table A.8: Containerisability of products at the SITC Rev 2: Class B Goods of Limited
Suitability for Containers
Code Good Description
01 Meat and meat preparations
02 Dairy products and birds’ eggs
034 Fish, fresh (live or dead), chilled or frozen
036 Crustaceans and molluscs, fresh, chilled, frozen etc.
054 Vegetables, fresh, chilled, frozen/preserved; roots, tubers
057 Fruit & nuts (not including oil nuts), fresh or dried
248 Wood, simply worked, and railway sleepers of wood
271 Fertilizers, crude
287 Ores and concentrates of base metals, n.e.s.
288 Non-ferrous base metal waste and scrap, n.e.s.
289 Ores & concentrates of precious metals; waste, scrap
292 Crude vegetable materials, n.e.s.
51 Organic chemicals
52 Inorganic chemicals
671 Pig iron, spiegeleisen, sponge iron, iron or steel
691 Structures & parts of struc.; iron, steel, aluminium
Table A.9: Containerisability of products at the SITC Rev 2: Class C Goods Not
Suitable For Containers
Code Good Description
001 Live animals chiefly for food
041 Wheat (including spelt) and meslin, unmilled
043 Barley, unmilled
044 Maize, unmilled
045 Cereals, unmilled (no wheat, rice, barley or maize)
245 Fuel wood (excluding wood waste) and wood charcoal
247 Other wood in the rough or roughly squared
273 Stone, sand and gravel
274 Sulphur and unroasted iron pyrites
278 Other crude minerals
281 Iron ore and concentrates
282 Waste and scrap metal of iron or steel
3 Mineral fuels, lubricants and related materials
56 Fertilizers, manufactured
57 Explosives and pyrotechnic products
661 Lime, cement, and fabricated construction materials
662 Clay construct.materials and refractory constr.mater
663 Mineral manufactures, n.e.s
672 Ingots and other primary forms, of iron or steel
676 Rails and railway track construction material
721 Agricultural machinery and parts
722 Tractors fitted or not with power take-offs, etc.
781 Passenger motor cars, for transport of pass., goods
782 Motor vehicles for transport of goods and materials
783 Road motor vehicles, n.e.s.
785 Motorcycles, motor scooters, invalid carriages
786 Trailers and other vehicles, not motorized
791 Railway vehicles and associated equipment
792 Aircraft and associated equipment and parts
793 Ships, boats and floating structures
9 Commodities and transactions not elsewhere classified
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Appendix B
Econometric Estimation of the
Effects of Containerisation at the
Country Level
Figure B.1: Testing for Serial Correlation in the FE Model
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St.Helena 4370 China MC SAR 3515 Madagascar 2632 Spain 464
Falkland Is 4351 Bahamas 3494 Kenya 2572 Austria 435
St.Pierre Mq 4192 Bolivia 3456 South Africa 2567 Switz.Liecht 298
Greenland 4118 Togo 3431 Saudi Arabia 2555 Sweden 293
Seychelles 4089 Afghanistan 3410 Fm German DR 2522 Denmark 271
Eq.Guinea 4083 Guyana 3391 Trinidad Tbg 2518 USA 242
Rwanda 4071 Uganda 3383 Nigeria 2504 Belgium-Lux 232
Samoa 4061 Mozambique 3316 Neth.Ant.Aru 2496 Fm German FR 209
Belize 4060 Dominican Rp 3310 Chile 2464 Netherlands 193
Djibouti 4047 Bangladesh 3304 Romania 2427 France,Monac 177
Gibraltar 4045 Viet Nam 3291 Tunisia 2422 Italy 168
Mongolia 3994 Korea D P Rp 3279 Fm USSR 2402 Japan 129
Lao P.Dem.R 3967 Liberia 3254 Hungary 2267 UK 103
GuineaBissau 3945 Bahrain 3247 Cote Divoire 2181
Burundi 3942 Libya 3225 Peru 2176
Asia NES 3937 Nicaragua 3202 Iran 2173
Gambia 3929 Jordan 3200 Venezuela 2154
Fr.Guiana 3925 Syria 3197 Taiwan 2132
St.Kt-Nev-An 3878 El Salvador 3195 Poland 2056
Kiribati 3855 Congo 3146 Egypt 2054
Mauritania 3836 Malawi 3131 China 2042
Zimbabwe 3783 Honduras 3121 Czechoslovak 1961
Fiji 3781 Paraguay 3096 Colombia 1911
Chad 3777 Gabon 3075 Indonesia 1866
Untd Arab Em 3756 Zambia 3075 Mexico 1853
Nepal 3725 Dem.Rp.Congo 3060 Turkey 1786
Burkina Faso 3718 Cuba 3057 Sri Lanka 1728
Albania 3713 Myanmar 3028 Philippines 1715
Fr Ind O 3708 Ethiopia 3004 Israel 1576
Papua N.Guin 3704 Jamaica 2982 Morocco 1476
New Calednia 3697 Guatemala 2901 Malaysia 1382
Qatar 3686 Cameroon 2883 Korea Rep. 1380
Sierra Leone 3682 Ghana 2877 Singapore 1307
Guinea 3674 Tanzania 2866 New Zealand 1197
Benin 3667 Costa Rica 2859 Greece 1151
Suriname 3666 Senegal 2832 Fm Yugoslav 1120
Niger 3655 Kuwait 2804 Thailand 1100
Bermuda 3622 Uruguay 2801 Argentina 1095
Cambodia 3616 Iraq 2797 India 958
Mauritius 3616 Panama 2770 Pakistan 954
Somalia 3613 Cyprus 2761 Australia 838
Cent.Afr.Rep 3600 Ecuador 2726 Portugal 786
Angola 3588 Malta 2712 Brazil 711
Guadeloupe 3584 Algeria 2702 Ireland 640
Oman 3583 Lebanon 2693 Finland 630
Haiti 3576 Bulgaria 2685 China HK SAR 532
Barbados 3573 Sudan 2670 Norway 506
Mali 3562 Iceland 2650 Canada 484
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Appendix C
Estimating the Effects of
Containerisation at the Product
Level
Table C.1: Refrigerated 4-digit SITC Products
Code Good Description
0110 Meat, edible meat offals, fresh, chilled or frozen
0111 Meat of bovine animals, fresh, chilled or frozen
0112 Meat of sheep and goats, fresh, chilled or frozen
0113 Meat of swine, fresh, chilled or frozen
0114 Poultry, dead & edible offals except liver, fresh/frozen
0115 Meat of horses, asses, etc., fresh, chilled, frozen
0116 Edible offals of animals in headings 001.1-001.5
0118 Other fresh, chilled, frozen meat or edible offals
0120 Meat & edible offals, salted, in brine, dried/smoked
0121 Bacon, ham & other dried, salted, smoked meat/ swine
0129 Meat & edibleoffals, n.e.s. salt.in brine dried/smok.
0140 Meat & edible offals, prep./pres., fish extracts
0141 Meat extracts and meat juices; fish extracts
0142 Sausages & the like, of meat, meat offal or blood
0149 Other prepared or preserved meat or meat offals
0220 Milk and cream
0222 Milk and cream
0223 Milk & cream, fresh, not concentrated or sweetened
0224 Milk & cream, preserved, concentrated or sweetened
0230 Butter
0240 Cheese and curd
0250 Eggs and yolks, fresh, dried or otherwise preserved
0251 Eggs in shell
0252 Eggs not in shell
0340 Fish, fresh (live or dead), chilled or frozen
0341 Fish, fresh (live/dead) or chilled, excl.fillets
0342 Fish, frozen (excluding fillets)
0343 Fish fillets, fresh or chilled
0344 Fish fillets, frozen
0360 Crustaceans and molluscs, fresh, chilled, frozen etc.
0540 Vegetables, fresh, chilled, frozen/preserved; roots, tubers
0541 Potatoes, fresh or chilled, excluding sweet potatoes
0542 Beans, peas, lentils & other leguminous vegetables
0544 Tomatoes, fresh or chilled
0545 Other fresh or chilled vegetables
0546 Vegetables, frozen or in temporary preservative
0548 Vegetable products, roots & tubers, for human food
0570 Fruit & nuts (not including oil nuts), fresh or dried
0571 Oranges, mandarins, clementines and other citrus
0572 Other citrus fruit, fresh or dried
0573 Bananas, fresh or dried
0574 Apples, fresh
0575 Grapes, fresh or dried
0576 Figs, fresh or dried
0577 Edible nuts (excluding nuts used for the extracting of oil)
0579 Fruit, fresh or dried, n.e.s.
C.1 Estimating a different specification
In chapter 6, we estimated the effects of containerisation through a country-pair time
variant variable (Contijt). However, if we use the classification of the products according
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to their containerisability of 1968, we can develop a potential new measure which is
specific to containerisable products. If we interact the country-pair specific variable
with a containerisability indicator, we get a variable that is specific to containerisable





The treatment group of the newly introduced variable is all containerisable products
that are moved in containers and the control group is all non-containerisable products.
This new product specific variable would then pick up the difference in the effects of
containerisation on containerisable trade versus non-containerisable trade.
Given that the product containerisability classification that we use dates back to
1968, we are not sure whether those products that are defined as non-containerisable
could have become containerisable or their trade were affect by containerisation. This
means that by using those products as the control group is not accurate. The results
from estimating the above equation are hence only suggestive and no causal statements
can be made based on them.
In this specification, we have two container treatment variables, Containerijt and
Contijkt. The first variable is the same one as in equation 5.2. The second one is
country-pair and product specific.
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Table C.2: Effect of Containerisation, 4-digit Product level regressions, 5-year Intervals
and 7 periods; First Difference Model






















Full Cont 0.674*** 1.007*** 0.388*** 0.793***
(0.0076) (0.0113) (0.0174) (0.0220)
full cont(ijk) -0.011 -0.013 -0.027 -0.077***
(0.0068) (0.0090) (0.0196) (0.0210)
FTA 0.339*** 0.089* 0.407*** 0.134*
(0.0082) (0.0348) (0.0088) (0.0595)
Both GATT 0.349*** 0.518*** 0.035 0.243***
(0.0088) (0.0138) (0.0277) (0.0184)
Common Curr 0.134*** 0.179*** 0.108** -0.070
(0.0149) (0.0187) (0.0381) (0.0507)
No. Countries 157 157 22 135
No. Observations 2237820 1306788 633583 284406
overall R2 0.097 0.1121 0.103 0.133


















Port Cont 0.567*** 0.842*** 0.329*** 0.789***
(0.0074) (0.0110) (0.0150) (0.0227)
port cont(ijk) -0.022** -0.028** -0.014 -0.090***
(0.0069) (0.0095) (0.0148) (0.0217)
FTA 0.328*** 0.068* 0.401*** 0.131*
(0.0082) (0.0349) (0.0088) (0.0595)
Both GATT 0.387*** 0.606*** 0.078** 0.243***
(0.0088) (0.0137) (0.0277) (0.0184)
Common Curr 0.134*** 0.176*** 0.110** -0.080
(0.0149) (0.0187) (0.0381) (0.0508)
No. Countries 157 157 22 135
No. Observations 2237820 1306788 633583 284406
overall R2 0.096 0.111 0.103 0.133
FE it,jt,kt it,jt,kt it,jt,kt it,jt,kt
Coefficients marked with *,**,*** denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively.
Table C.3: Effect of Containerisation, 1-digit Product level regressions, 5-year Intervals
and 7 periods; First Difference Model






















Full Cont 0.701*** 1.282*** 0.351*** 0.858***
(0.0232) (0.0419) (0.0828) (0.0477)
full cont(ijk) -0.0133 0.0181 -0.0634 -0.0713
(0.0213) (0.0268) (0.0832) (0.0471)
FTA 0.286*** 0.158 0.318*** 0.347**
(0.0365) (0.111) (0.0365) (0.133)
Both GATT 0.278*** 0.271*** 0.148 0.289***
(0.0242) (0.0468) (0.106) (0.0402)
Common Curr 0.0999 0.192*** 0.360* -0.000
(0.0513) (0.0676) (0.157) (0.104)
No. Countries 157 157 22 135
No. Observations 237106 146062 24342 66702
overall R2 0.108 0.129 0.114 0.129


















Port Cont 0.664*** 0.806*** 0.428*** 0.949***
(0.0233) (0.0359) (0.0681) (0.0494)
port cont(ijk) -0.039 -0.011 -0.237*** -0.112*
(0.0223) (0.0283) (0.0589) (0.0485)
FTA 0.264*** 0.156 0.304*** 0.350**
(0.0365) (0.111) (0.0367) (0.132)
Both GATT 0.289*** 0.344*** 0.170 0.292***
(0.0242) (0.0468) (0.106) (0.0402)
Common Curr 0.099 0.192** 0.364* -0.004
(0.0513) (0.0677) (0.157) (0.104)
No. Countries 157 157 22 135
No. Observations 237106 146062 24342 66702
overall R2 0.107 0.126 0.114 0.1300
FE it,jt,kt it,jt,kt it,jt,kt it,jt,kt
Coefficients marked with *,**,*** denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively.
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